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Abstract 
 
Scholars have proposed and investigated a view of social 
relations as social networks and therefore the role of public policy 
in creating new networks and new social and economic relations. 
Are different incumbent institutional settings a relevant 
variable to explain different regional policies responses to 
Regionalization  and Europeanization? I will address this question 
with regard to the regional policy that was initiated in Italy in 
1950 and that represented the country’s attempt to improve its 
economic and geographic cohesion.  
The hypothesis is that, within a devolution process, different 
adaptation to regionalization and Europeanization pressures are 
correlated to “path dependence” from incumbent institutional 
settings. Specific attention is dedicated to the role of “paradigms” 
in the processes analysed. This, in turn could generate different 
devolution outcomes, in terms of discrepancy between formal and 
effective outcomes. 
Devolution is analysed in terms of institutional change and 
policy (regional policy) change. Institutional change is 
operationalized in terms of changes in polity and administrative 
variables, and policy change is investigated through variables 
representing formal (policy issues, i.e. design and responsibility) 
and effective (financial, i.e. uses and sources) dynamics under the 
two different pressures for change identified: regionalization and 
Europeanization of regional policies. 
The research proposed is pertinent and important in the 
context of European integration where national policies have been 
restructured due to, on the one hand, regionalization—i.e., the 
transfer downward to the sub-national level—of policies formerly 
handled at the national level and, on the other, “Europeanization” 
or the transfer of policies upwards to the European level.  
This thesis investigates the dynamics of the “paradigm and 
policy shift” that took place within Italian regional policy between 
1950 when the policy began and 1992 when the policy was 
officially terminated due to a dual transfer of the policy upward to 
the European level with the co-financing of cohesion policy and the 
transfer downward to the role of the regions as management 
authorities for the operational programmes that were responsible 
for the bulk of Italian regional funds.  
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1. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO 
REGIONALISATION AND EUROPEANIZATION 
 
1.1. The restructuring of national policies 
In 2009 Peter Hall observed that public policies have a number of impacts on their 
target community. First of all, they redistribute resources; secondly, they create 
incentives for, or sanctions against, certain types of behaviour. Thirdly, public policies 
have an impact on the emotional or psychological health of the individual and the 
ability to undertake certain activities. Finally, public policies have a significant effect 
on socio-economic (encompassing social, economic and inter-governmental 
institutional) relations by creating “resources” for resolving problems. Hall goes on to 
cite Robert Putnam’s work (2000 and 1993) on social capital to propose a view of 
social relations as networks and therefore the role of public policy in creating new 
networks and new social and economic relations.  
The research addresses these issues with regard to a policy that was initiated in 
Italy in 1950—the “extra ordinary interventions in Southern Italy”, commonly referred 
to in Italian as the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno or in English as the Fund for the South—
that represented the country’s attempt to alleviate the depressed socio-economic 
conditions in Italy’s eight southern regions. In terms of policy making, the creation of 
the Fund for the South represented the initiation of a regional development policy 
based on an initiative taken at the national level. The Italian government’s centralized 
regional development policy incorporated a clear development paradigm; it created 
dedicated institutions; it brought into existence specific political dynamics to generate 
and access financial resources; it created certain social, economic and political 
expectations on the part of the beneficiaries of the policy; and it nurtured the 
development of a policy community and a particular system of governance linking 
various institutional levels engaged in the decision making and implementation 
procedures associated with the policy. After 1950, a number of reforms were 
introduced that directly or indirectly affected the policy in terms of institutional 
structures and policy responsibilities. Among the reforms that  need to be considered 
in relation to the policy are: 1) introduction of political considerations in the 
management of the policy during the 1950s and 1960s; 2) the shift in the objectives of 
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the policies in the 1960s and 1970s; 3) the creation of a nation-wide regional 
government structure in the 1970s that was given responsibilities in the area of 
regional development by the Constitution and enabling governmental decrees; 4) the 
change during the 1980s of the development paradigm best suited to provide for 
regional growth based on the new paradigm emphasizing the role of small and 
medium enterprise as the motors for diffused forms of socio-economic development; 
5) the introduction of a European regional policy through the initiation of the EU’s 
cohesion policy in 1989; and 6) the abolition in 1992 of the national government’s 
policy of extra-ordinary interventions in Southern Italy.  
According to the logic described in Hall’s 2009 article these changes should have 
affected the networks and socio-economic relations brought into existence at the 
beginning of the 1950s with the initiation of the centralized regional policy and 
generated changes in the interactions and governance of the policy. New actors—in 
this case, the regions and the EU— were incorporated into the incumbent national 
policy during the 1980s and then joined the national government in the 1990s as the 
important actors in the formulation and delivery of regional policy in Italy. As a 
consequence, one would expect the old networks and socio-economic relations to react 
to the paradigm shift and policy changes that took place during the decade by: 1) 
simply ceasing to exist, 2) mutating and adapting to the policy shift, or 3) finding a 
new policy vessel to maintain the existing networks and socio-economic relations. 
These are all issues that need to be addressed if we are to understand not only 
policy making but also its opposite—the un-making of policy-- and how existing 
policy networks, institutions and socio-political-economic relations respond to 
challenges posed by policy change. In this context, the thesis will look at the role that 
the political, economic and social logic of “path dependence” plays in keeping the 
policy networks and social relations alive.  For this purpose it will look at different 
types of literature: from institutionalism to policy making, from regionalism to 
Europeanization and from path dependence to policy/institutional change.  
The reasons why regionalization and Europeanization caused a shift in the 
direction and management of the policy have to be sought in the constitutional basis of 
regional policy making and implementation in Italy and in the declining role of 
national governments in unilaterally deciding economic policy. The thesis will argue 
that regional policy is a fundamental part of economic policy, and therefore any shift 
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in the manner in which economic policy is decided and implemented (e.g., Single 
Market programme) will have an impact on regional policy. 
The context that is important for any analysis is the prevailing paradigm (i.e., 
model) of regional development that is dominant not only in the academic literature 
but also at the policy making level that then guides the choice of institutional 
structures selected to activate a particular policy. In the case of Italian regional policy 
the change took place between a “Fordist” approach (Perroux, 1954; Myrdal, 1957) 
emphasizing the role of industrialization based on the creation of vertical and capital 
intensive industries to an “industrial district” (Piore and Sable, 1984) approach that 
emphasized the role of diffused forms of small and medium sized enterprises in 
achieving economic development. The heart of this thesis is not to try to explain why 
the regional development paradigm shifted. That shift is taken as a given within the 
theoretical and political contexts during the last fifty years. What the thesis  wants to 
concentrate on is the impact of the institutional change with the introduction of 
regional level institutions  that was politically and constitutionally driven during the 
immediate post-war in the Italian political system on national regional policy and the 
emergence of new policy choices during the 1980s and 1990s. The hypothesis of the 
thesis is that this  institutional change  in the final analysis created the basis for 
transforming Italian regional policy; the institutional change also helped the political 
system to acknowledge the failure of the previous national regional policy and the 
need to change it. The change in the development paradigm during the 1980s also 
eased the shift from a centralized regional development policy to a decentralized one 
emphasizing the role of the regions rather than the nation state in achieving regional 
development. Figure 1 presents the logic behind the research and the important 
variables to be analyzed: 
Figure 1: Research approach and intervening variable 
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As Figure 1 illustrates, the research is focused on the role of institutional change in 
promoting policy change, and the change in the prevailing development paradigm 
operates as an intervening variable in facilitating the change in policy.  
The figure also illustrates the fact that, theoretically, in the presence of a paradigm 
shift there may or may not be a parallel change in institutions or policies. This model 
can also be used to analyze the shift in regional policies and modifications in 
institutional structures in other European Union member states that do not possess 
such a constitutional institutional imperative as existed in Italy.  
Figure 2: The paradigm shift in the prevailing regional development paradigm and the 
implications for institutional and policy changes 
 
 
Figure 2  identifies four possible and different outcomes that may arise from the 
change in the prevailing development paradigm and its implications for institutions 
and policies. The first is both an institutional as well as a policy shift to maintain a 
functional balance among the institutional setting, policy requirements and 
development paradigm. The second possible response is that despite the paradigm 
shift there is no institutional or policy change. This combination leads to policy 
stagnation and profound incoherence in the management of the policy and an inability 
to learn how to adapt the regional policy to socio-economic needs. The third and 
fourth solutions provide two interesting possibilities. When policies change and 
institutions do not, the result is the adoption of temporary solutions to the problems of 
policy implementation but these solutions are not “permanent” and exist as long as the 
funding is available. Once the funding dries up, so do the institutions.1  The second 
possible response of where the policy does not change but the institutions do is also 
                                                      
1 An example of this case, can be identified in  the solution found by the Irish government in creating planning 
regions for the remaining areas in Objective 1 when the rest of the country exited during the 2000-2006 planning cycle. 
See Nicholas Rees, Brid Quinn and Bernadette Connaughton, “Ireland’s Pragmatic Adaptation to Regionalization: The 
Mid-West Region”, Regional and Federal Studies, Autumn 2004, pp.379-404 
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inherently unstable due to the fact that the policy is out of alignment with the 
institutions. The most likely outcome is the shift in the policy brought about by the 
political pressure delivered by the institutions to decision-making bodies with the 
power to shift the locus of policy decisions and implementation responsibilities. 
Even if initially the attention of the thesis is focused on institutional change, the 
issue of policy change is also fundamental to the research. As observed by Guy Peters 
(1997) change has not always been adequately dealt with by the literature on 
institutionalism. Instead, this thesis will also look at issues involving: if an important 
public policy is changed, this will not lead automatically to the transformation of the 
policy networks or socio-economic-political relations connected with the policy or 
even the cessation of the flow of resources to the social relations and networks 
responsible in the past for the delivery of the policy and currently no longer in the 
centre of the policy process. In essence, the thesis proposes that in some or even in all 
cases these networks and social relations will resist the policy change and strive to 
survive within a new policy context and maintain the existing social relations and 
policy networks. 
The hypothesis is even more pertinent and important in the context of European 
integration where nation-states and national policies have been restructured due to, on 
the one hand, “Europeanization” or the transfer upwards to the European level and, on 
the other, regionalization—i.e., the transfer downward to the sub-national level—of 
policies formerly handled at the national level. In both cases, as part of the process of 
transferring policies upward or downward, the national policy d has been substantially 
reduced—in terms of the allocation of resources and support of policy networks and 
social relations.  
This aspect of significant policy change has only minimally been treated in the 
Europeanization and regionalization literature. Little consideration is given to how the 
national level responds to the policy transfers in terms of path dependence or policy 
shifts. Keating (2003) has argued that: “Regionalism and European integration have 
posed twin challenges to the nation-state in Western Europe” and have significantly 
changed state behaviour. By developing simultaneously in the post-war era, both 
innovations have had a political and an economic dimension and challenged the role 
and functions of existing national institutional structures, specifically with respect to 
the policy roles of central governments.  The challenge, and the inherent pressure for 
change, is twofold, and as Keating (2003) maintains, there should be “at first glance a 
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contradiction between the two trends”: European integration takes matters to a 
supranational level, while regionalism is concerned with strengthening the sub-
national level.  It will be  argued that  in relation to regional policy there are elements 
of consistency and mutual reinforcement in the two movements, and it is the combined 
impact of these two institutional changes on regional policy that is of importance to 
the dual nature of the regional policy shift. 
 
1.1.1. Regionalisation and regionalism 
With regard to regionalization the thesis makes  an explicit distinction between 
that concept and regionalism. From the  perspective of the thesis, regionalism is a 
broader political phenomenon that has clear policy implications, and it is put into 
motion by both economic and political impulses. Regionalism is characterized by the 
creation of regional institutional structures capable of undertaking policy making and 
implementation in a form that is autonomous from national political and 
administrative considerations. During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s regionalism has 
taken two forms (1) 'top-down regionalism' in the formulation of national regional 
policies that set out to create regional administrative structures to carry out the policy 
and (2) 'bottom-up regionalism' that aimed at the creation of regional political 
institutions capable of undertaking both policy making and implementation. 
In the 1960s, many European states adopted regional development policies as an 
extension of schemes of national and sectoral planning. Economically, these were 
justified in terms of the need to tap under-utilized resources in peripheral and 
declining regions and thereby increase national output. Politically, they served to 
enhance national solidarity and secure support from peripheral regions for the State or 
for the party in power. Such development policies were presented as positive-sum 
games in which all could win, the depressed regions could gain through the transfer of 
resources and the initiation of growth, the advanced regions could gain through larger 
demand for restricted resources, and the national economy was enhanced through the 
creation of additional output and an easing of inflationary pressures. Regional policies 
also helped national governments to economically and politically integrate their 
peripheral territories, strengthen national unity and legitimize the expanding role of 
the State.  
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Gradually, as national governments saw the need to institutionalize regional 
policies and involve regional political and economic leaders in their elaboration and 
implementation, regional development became more politicized. Tensions arose 
between the central, top-down perspective and pressures arising from within regions 
demanding a more direct participation in the decision-making process.2  The tension 
between this indigenous regionalism and State regional policy became more acute in 
the 1970s as central governments, giving increased priority to national 
competitiveness in the global market, found it more difficult to plan their spatial 
economies in a global perspective and therefore began to reduce regional policy 
expenditures. At the same time, though, they became more open to the demand to 
create autonomous regional institutions in response to calls for greater political 
participation on the part of citizens and responding to the demand to bring “power 
closer to the people” and a gradual shift in the development paradigm. By the 1980s 
the efficacy of the old models of top-down territorial development through national 
planning and interventions was being placed into serious question. 
Since the 1970s regions have also become increasingly important as a level of 
government, though the experience varies greatly. In France and Italy, national 
governments established regions slowly over a period of years, proceeding from mere 
consultative organs, to indirectly elected, then directly elected regional councils, and 
then conceding powers and functions to the new regional bodies. National 
governments have over the past three decades conceded more power to sub-national 
governments, but they have done so only reluctantly and as a result of significant 
pressure being applied on the national political and administrative elites. 
In Italy although the creation of a national network of regional government was 
stipulated in the 1948 Italian Constitution, it was not until the beginning of the1970s 
that the “ordinary-status” regions came into being adding fifteen regions to the already 
existing “extraordinary” regions created in the immediate post-war period to ease 
tensions with linguistic and ethnic minorities in the two islands (Sicily and Sardinia) 
and along Italy’s northern border (Val d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli-
Venezia Giulia. In France, the process, started in 1982, and was brought to completion 
with the regional elections of 1986 through the creation of a homogenous national 
                                                      
2 In the conception of institutional change advanced in this thesis what is important is not only the creation of new 
institutions (in this case, regional governments) but the consolidation or institutionalization of this new institutions in 
certain policy areas. In Italy and Spain this institutionalization process was relatively quick. In France regions have had 
more difficulty in becoming the primary institutions involved in regional policy. 
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system of twenty-two regions. In Spain and Belgium the creation of regions and 
autonomous communities are more a response to demands from within the regions 
themselves. In Spain a regional structure was introduced into the 1978 Constitution 
and the seventeen regions came into existence upon the ratification of the Constitution 
but special conditions of autonomy were attributed to the Basque Country, and to the 
Catalonian and Galician nationalities. In Belgium the three regions took a longer time 
to develop into autonomous cultural communities through a series of constitutional 
reforms that in 1990 created a de facto federal system of government. The German 
Basic Law of 1949 provided for a federal system in response to both pre-Prussian 
German local government traditions and to the insistence that a centralized state 
structure be prevented from being created as part of the accord to lift the Allied 
occupation.  In the United Kingdom, a revival of historical pressures from the 
periphery led the Labour Government of 1974-9 to propose elected assemblies in 
Scotland and Wales but opposition in Parliament and a defeat in the Scottish 
referendum brought that experiment to an end. The effort was renewed in 1997, and it 
led to the creation of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. Since then, 
efforts to create regional governments within England have been defeated.  Denmark, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Greece, and Portugal likewise remain centralized, though 
pressures for decentralization exist, reinforced by the process of European integration. 
Portugal did create a system of asymmetrical regionalism with the introduction of 
regional governments in the two island regions--Azores and Madeira—while the 
attempt to create a regional government system in continental Portugal was defeated in 
1998. The other countries cited above have introduced regional administrative bodies 
for the purpose of administrating European Structural Funds that finance the EU’s 
regional development policy. 
In centralized states, without regional political institutions, it is extremely difficult 
for regional interests to articulate their demands outside of the centralized political 
structure or to achieve some form of voice in European policy making. The exception 
to this rule has been provided by the creation of the Committee of Regions in 1993 as 
part of the implementation of the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. In the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty it was established that representation in 
centralized nation-states would be reserved to directly elected local authorities while 
in countries with formal regional governments the region would be represented in the 
Committee. 
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Prior to the creation of the Committee of Regions national governments had 
insisted that participation in European affairs in Brussels represented an aspect of 
foreign policy and therefore remained the exclusive responsibility of central 
government. Prior to 1993 in both Spain and Italy there was a growing tension 
between the regions and the national government over the ability of the regions to be 
represented  in Brussels given that they had direct responsibility since 1989 for 
managing the EU’s regional policy created by the 1986 Single European Act.  What 
emerged after 1989 was a struggle for the control of the regional policy instrument 
among the Commission, member states, and regions with the member states 
conducting a rearguard action to slow down the full implementation of the EU 
regional policy and salvage their own national regional policy prerogatives.  As 
Goldsmith (2003) has suggested, the creation of the European Union, and the 
associated process of economic, political, and social integration that has accompanied 
it, has changed the nature of nation state and sub national politics as it had been 
known for at least two centuries, and Leonardi (2005) argues that the policy with the 
most impact on state-regional relations has been the EU’s regional policy, officially 
referred to as the “cohesion” policy. 
This thesis  will address the processes of regionalization and Europeanization from 
the perspective of (public) policies “as the principal vehicle for a government’s 
action”. The thesis would accept  Hall’s (2009) contention that public policies do not 
simply redistribute resources or enforce specific modes of behaviour but that they also 
restructure social relations and administrative behaviour over time. Therefore, to 
change policy structures and rearrange resource distribution requires time and effort 
due to the need to create new institutions and policy processes and to dismantle the 
previous ones.  Inevitably, the time necessary to put into place the new policy and to 
dismantle the old one may require that the two policies plus their networks and socio-
economic relations co-exist over time even if their approach and interests are 
diametrically opposed to each other. It is also conceivable that the old policy may 
never be abandoned and will continue to survive under the new paradigm due to the 
unacceptable social and political costs associated with its termination, whereas from 
an economic perspective (i.e., in terms of cost and effectiveness) the termination of the 
previous policy and funding only the new policy are the only rational alternatives 
available for policy makers. 
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1.1.2. Europeanization 
Following Redaelli (2003) the thesis  will consider Europeanization as the 
emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance—i.e., of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political 
problem-solving that formalize interactions among the actors—and of policy networks 
specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules. Ladrech (1994) argues that 
Europeanization is an “Incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of 
politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy-making”. Ladrech refers to the 
processes of construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal and informal 
rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, and “ways of doing things”.  This 
definition stresses the importance of change in the logic of political behaviour. 
Europeanization involves the domestic assimilation of EU policy and politics; hence 
the definition refers to processes of institutionalization (Stone Sweet et al. 2001).   
Alongside with Redaelli (2003) the study of Europeanization can be approached 
by pursuing the answers to the questions “what”(i.e. the domains where the changes 
actually take place) and “to what extent”? (i.e. the extent and direction of change). In 
the case of Europeanization there are some policies that are “completely” 
Europeanized in terms of rule making, resource allocation, and management (e.g., 
Single Market, Single Currency, competition and foreign trade) while other policies 
are only “partially” Europeanized, such as transport, environmental protection, 
research and development). Finally, there are some policies that are only “minimally” 
Europeanized due to the fundamental intergovernmental nature of the rules, resources 
and management provisions. Here, we find policies dealing with immigration, justice, 
foreign policy and defence (Leonardi and Nanetti, 2007). The Europeanization of 
public policy can take different forms. In principle, it can affect all of the elements of 
public policy, such as actors, resources, and policy instruments, and theoretical policy 
analysis has produced a number of propositions and hypotheses on the more specific 
question of policy change.  The problem is that casting the discussion of 
Europeanization exclusively in terms of its effects leads to a serious risk of prejudging 
the significance of the EU variables. The emphasis on effects, indeed, should be 
accompanied by a contextualisation of Europeanization and by an explicit treatment of 
causality.  As Redaelli suggests the focus on Europeanization can produce serious 
fallacies when it leads the researcher to adopt a top-down logic in which the only aim 
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is to find out the domestic effects of independent variables defined at the EU level.  In 
this top-down perspective, the problem of domestic policy-makers is all about putting 
into practice—or 'absorbing'—EU policy rather than looking at the other aspects of 
national reactions to the EU policy or how this reaction differs from one policy area to 
another or from one country to another.   
The implication of this approach is that the researcher will trace only one line of 
events in domestic policy rather than looking at how national policy structures react 
and mutate their policies in response to the European stimulus. Drawing upon 
Elmore's (1981) suggestion for bottom-up research, the thesis will look at the 
individual and institutional choices 'that are the hub of the problem to which policy is 
addressed, to the rules, procedures, and structures that have the closest proximity to 
those choices, to the policy instruments available to affect those things' (Elmore 1981). 
It is in the context of domestic choices made 'at the hub of the problem' that one can 
see if and when processes of change play a role in the logic of economic policy 
making, and where the research is located in addressing the role of path dependence in 
guiding the reaction of central governments to pressures for change.  
In terms of substantive change, the academic debate is still open on a number of 
critical issues, such as whether Europeanization is producing substantive convergence 
in institutional structures and behaviour. Current research points to a differential 
Europe response or clustered convergence: with some countries exhibiting similar 
outcomes, while others do not—hence the result of differentiated clusters as reported 
by Börzel and Risse (2000) and Börzel (2001).  
Further research on European policies needs to make a clear distinction between 
policy outcomes and policy processes (Börzel and Risse 2000). In some countries and 
some policy areas, the Europeanization of policy has triggered processes of 
transformation of the state. This thesis  will follow Redaelli’s proposals, according to 
which there is the need “to intensify research at the policy level and to start thinking of 
Europeanization less in substantive terms (i.e. as an end-state) and more in process 
terms”. This research will deal with disentangling the causal links that have produced 
in the institutional and policy settings in Italy’s policy toward the Mezzogiorno as an 
outcome of these pressures. 
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1.2. Regional Policies at the National and European 
Level 
The thesis  will be focussing on regional policy as a case study of policy making 
and un-making because in the Italian experience; it covers a number of the important 
aspects of the more general problems associated with public policies and how these 
policies have changed or mutated in response to both Europeanization and 
regionalisation/regionalism.  
Since the end of the Second World War nation states have been struggling with the 
problem of using public policies to guarantee a measure of equity in the distribution of 
economic development and opportunities, irrespective of social class and territorial 
location. From a territorial perspective, nation states have found it difficult to always 
guarantee an equitable distribution of socio-economic resources to the inhabitants of 
both “core” and “peripheral” areas (Krugman and Venables 1995; Puga 1999). The 
persistent differences between core and peripheral areas also bring into question the 
efficiency of national economic and social policies in resolving the problems of the 
socio-economic groups to be targeted by the policy.  Core areas have been defined in 
the literature as those areas of the nation-state: where there is a high concentration of 
economic activity; where economies of scale predominate; where salaries are 
relatively high; where capital is abundant and available at lower interest rates; where 
the infrastructure grid guarantees swift and easy access to markets; and where the 
dominant political and cultural institutions are located. Peripheral areas are, instead, 
characterized by the opposite characteristics: low level of economic activity, absence 
of economies of scale, low salaries, scarcity of capital and higher interest rates, lack of 
adequate infrastructure, and absence of important political and cultural resources. In 
order to bridge the gap between core and peripheral areas nation-states have tried to 
engage in a number of development schemes, which have attempted to alleviate the 
conditions of the less developed areas. These types of policies have been commonly 
referred to as regional development policies.  
The reason why the term “regional policy” has been used to characterize policies 
attempting to achieve a better socio-economic equilibrium within a country is due to 
the fact that these policies in Italy and elsewhere are focused on specific territorial 
entities—i.e., regions—and normally do not address the entire national territory 
(Meyer 1963; Omahe 1995; Armstrong and Taylor 2000).  If the latter were the case, 
  18 
then it is more common to refer to development policies as “sectoral”—i.e., covering 
various sectors of the national economy such as agriculture, industry or specific 
services—rather than regional in nature. Such sectoral policies are thus implemented 
on a nation-wide basis, irrespective of territorial specificity or in one region vis-à-vis 
another. This definitional distinction between regional and sectoral policies does not 
mean that regional development strategies are devoid of a sectoral component. On the 
contrary, it is common to find in regional development policies an emphasis on the 
development of particular sectors and in particular areas. Therefore, sectoral and 
regional development strategies are not, from a theoretical and practical perspective, 
diametrically opposed. Where they do differ is in the definition of territorial scope and 
concentration. Regional policies are oriented toward the development of specific 
regions or parts of the national territory. Sectoral policies, on the other hand, are 
usually applied on a blanket basis throughout the national territory and their objective 
is to develop specific sectors in the overall national economy. 
An important aspect of regional development policies is associated with the 
institutions responsible for the formulation and implementation of these interventions. 
In this case the relevant institutions and actors are represented by national and sub-
national political and administrative entities operating within elected governmental 
institutions. In the Italian case regional government institutions have been created 
during various phases of the nation’s post-war history, but according to the 1947 
Constitution they were allocated a central role in the implementation of development 
policies (see Articles 117 and 118 of the Italian Constitution).  
However in Italy as well as in other countries, the dictates of the Constitution have 
not always been implemented in an efficient and effective manner by the central state 
and national political leaders. In the immediate post-war period regional development 
policies in France, the UK and Italy were predominantly the responsibility of national 
authorities. To a certain extent national authorities assumed the task of balancing 
levels of territorial development as part of a national political responsibility to 
promote the development of the entire country and to achieve equitable results for all 
citizens. Such an approach was understandable in Italy (and also in the UK and 
France) because regional level institutions did not exist throughout the country: all 
three countries had highly centralized governmental structures and national 
governments were the predominant central actors in the pursuit of equitable social and 
economic outcomes. In Italy it was not possible to allocate the responsibility of 
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regional development policies to regional institutions because the latter simply did not 
exist.3 During the immediate post-war period, regional development policies were 
formulated by the central state authorities for the regions rather than by the regions for 
themselves. The thesis will argue that the centralization of regional development 
policies did not take place only due to the fact that regional government institutions 
did not exist but rather to the fact that the dominant development paradigm 
emphasized the role of central institutions vis-à-vis that of the regions.  This 
predominant post-war paradigm is defined as a “Fordist” one, but it could also have 
been referred to  as the “TVA” paradigm based on the use of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority experience in the U.S. to combine and harness the federal government’s 
commitment to flood control as a mechanism to promote the economic development 
of a particular territory. The TVA example was particularly important in developing 
the Italian approach to regional development while the Fordist industrialization model 
was more generally accepted in Europe as providing the basic rationale for regional 
development policies.   
The Italian case illustrates two important changes over time with regard to the 
development paradigms involved in the formulation and implementation of regional 
policies: the first involves the economic model used to influence the formulation of 
development strategies and the second deals with the institutional structure 
(centralized versus decentralized) used to formulate and implement the chosen policy. 
After 1970, constitutional reforms in Belgium, France, and Spain changed the 
nature of the centralized nation-state. In Italy the introduction of a uniform system of 
regional government in 1970 finally brought to fruition the constitutional clauses that 
had remained dormant for over two decades. In the UK an asymmetrical form of 
devolution—i.e., introducing it in Scotland and Wales but not in other parts of the 
country—was carried out in the latter part of the 1990s.  
A similar form of asymmetrical devolution took place in Portugal with regard to 
the ultra-peripheral regions of the Azores and Madeira following the ratification of the 
new Portuguese Constitution in 1976. Spain also introduced an asymmetrical form of 
decentralization with the creation of three super autonomous regions (Basque Country, 
Catalonia and Galicia) and “ordinary” regions. A decade later Greece introduced a 
                                                      
3 In Italy the twenty regions were created in phases. During the 1946-49 period, four of the “special regions” 
were created in Sicily, Sardinia, Val d’Aosta and Trentino-Alto Adige. In 1964 the other special region was created in 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia. The remaining fifteen “ordinary regions” had to wait until 1970 before they were constituted. 
See .Mossetto 1980, Morgan 1986, Leonardi 1993. 
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decentralization of its central administrative structure in order to accommodate a 
bottom-up regional development strategy financed through the EU Structural Funds. 
However, the Greeks transferred power to the fifty-five district or provincial level 
governments rather than to the thirteen regions administrative regions created to 
manage the Structural Funds. By the 1980s central governments may still have been 
hesitant to create directly elected and strong political institutions at the regional level, 
but the change in the regional development paradigm became a general phenomenon 
in Europe. The predominance of top-down national development policies had been 
substituted by a bottom-up, regional focus in regional development policies. 
The original 1975 EC regional policy began with a faltering attempt to encourage 
a co-ordination between the national and European levels where the main focus of 
decision-making and implementation lay with the national level. Member states were 
required to supply the EC with annual information and statistical summaries of their 
own regional policies and of the use to which EC money was being put within the 
boundaries.  The 1979 reforms provided a major boost to coordination by introducing 
programme assistance, which by its very nature required the parties involved, notably 
the EC and member-state governments, to act together in a carefully planned manner. 
The 1984 reforms continued to strengthen the programme approach. The 1988 reforms 
finally provided regions with the opportunity to play a role at the European level. 
Prior to the initiation of the cohesion policy in 1989 the Community had shown a 
marked indifference towards the regions. Their involvement in the implementation of 
regional policies was minimal. The role of regions was treated as a wholly domestic 
matter. In Italy, for instance, given that central government prevented the regions from 
having direct relations with the Community, the result was that the regions had no 
clear perception of Community policies even though they were directly affected by 
them, and showed indifference to their goals and requirements. The existing EU 
regional policy owes many of its features to a major set of reforms introduced in 1989 
as part of the single market process. The 1989 reforms marked the most significant set 
of changes to EU regional policy since its inception in 1975. More recent (1993, 1999 
and 2005) revisions essentially represent a fine-tuning of the 1989 policy. 
What was significant in the new approach to regional policy introduced by the 
Community during the last half of the 1980s was the radical departure from the 
existing structure of national regional policies. The first element of innovation was the 
change in development paradigm upon which the policy was based. The component 
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elements of the new paradigm used to base Community regional policies is presented 
in Table 1.1 on the basis of an original scheme developed by Bachtler (2001) to 
illustrate the different approaches to European regional policies with regard to 
conceptual basis and subsequently to the characteristics of the policy, the structures 
necessary to administer the policy, the organization of the interventions, and the 
evaluation of the results.4 
The change begins with the shift from the abandonment of the industrial location 
theories where the key factors were represented by production costs, skills and 
quantity of workers, cost of land, and the availability of capital to the theories of the 
“learning region” where the essential elements are represented by the existence of an 
innovative milieu, production clusters and interactive networks linking producers, 
distributors and consumers. Once the theory is radically changed, it is obvious that the 
policy characteristics and structures have to be shifted from the emphasis of narrow 
sectoral objectives to broader multi-sectoral ones where the approach is based on a 
programme (i.e., not just projects but integrated, multi-sectoral plans) and the 
objectives are to improve the region’s overall competitiveness in national and world 
markets.  
Crucial in this shift has been the creation of political and administrative 
institutions at the sub-national level capable of assuming the responsibility of 
activating the new decentralized paradigm. Once the institutions are present it is 
possible to engage in bottom-up planning, the mobilization of local government and 
socio-economic forces, and the formulation of multi-year programmes. Finally, the 
shift in paradigm has also made it possible to place emphasis on the measurement of 
both the outputs and outcomes of the policies being pursued and enhance the diffused 
“ownership” of the regional policy by the various components in the regional society. 
In the following table, as well as throughout the text,  the centralized paradigm 
will be referred to as the “Fordist” model of industrial development. Otherwise, the 
decentralized model  is represented by the industrial districts. 
                                                      
4 The author has made some significant changes to the original Bachtler formulation of the table in order to more 
accurately reflect the essential characteristics of the shift in the Italian development paradigms.  
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Table 1.1 The “paradigm shift” in European Regional Policies  
 
Source. Author’s adaptation from Bachtler 2001, p.10 
 
The immediate implications of this paradigm shift became evident when the 
Community launched the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) as part of the 
policy response to the entry into the Community of Portugal and Spain in 1986. What 
the Community produced as a policy in 1986 was a preview of the policy approach it 
was to introduce in 1989 as part of its new cohesion policy that would be applied 
throughout the Community. 
For Italy the IMPs produced a revolution. Not only was there a significant increase 
in Community funds for development programmes but there was also a radical change 
in the role of the regions in the development process. The manner in which the regions 
adapted to the IMPs provides a clear indication of the difference in approach that 
existed between the regions in the south benefiting from the national regional policy 
and the rest that did not (i.e., the regions located in the centre and north of the 
country). 
Criteria Decentralized
CONCEPTUAL BASIS 
Learning region theories Key factors are 
regional capabilities eg. innovative 
milieux, clusters, networks 
POLICY CHARACTERISTICS 
Aim(s) Equity and efficiency 
Objectives Increased competitiveness (eg. 
entrepreneurship, innovation, skills) 
Sphere of action Broad (multi-sectoral) 
Mode of operation Pro-active, planned, strategic 
POLICY STRUCTURE 
Spatial focus All regions 
Analytical base Regional SWOT analysis 
Key instrument Development programme 
Assistance Business environment 
Soft infrastructure 
ORGANISATION 
Policy development Collective/negotiated 
Lead organisation Regional authorities 
Partners Local government Voluntary sector, 
Social partners Administration Complex/bureaucratic 
Project selection Participative 
Timescale Multi-annual planning periods 
EVALUATION 
Stage(s) Ex ante, interim, ex post 
Outcomes Difficult to measure 
Centralized
Industrial location theories Key factors 
are regional attributes eg. production 
costs, availability of workers 
Measurable 
Equity or  efficiency 
Reactive, project based 
Narrow (economic/industrial) 
Employment creation Increased 
investment 
Internalised 
Open-ended 
Ex post 
Top down/centralised 
Central government 
None 
Simple/rational 
Incentive scheme 
Business aid 
Hard infrastructure 
Problem areas 
Regional economic indicators 
 The Changing Paradigm of Regional Policy 
  23 
For the southern regions the IMPs represented the introduction of a parallel 
regional development policy to the one already financed by the national government. 
What was different with the IMPs was that the responsibility for implementation was 
transferred directly to the regions. The national government’s role was reduced to a 
minimum and it was restricted to a light form of coordination. The results showed that 
the Italian regions demonstrated widely divergent administrative capacities and ability 
to adapt to the new policy originating at the European level. According to a report 
from the Italian Senate Committee on EC Affairs, by 31 December 1989 Italy had 
spent 40 per cent of the sums available vis-à-vis the 82 per cent for Greece and 73 per 
cent for France.  The lowest levels of expenditure were registered in the southern 
regions, with the exception of Molise. The widest gap in expenditure levels was 
registered between the 97 per cent spent of the funds allocated so far by Emilia-
Romagna in the north-central part of the country and the 7 per cent spent in the case of 
Campania where Naples is the regional capital. By 31 December 1990 a slight 
improvement had taken place, but the southern regions accomplished not much. Of the 
new funds made available 72.5 per cent had been allocated in Tuscany but only 4 per 
cent in Sicily. However, the Report of the Senate Committee on EC Affairs noted that 
southern regions had other ways of financing regional development policies aside 
from the IMP programmes. In addition, regional level authorities were not used to 
directly managing development policies because of the centralized nature of Italian 
regional policy. In other words, the southern regions did not have the properly trained 
staff or efficient offices to implement their individual programmes. They, instead, 
depended on the central state to undertake both the responsibilities of planning and 
implementation of development policies.  
According to the model in Figure 1 there were  different regional responses to the 
EU’s IMP policy. In the centre-northern regions that did not have any previous 
experience with the national regional policy, the ability to accept and implement the 
EU policy went smoothly, thereby creating what is  defined as a “functional balance” 
as referred to above in Figure 2 between policies and institutions. In contrast, in the 
southern regions the new policy was not followed by an adequate transformation of 
the institutional management structures. Therefore, the institutional response (or lack 
thereof) led to a blockage of the policy and the search for temporary ad hoc solutions.  
The difficulties of implementing the Community's regional policies in the 
disadvantaged regions of the south were a further symptom of the role played in the 
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past by the national government and the difficulty in shifting policy making and 
especially implementation in a new decentralized direction where a centralised 
structure and procedure was already in place. In this case, the southern Italian regions 
that were benefiting from the national regional policy basically ignored a European 
policy providing substantial financial resources for regional development projects. In 
the case of the southern regions there was a basic differentiation between the 
requirements for implementation required by the European policy that could not be 
met by the existing norms and procedures at both the regional and national levels. 
Therefore, the response to the new policy was non-implementation and non-
compliance with the new regulations.5 
 
  
                                                      
5 See Leonardi (2005) for a discussion of basic reactions to new policies originating at the 
European level. Resistance to the new policy may be much more rational from the national or 
regional perspective rather than compliance. 
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2. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Definitions and timeframe  
2.1.1. Definition of terms 
The term “decentralisation” is used to refer to the overall goal of the diffusion of 
responsibility for policies among different levels of government. In the Italian case 
this goal is clearly spelled out in Article 14 of the Italian Constitution, and in the case 
of Italy this goal has required the fulfilment of numerous objectives of institutional 
change – political institutions, relationships among political forces, integration of 
economic actors, links with civil society and styles of management in the 
implementation of public policies.  Decentralization, in turn, is achieved through 
processes of devolution. Devolution is defined as the transfer of decision making 
powers and responsibility for implementation from the national to sub-national 
institutions. In other words, devolution refers to the change in the distribution of 
administrative, political and financial decision making power in favour of the regions 
as defined by the national constitution. 
The decentralization of power from central to regional government has been much 
discussed in recent years as part of the debate on institutional reform and the impact of 
the European Community on member states. The analysis carried out by Leonardi 
(1993) shows that decentralization of unitary states is not a “linear” process that 
develops over time in an even manner through a clear qualitative leap from one system 
of institutions to another.  On the contrary, “the implementation of regional reform in 
Italy took place (and it is still taking place) in “cycles” characterized by periods of 
rapid change that are followed by moments of retrenchment and stagnation” (Leonardi 
1993).  For the purposes of this research it is useful to distinguish two concepts, 
related to the process of decentralization: devolution of authority from the central 
government to sub-national units, and the devolution of effective entitlement for 
utilizing that authority by the newly independent units. Such a distinction acquires 
relevance in the Italian context where “uniformly delegated powers might be utilized 
with widely varying degrees of success in different regions” (Leonardi 1993).  
Accordingly the thesis  identifies two autonomous processes: formal and effective 
devolution in the specific case of regional development policies. 
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Formal devolution is defined as the complex of administrative and juridical acts 
and Laws that have been promulgated in order to devolve the responsibility of 
designing and implementing regional development polices to regional governments. 
Effective devolution, instead, is defined as the process of administrative acts and 
public finance settings that progressive entitle regional governments to implement the 
policies it has designed, with a high level of autonomy in the management of the 
necessary financial resources. 
Regional development policies are defined as the different types of public 
interventions in various sectors (productive activities, infrastructures, professional 
education, aid to industry, etc) that have been implemented in the pursuit of improving 
the living conditions and economic performance in a particular geographic area of the 
national territory (Mossetto 1980)6.   
The research will investigate the evolution of regional development policies in 
Southern Italy with specific attention to the institutions involved in designing and 
implementing the policies.  The changes in the relations between central and regional 
governments will be investigated in order to identify what has been the impact of the 
devolution of power between institutional levels in the economic performance.   
The research will address the process of institutional change, in terms of changes 
in the relation between central and regional governments and the economic 
convergence path in the Italian Mezzogiorno.  With respect of this research, central 
government is the centralized administration of the State; regional government is the 
regional administrative unit.  The regional governments considered in the research are 
the eight regional administrative units present in Southern Italy by 1970: Abruzzo, 
Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise, Puglia, Sicily, and Sardinia.  
Regional development policies are intended to represent  the different types of 
public intervention in various sectors (productive activities, infrastructures, etc) that 
have been implemented in pursue of improving living conditions and economic 
performance at regional level.   
The decentralization of power from central to regional government has been much 
discussed in recent years as part of the debate on institutional reform and the impact of 
the European Community on member states. The analysis carried out by Leonardi 
(1993) shows that decentralization of unitary states is not a “linear” process that 
                                                      
6 Mossetto G. 1980, provides a relevant conceptual framework for the Italian case (p.11-27) 
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develops over time in an even manner through a clean qualitative leap from one 
system of institutions to another.  On the contrary, “the implementation of regional 
reform in Italy took place (and it is still taking place) in “cycles” characterized by 
periods of rapid change that are followed by moments of retrenchment and stagnation” 
(Leonardi 1993). 
The term “decentralisation” is used to mean the overall ideal or goal to be pursued 
in the restructuring of the state apparatus, the concept of the Article 14 of the Italian 
Constitution, which states ‘the Republic is divided in regions, provinces, and 
communes’. The implementation of the goal of decentralization requires the fulfilment 
of numerous objectives of institutional change – political institutions, relations among 
political forces, integration of economic actors.  Instead, devolution is defined as the 
transfer of constitutional, exclusive powers to the regional level of government as one 
of the specific objectives which is central to the process of decentralization.  
Devolution refers to the change in the distribution of administrative, political and 
financial decision making power in favour of the regions as defined by the national 
constitution. 
For the purposes of this research it is useful to distinguish two concepts, related to 
the process of decentralization: devolution of authority from the centre to sub-national 
units, and the effective utilization of that authority by the newly independent units. 
Such a distinction acquires relevance in the Italian context where “uniformly 
delegated powers might be utilized with widely varying degrees of success in different 
regions” (Leonardi 1993). 
 
2.1.2. Hypotheses and timeframe 
Devolution is analysed in terms of institutional change and policy (regional 
policy) change. Institutional change is operationalized in terms of changes in polity 
and administrative variables, and policy change is investigated through variables 
representing formal (policy issues, i.e. design and responsibility) and effective 
(financial, i.e. uses and sources) dynamics under the two different pressures for 
change identified: regionalization and Europeanization of regional policies. 
The hypothesis to be tested by the thesis is that, within a devolution process, 
different adaptation to regionalization and Europeanization pressures are correlated to 
and affected by a process of “path dependence” that is derived from pre-existing  
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institutional settings and procedures. This, in turn can generate different devolution 
outcomes, in terms of discrepancy between formal and effective outcomes (as 
described in Figure 2 in previous Chapter). 
 
The period covered by this study is from 1950 to 2000.  Three sub-periods have 
been identified and are illustrated in following table.  The milestones have been 
identified concerning Institutional changes and Regional Development Polices: 
Table 2.1  Time framework for decentralization process in Italy 
 Institutional milestones Regional Development Polices 
milestones 
First Phase (1950-65)  1948 Italian Constitution sets out five 
“special statute regions (two in the 
Mezzogiorno) 
 Law 646/1950 Institution of the 
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno 
(Casmez) 
 
Second Phase (1965-86)  Law 281/70 and Law 775/70 reformed the 
relations between Central and Regional 
governments. 
 Creation of the first 15 “ordinary regions. 
 Law 717/65 Political control over 
Casmez 
Third Phase (1986-
2000) 
 Law 59/97 devolved to the Regions large 
part of administrative competences 
 Law 64/86 End of the Cassa per 
il Mezzogiorno and creation of 
Agensud.  
 
What is meant by paradigm shift is illustrated in Table 2.2.  As suggested, this 
research is interested in looking at three components of the paradigm shift affecting 
Italian regional policies during the period when the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno had a 
monopoly on the formulation of regional policies for Italy’s less developed areas and 
in the period (i.e., 1992) subsequent to the demise of the Cassa and the Ministry for 
Extraordinary Interventions in the South.  The following table summarizes the main 
aspects of this process. 
Table 2.2  Paradigm shift in Regional Italian regional policies 
 Economic model Institutional model Management model 
Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno (until 
1992) 
 Top down approach 
 Induced growth and growth 
poles 
 Industrialization 
 Large industries 
 Centralized planning 
and implementation; 
 No interaction with 
regions and social 
partners; 
 
 
 Mono-level  
 All interactions at 
national level 
“European policies” 
(after 1992) 
 Bottom up approach 
 Networking 
 Industrial districts 
 Decentralized planning 
and implementation; 
 Regions main 
development actors; 
 Involvement of sub-
regional institutional 
actors and social 
partners 
 Multi-level 
 Interaction at various 
levels (EU, national, 
regional) 
Source: Developed by the author 
 
  29 
The first is the change in economic model used to justify the theoretical basis of 
the policy. In the Italian case this change went from the emphasis on a top-down 
approach to industrialization concentrated in growth poles to a diffused model of 
industrialization based on the network patterns one finds in industrial districts. 
Industrial firms operating under the latter scenario are small and medium enterprises 
where the economies of scale are external to the firm and internal to the industrial 
district.  
The second change is characterized by the institutional structure employed to 
make and implement regional policies. In the period when the Cassa was dominant the 
institutional structure was highly concentrated at the national level and there were no 
provisions for the participation of regions or social partners in any of the phases of 
decision making and policy making relating to regional policies. After 1992 the 
predominance of the national level was substituted by the central role played by the 
regions as promoters and managers of development policies. 
The final shift that is of relevance to my study is the shift from a mono to a multi-
level model used to manage regional policies. During the days of the Cassa, only one 
level—that Cassa and elements of the national government—were given relevant roles 
in the determination of regional policies, and the creation of sub-national offices or 
interactions with the regions were not considered relevant for the conduct of regional 
policies. After 1992 there was a formal as well as practical acceptance of a multi-level 
model of governance for regional policy involving the European, national and regional 
levels.  After 2000 emphasis was also given to the involvement of sub-regional 
institutional actors, such as cities (comuni) and provinces. 
The thesis  will argue that the differentiation in degrees of decentralization in 
specific aspects of governance is strongly related to interaction of the relevant actors 
in the process of decentralization itself.  More specifically, the design and 
implementation of an effective decentralized form of government is subject to specific 
conditions related to the process itself (coherence among administrative and financial 
aspects of decentralization) and the entry and evolution of incumbent and new actors 
in the process of political and institutional bargaining related to institutional change.   
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2.2. Rationale for the research and Research Question 
2.2.1. Rationale for Research 
The core issue addressed by this research is the institutional determinants of 
differentiated regional economic performances in the Italian Mezzogiorno.  For a large 
part of the period examined (1950-2000), Italian regional development policy was 
central government-led; and the differences between the expected results and the 
observable outcomes do not seem to be related to different policy approaches or 
capacity to implement a policy once it has been decided.  One of the possible 
determinants is the structure of relations between the Centre (i.e., the national level) 
and the Periphery (i.e., the regional level).  The aim of the research is to identify to 
what extent institutional changes (i.e. the evolution in Central and regional 
government relations in the period before the implementation of Structural Funds) 
have affected the implementation of recent regional development policies and the 
economic performance of the regions. 
Recent research results highlight two key facts that underlie the “scepticism” 
(Rodriguez Pose- Fratesi, 2002) on the effectiveness of European development 
policies. The first is the generalized failure in Italy of Objective 1 regions to rise above 
the threshold of assistance.7 Although vested interests in remaining below the 
threshold may have played a part in the lack of convergence, only Abruzzo and Molise 
among the original eight 1989 Objective 1 regions have managed to come out of the 
Objective in Italy before 2000. The second is a lack of convergence vis-a-vis the 
North since the reform of the Structural Funds. (See also Cheshire and Magrini 2000). 
Other European countries have faced different growth paths in absolute as well as in 
relative terms.  
The analysis of the evolution of European regional disparities since 1989 
highlights the existence of convergence at the European level but the absence of 
convergence within countries. In order to assess the scope and relevance of the present 
research, the following paragraphs briefly present the results of the preliminary inter-
country analysis. This preliminary analysis has the aim of highlights the specificities 
of the Italian case, and making the case for a more in depth analysis of the Italian 
Mezzogiorno’s economics and institutions. 
                                                      
7 Of the original eight Objective 1 regions in 2007 that figure was reduced by half. In the rest of the EU the number of 
formerly Objective 1 regions was reduced by even larger margins. 
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The general trend of the four countries of the European Union with the largest 
number of Objective 1 regions (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) is toward a greater 
divergence or a steady state of convergence/divergence levels. The greatest increase in 
disparities takes place in Spain, where the standard deviation in GDP per capita grows 
by 15,7% between 1988 and 1999, followed by Greece and Italy with an increase of 
11,7% and 1,8% respectively (Rodriguez-Pose 2002).8 
The following graphs show how the ratio between GDP per capita in the country 
and regions and the GDP per capita at UE15 level varies steady across time and 
countries. The graphs highlights the ratio between: the member country (Country) and 
the EU average, the less developed region within Objective 1 of each country 
(Country_Ob1min); and the most developed region within Objective 1 of each country 
(Country_Ob1max).  
 
 
Source: Author’s elaborations on Eurostat data 
 
Italy does not show an upward trend, as the other countries which are slowly 
reducing the gap at the European level in terms of GDP per capita. Conversely the 
2000 value of regional GDP per capita over European average is very close to the 
figure estimated in 1989.  
Recent studies, based on sigma and beta convergence, have shown that the overall 
convergence process in the years 1988-1999 is the result of two different dynamics. 
Sigma convergence is a reduction in the dispersion of per capita incomes over time,  
                                                      
8 The objective of the cohesion policy was never to reduce disparities within countries but within the EU as a whole. 
Based on this parameter the amount of convergence within European regions has been substantial (Leonardi, 2005). 
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Beta-convergence, estimated in relation with regions initial conditions and rate of 
growth of GDP per capita, is present when less developed economies are growing 
faster that developed ones. 
On the one hand, Objective 1 regions are showing a strong convergence path; on 
the other, Non Objective 1 regions are moving extremely slowly towards EU average.  
This trend seems to be not homogeneously present in Italy as it appears in the other 
four countries. 
Specifically, the hypothesis is that the experience with previous national regional 
policies affects the choices made in decision making and implementation strategies 
developed to take advantage of Structural Funds, in terms of co-ordination between 
Central Government and Regional development policies.  Supporting this 
interpretation, the institutional setting of three of the four countries cited above have 
been investigated. Spain is based on the unitary system of regional autonomy based on 
17 constituent regions. The tensions between central government and regional powers 
are mainly concentrated around the definition of central-regional powers, reform of 
the central administration, distribution of financial resources and lack of coordination 
(Leonardi 1993). After the 1989 reforms of the structural funds, the Spanish regions 
began to participate in policy formulation.  Greece has no previous tradition of 
devolution of powers or responsibilities to regional authorities. The institutional 
structure is hierarchical and the centralized governmental structure has been managing 
the regional development policies process through the administrative regions created 
initially in 1986 to implement the IMP programmes. The political administrative units 
(communes and villages) were too small to contribute to the regional planning 
process, but the creation of the nomoi (similar to provinces in other European 
countries) in 1993 has begun to provide an intermediate level of governmental power 
capable of participation in the structuring of regional priorities and aiding in the 
implementation of the programmes (Leonardi 1993).  From the perspective of the 
Structural Funds, the Greek system is predominantly controlled by a regional 
administrative structure that basically reflects a top-down process which has de facto 
remained a Central Government responsibility. 
Italy and Spain are considered as the most comparable cases in terms of an early 
devolution of policy-making powers to regions concerning regional development. 
According to this perspective, a comparison in terms of economic performance of the 
regions has been conducted between Italy and Spain.  The latter appears to perform 
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consistently better that the former, as higher growth rates are spread over the entire 
national territory.  This trend emerges from the graphs presented above, as well as in 
the following map (Second Social and Economic Cohesion Report, EC 2002) that 
describes this dynamic in the period between 1995 and 2000.  
Source: Second Social and Economic Cohesion Report, 2002 
 
The Spanish devolution process has produced overall unambiguous outcomes, 
providing elements of validation for “new growth theories” hypotheses that consider 
regional administration autonomy as one of the determinants of regional growth 
potential. Southern Italy’s economic performance, although has been subject to a 
similar devolution process, has not provided uniform regional economic performance. 
Moreover, regions with enhanced regional government autonomy have not shown 
homogeneous convergence paths. 
Given that the institutional settings have been similar before (regionalized 
countries) and after 1989 (EU regulation), the implementation of such institutional 
changes in Italy (i.e. the difference between formal and effective devolution) may be a 
determinant of the different regional outcomes, not only between the two countries, 
but among Southern Italy regions.   
 
2.2.2. Preliminary findings 
The starting point of the research relies in the empirical evidence of a lack of 
homogeneous convergence among regions within the same State, and of regions 
within Southern Italy in the specific.  The interest for this topic has been recently 
renewed, linked to the appearance of new contributions on economic growth 
(endogenous growth) in contrast to the more conventional neoclassic models. The 
debate has been centred not only on the capacity of both approaches to clarify the 
forces and the factors explaining economic growth, but also on the trends toward 
convergence or divergence. 
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In the European case, the results, obtained in different researches, varies 
significantly. On the one hand most of the neo-classical analyses tend to show a 
certain global predominance of economic convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin; Sala-
i-Martin among others) on the other this trend is widely debated (Armstrong; Dunford; 
Rodriguez-Pose; Cuadrado-Roura; Magrini and others).  Some caveats have to be 
raised in considering different interpretations. Factors that affect the analysis are both 
empirical (different initial conditions, number of regions, period of the analysis) and 
methodological (choice of the relevant variables-GDP per capita or PPS).  According 
to Cuadrado-Roura (2001) it is possible to identify three periods that have shown 
specific characteristics in the European convergence path: from 1960 to mid-1970 the 
prevailing process is convergence; form mid- seventies the economic convergence 
process slow down up to the mid-eighties, from the end of eighties the convergence 
process shows different paths and different speeds between regions. 
The difference in convergence path has moved the academic research focus toward 
the impact of regional development policies and public spending on economic growth.  
Scepticism has been raised with respect to European regional development policies, as 
they failed to achieve relevant results in reducing regional disparities.  Regional 
polices are affected by countervailing effects due to dynamics explained by “new 
growth theories” and industrial localisation theories.  Moreover, regional policies have 
been leading to an unbalanced and inefficient allocation of public spending that, in 
turn, has affected the regional growth potential. 
Within this framework, the results presented by Leonardi (1995, 2003), show that 
there is some evidence for arguing that regional development may be strongly 
promoted by regional government activity. The strongest regions in Europe have the 
most developed regional institutions, and, conversely, the weakest regions have the 
regional governments with formal power only.  Analyses, carried out on behalf of the 
European Commission, suggest that central government policies have been less 
successful in mobilizing resources in the pursuit of economic and social development, 
than more decentralized states.  These results seem to confirm the relevance of 
“endogenous” growth factors. Under such approach, the role of an effectively 
autonomous regional government is central as regional governments are in the best 
position to foster the creation and the diffusion of regional growth factors.  
The evolution of Italian institutional change, i.e. devolution process, may be 
described, following Cassese (Sharpe 1993) “as a process of growing interdependence 
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between the centre and the periphery”. The 1948 constitution referred to the principle 
of separation between state and regional administration, each level of government was 
to have a separate, independent responsibility. This separation was intended to ensure 
regional autonomy and to prevent interference and conditioning by the centre.  The 
regions were assigned only policy sectors and matters considered at the time to be of 
minor importance.  However, the law enforcing the regional clause of the constitution 
have followed different principles, and have established the division of responsibilities 
in such a way as to abandon the separation principle completely (Sharpe 1993).  The 
initial transfer of responsibilities to the regions in early 1970s was restricted in two 
different ways. First, functions were assigned only partly to the regions and partly to 
the state, so that each task required the joint intervention of the two bodies.  Secondly, 
financial responsibilities had been centralized by the means of a tax reform (Cassese 
1993).  Regional financing was therefore derived from state allocations and transfers, 
the regions thus became partly responsible for spending but not for levying taxes. 
The process of devolution of decision-making power means the effective use of 
formal powers to increase decision-making autonomy (i.e. special status regions) from 
national government.  In formal terms, central and regional government relations are 
affected by such factors as constitutional, administrative and financial frameworks.  
The use of the different set of resources made available by devolution is at the core of 
the bargaining between central and regional government, as it is one of the 
determinants in regional development policy making.  During the second half of the 
’70 the responsibilities transferred to the regions were considerably expanded to the 
extent that their autonomy increased in functional terms. Increasingly, stricter limits 
were imposed in financial terms (Cassese 1987).  The special funds were added to the 
transfers generally allocated to regions.  Such a contradictory process is a “typical 
example of the continuous tension between political and administrative system’s 
centrifugal tendencies and recurrent attempt to reconstruct the cohesion and 
uniformity of the system itself” (Sharpe 1993). 
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Main composition of Italian regional revenues 1980-2000 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on Sharpe 1993 and LIUC 2002 data. 
 
The hypothesis is that the role of central government and its “ancillary 
institutions” (Hall 1986) –Cassa per il Mezzogiorno and Agensud- have had a 
detrimental role on the process of convergence in that it has limited the capacity of 
regional governments to effectively manage development policies.  Italian regional 
development policies have substantially failed to reduce disparities among regions, 
although a large amount of financial resources have been spent in pursuing this aim.  
Italian regional results show significant differences in convergence paths, producing 
counterfactual empirical evidence to neo-classical growth theories, and to the 
Keynesian approach to regional development pursued by the European Union through 
the Structural Funds. Conversely, “new growth theories” seem to have more 
explanatory power for recent regional evolutions.  On the other side, the process of 
institutional change in Southern Italy have not produced unambiguous impacts on the 
economic performance of the regions, despite the hypotheses deriving from the 
institutional economics theory and “new growth theories”, that consider devolution as 
positive for economic growth. 
Despite relatively huge literature on the economic impact of devolution, no 
consensus has yet been achieved regarding its effects on regional disparities. Calamai 
(2009) addresses this issue providing some empirical evidence concerning the Italian 
case.  Following Calamai 2009, the figure shows a comparative analysis of the 
simultaneous evolution of regional disparities, measured by the log variance of 
regional GDP per capita and the process of devolution, measured by subnational 
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government expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure during 1994-
2004. The pattern illustrated reveals a clear historical coincidence between the 
increase in devolution, and more specifically the onset of the so-called "fiscal 
federalism", and the decrease in regional inequalities. The upsurge in devolutionary 
trend clearly precedes the reduction of regional disparities with a one-year time lag. 
 
Source: extracted from Calamai 2009 
 
However, this research, as described in following paragraphs, does not address the 
economic development issues, and the determinants of correlation between 
institutional change and economic development. It aims at investigating the internal 
dynamics of institutional change and policy change, in the context of regional policies. 
 
2.2.3. Research questions 
The research will investigate the relations between institutional changes and 
regional development policies considering two different aspects, which lead to the 
formulation of the research questions: Institutional change and Policy Change. 
The hypothesis is that, within a devolution process, different adaptation to 
regionalization and Europeanization pressures are correlated to “path dependence” 
from incumbent institutional settings. This, in turn could generate different devolution 
outcomes, in terms of discrepancy between formal and effective outcomes. 
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The research framework set up as above has the objective of creating an adequate 
research framework as well as a consistent database for answering the following 
question, are different incumbent institutional settings a relevant variable to explain 
different regional policies responses to Regionalization  and Europeanization? 
In order to answer the question above, some sub-questions will be addressed: 
• What has been the effect of institutional change on Italian Regional 
Development Policies?  (i.e. What was the role of the “peripheral” 
institutions: regions and regional governments in the policy making and 
implementation process?) 
• What contribution did the special status regions (i.e., Sicily and Sardinia) 
make and what contribution was made with the progressive devolution of 
decision power from the Central Government to the Regions, with regard 
to regional development policies design and implementation? 
• How the devolution process (form central government led Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno to Structural Funds) has modified the government 
interventions? and how is this process reflected by regional economic 
performance?  
The research examines the interaction between institutional settings and economic 
variables in the policy design and implementation process. The approach followed 
puts particular stress on the critical role played by institutions in the determination of 
regional development policies. 
Accordingly, the research will contribute to the construction of an institutionalist 
analysis of politics and policies related to regional development and will help in 
explaining differences among different regional institutional settings and different 
development strategies.  
The concept of institution is used here to refer to formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between 
actors and institutions involved in regional policy design and implementation.  In this 
model, the organization of policy making affects the degree of power that any set of 
actors has over the policy outcomes. The organizational structure of policy making 
affects as well the degree of pressure an actor can bring to bear in the policy making 
process.   The method, through which such approach is implemented, is presented in 
the following paragraphs. 
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The understanding of decentralization and its core meanings comes from the terms 
and concepts to be used.  Some of the most successful conceptualization and 
categorizations in the literature have concentrated on decentralization in terms of 
decentralization to. Accordingly they focus on “decentralization in terms of who 
receives the power and resources that are being decentralized” (Schneider 2003).  This 
conceptualization is coherent with the aim of investigating the effects of 
decentralizing something to someone.  
This thesis concentrates mainly on the decentralisation of public expenditures and 
revenues, with specific respect to the design and implementation of regional 
development policies, as well as the management of regional development policies.   
The process of analysis will be operationalized throughout the investigation of 
four main issues regarding regional policies in Southern Italy: 
• The evolution in economic theories that led to the adoption of different 
strategies in different time periods; 
• The institutional implications of these change in the definition of the 
instruments for promoting regional development from a top-down versus a 
bottom-up perspective; 
• The introduction of a third level, the European one, after 1989 in the 
management of regional development policies; and 
More specifically, this research investigate how the “paradigm shift” between 
different economic theories, institutional approaches and levels governance have 
informed the process of devolution itself, the evolution of regional development 
policies in the Italian Mezzogiorno, and the actual effectiveness of the latter with 
respect to its economic objectives. One of the explanatory dynamics of the differences 
between expected and actual economic outcomes relies on the specificities of the 
implementation of the decentralization process: i.e. the dichotomy between formal and 
effective devolution, namely the different degree of administrative, political and 
financial power devolved from central government (to regional governments).  Figure 
2.1 presents what I conceive as the decentralization process with regard to the Italian 
case. 
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Figure 2.1  The devolution process 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, adapted from Parker A. 1995.  
 
2.3. Methodological framework for the discussion of 
regional policies 
2.3.1. Analytical framework 
The thesis considers the political and administrative aspects of the inter-
institutional arrangements and then moves to consider the policy and financial aspects 
of decentralization.  As a first step in the analysis, the thesis considers the 
decentralization process as a dependent variable that then has an impact on the 
structure of regional policies and socio-economic outcomes.  The focus is be on the 
analysis of the dependent variable and its interaction with structural and mediating 
factors; accordingly the main purpose of this part of the analysis (see Figure 2.2) is to 
concentrate on the interconnections between arrows A, B, C, D and E  In the figure 
below,  a model of explanatory factors connected to decentralization (with 
modifications) based on the model presented by Bukoski in 1997 is presented to 
account  for the causal factors in the redistribution of political authority.  The purpose 
of the model is to account for both devolution and the structure assumed by regional 
policies. 
The present research does not address socioeconomic outcomes (E) and is focused 
on the first part of the process. 
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Figure 2.2  Model of interaction in decentralization process 
  
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, adapted from Bukoski. 1997 
 
The definition of the component elements of the structure and mediating factors 
and institutional relation is the following:  
• Structural factors encompass political, economic, and social factors, 
constitutional provision operation within the political system.   
• Mediating factors include development paradigms, administrative path 
dependence, political opportunity costs, and interest group preferences.  
• Institutional relations are the way in which different levels of government 
have interacted among themselves before decentralization take place.   
 
Most of the studies that have dealt with explanatory factors in the devolution 
process have introduced various structural factors as explanatory variables without 
taking into account whether these factors per se prompt or do not prompt the 
introduction of institutional change. Instead, they remain as potential factors of change 
until political actors use the conditions created by them to make a political decision to 
change the distribution of power. In my case, this refers to the decentralization of 
powers to local levels of government (a relationship that is represented in arrows A, B 
and C in the above figure).  
The costs of decentralization for national policy-makers have never been seriously 
considered.  However, it involves the loss of considerable power and potentially 
financial resources to affect the behaviour of sub-national actors. Thus, there is the 
tendency on the part of national institutions to reduce the pace of power transfer and to 
divide the transfer of power from the transfer of resources. In the final analysis, if 
financial resources are not transferred the decentralisation of power becomes moot.   
As far as local governments are concerned, their calculations in making demands 
for decentralization will follow the same rationale as the logic followed by national 
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decision-makers: benefits of fiscal decentralization must be higher than its costs. The 
cost of devolution for local governments is related to accountability. Once they are 
endowed with autonomy over policies and expenditures voters may hold them 
responsible for the quality of services in addition to the level of taxes.  
The process of decentralization of decision-making power means that there is a 
transfer of political and administrative powers that increases decision-making 
autonomy from the national level.  The use of the different set of resources made 
available by devolution has been at the core of bargaining between central and 
regional government, and the main determinant of differences between political, 
administrative and financial devolution.   
Since the late 1980s there has been a qualitative change in the debate on 
decentralisation in Italy with some regions demanding a greater voice in the decision-
making process regarding the levels and conditions for the transfer of funds from the 
state level and the autonomy of the regions in developing their own sources of finance. 
The key feature of this programme demanding further political and financial 
autonomy has been in the transformation of the Italian regional system into a federal 
one —i.e., where powers are not shared between the central and regional government, 
and where they are constitutionally separated. The same would hold true for financial 
resources: the two levels of government with have separate rather than concurrent 
sources of financing.   
Following Donahue’s (1997) approach, the present analytical framework will 
examine administrative and political variables in order to investigate the process of 
political and administrative devolution, and policy making and financial variables 
(revenues and expenditures) to represent the financial and devolution aspects. 
 
With specific reference to regional development policies, Italy represents an 
interesting case given that in the post-war period a progressive and gradual 
decentralization process (both administrative and financial) has been implemented, 
especially starting in 1970; the design and implementation remained highly centralized 
until the late Eighties; Italian regional development policies in the Italian 
Mezzogiorno underwent an evolutionary process that has redefined their objectives, 
instruments, and procedures; and since then the demand for further powers has been 
mounted and subsequent governments has undertaken significant constitutional and 
legislative initiatives to move Italy down the federalist path.  
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2.3.2. Approach and research methods 
The research examines the interaction between institutional settings and regional 
economic policies in the policy design and implementation process. The approach 
followed puts particular stress on the critical role played by institutions in the 
determination of regional development policies. 
Accordingly, the research will contribute to the construction of an institutionalist 
analysis of politics and policies related to regional development and will help in 
explaining differences among different regional development strategies and economic 
growth paths. The concept of institution is used here to refer to formal rules, 
compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship 
between actors and institutions involved in regional policy design and implementation.  
In this model, the organization of policy making affects the degree of power that any 
set of actors has over the policy outcomes. The organizational structure of policy 
making affects as well the degree of pressure an actor can bring to bear in the policy 
making process. The method, through which such approach is implemented, is 
presented in the following paragraph.  The analysis of the decentralization process in 
Italian regional development policies will be carried out, on one hand, on the basis of 
the evolution and change over time of the policy making models and, on the other, on 
policy outputs and outcomes, not including impacts (.i.e. socio economic 
development).   
The research is articulated through three methodological steps: definition, analysis, 
evaluation: Definition, is to identify the appropriate set of variables that are necessary 
for the analysis. Specifically, this phase encompasses the definition of actors (central 
and regional governments), the different type of relations between them.  This phase 
will define the theoretical underpinnings and expected outcomes to be tested against 
Italian actual regional economic performance.  Analysis, is to test the hypotheses set 
up in the previous phase. The activities of this phase encompass the analysis of the 
institutions and actors involved, the mapping of the procedures set up for policy 
design and implementation, under the different administrative settings.  This phase 
includes as well the construction of specific databases with time series data for the 
relevant variables.   
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The analyses have been carried out through: 
• Collection of primary sources (mainly, newspapers, primary data from 
National Archives, face to face interviews); 
• Secondary data elaboration (statistics, studies, etc) 
 
Evaluation, finally, is to bring together the threads of the analyses which have 
been completed in the previous phase. In this phase the results deriving from the 
analysis of economic performances and institutional developments in Southern Italy’s 
regions, are confronted in order to investigate difference between expected (theory) 
and actual outcomes (empirics). 
 
With respect to the analytical framework to be set up for this research, reference is 
made to the work of Donahue (1997). Donahue  characterizes the process of 
devolution as being made up of three separate factors: decentralization of authority 
(administrative), legitimacy (political), and the decentralization of resources 
(financial).  Accordingly, the answers to the research question will be based on the 
analysis of the three main dimensions of decentralization: administrative and political 
powers, regional policies, and the decentralization of resources).  More in detail, the 
variables encompassed in the research are presented in Table 2.3. 
The evaluation will focus on the relations between different regional economic 
outcomes and different devolution process, i.e. different central and regional 
government relations.  Specifically, the evaluation will lead to the definition of 
different type of central-regional relations, according to the assessment of the 
following main dimensions of interaction, and of the relative variables: 
Political Dimension  
• Passage of constitutional and legal reforms to transfer power (i.e., regional 
governments have legal status and specific powers and responsibilities); 
• Level of authority to accept, reject, or modify central government plans 
for urban infrastructure constructed by central agencies; 
Administrative Dimension 
• Responsibilities specifically reserved to regional government (as opposed 
to central government); 
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• Scope of responsibilities for each level; 
• Degree of assignment of functional responsibilities from central 
government to regional government. 
Financial Dimension  
• Trends in regional own-source revenues; 
• Degree of independence in use of central government financial transfers; 
• Existence of regional economic development strategies and incentives. 
 
With respect to the main research questions, the framework set up by the 
evaluation of the issues of above should help in reaching an exhaustive answer.  The 
first two dimensions (administrative and political) will contribute in addressing the 
first two questions (institutional change and special status). The third dimension will 
help in investigating the difference in the financial management of the funds, from 
special national funds, to European Union Structural Funds. 
In order to identify the type of relation between central and regional government in 
the different regions, the level of “devolution” will be formalized on a region-specific 
scale (i.e. form highly centralized to high devolution) for each of the dimensions of 
above. 
Table 2.3 Dimensions and variables for research 
Dimensions Variables / Aspects 
Political 
 
 Passage of constitutional and legal reforms to transfer power 
(i.e., regional governments have legal status and specific 
powers and responsibilities); 
 Level of authority to accept, reject, or modify central 
government plans for urban infrastructure constructed by 
central agencies; 
  
Administrative  
 
 Responsibilities specifically reserved to regional government 
(as opposed to central government); 
 Scope of responsibilities for each level; 
 Degree of assignment of functional responsibilities from 
central government to regional government. 
 
Policies (Regional 
Policies)  
 Objectives 
 Priorities (sectors, areas,etc) 
 Instruments 
 Procedures 
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Dimensions Variables / Aspects 
Financial  
 
 Trends in central government public spending; 
 Trends in regional public spending; 
 Trends in regional own-source revenues; 
 Degree of independence in use of central government 
financial transfers; 
 Existence of regional economic development strategies and 
incentives. 
 
 
The first two dimensions (administrative and political) will contribute to defining 
the process of institutional change (decentralization) in its formal aspects. This 
research presents the results related to this analysis in Chapter 4. 
The third and fourth dimensions address how regional policies were modified by 
the changes in the institutional setting over time.  The fourth dimension will help to 
investigate both the financial devolution process and public spending implemented 
during the same period.  In order to identify the type of relations between central and 
regional government in the different regions, the level of “devolution” will be 
formalized on a region-specific scale (i.e. form highly centralized to high devolution) 
for each of the dimensions listed above.  This research presents the results related to 
this analysis in Chapter 5 and 6. 
More in detail, I will look at the financial aspects of devolution. With respect to 
the financial aspects of regional development policy implementation, decentralization 
will be analysed through the actual implementation of regional polices, i.e. the actual 
transfer of the financial instruments to implement them, both in terms of collecting 
revenues and allocating funds.  In order to address this issue the following measures 
will be estimated: 
• Sub-national expenditures (% of total expenditures); 
• Sub-national revenues (% of total revenues); 
• Composition of sub-national revenues and grants; 
• Composition of sub-national expenditures (expenditures in infrastructures 
as % of total sub-national expenditures). 
 
The analysis will assume a coeteris paribus framework with respect to other 
variables that affect regional economy.  This hypothesis seems to be consistent in 
order to achieve relevant results for the following reasons.  Concerning the financial 
variables that could affect regional economic performance, interest rate is equally set 
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up at national level; accordingly its impact on different regional economic 
performances is to be considered as marginal.  The inflation rate is a variable that is 
measured at national level, and Italian context has shown throughout the years a 
limited variance across regions. 
External shock, such as rising energy prices, global recession or expansion, are 
considered of limited impact as the effects are equally spread over the different 
regions, and their contribution to regional growth would not help in identifying the 
determinants of the different  growth paths among the Mezzogiorno’s regions. 
 
2.3.3. Data Sources  
Large part of the quantitative economic data has been available in the ESOC –Lab 
database on economic conditions of Southern Europe Regions. Data on GDP per 
capita and PPS The research has expanded the data set backwards to 1950. 
Data on political-cycle have been gathered through research on primary sources 
(newspapers and interviews).  As well, data on Central Government intervention have 
been collected in terms of fund allocated in the different regions and sectors trough on 
–field research in National Archives. 
Qualitative data have been gathered mainly through targeted interviews with the 
key players in Italian economic policy making that acted during the period addressed9. 
This allowed setting up the political and administrative framework which acted as a 
bias in the evolution of regional economic policy. Acts and proceedings from the 
Italian institutions present in National Archives and minutes of speeches in Italian 
Parliament have been  analysed, as well as laws and economic planning documents. 
 
                                                      
9 Interviews have been carried out with former MPs, Directors of Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, former Ministers, and 
Journalists. Interviews (in a number of 15) have not been carried out using a structured questionnaire, given  the profile 
and age of interviewees, instead a more informal approach has been adopted, which resulted extremely fruitful  in 
order to answer the research questions. Among the most relevant interviewees it worths to cite Andrea Manzella (State 
Counselor); Giacomo Schettini (Comitato delle Regioni Meridionali); Giuseppe Alvaro (Professor of Statistics), 
Michele Cascino (Vice President of Southern Regions), Andrea Saba (former president of IASM), Sandro Petriccione 
(former Vice-President of Cassa per il Mezzogiorno); Nino Novacco (director of SVIMEZ); Ercole Incalza (former 
expert of Cassa per il Mezzogiorno); V Deluca and C Casavola (Dipartimento Politiche di Sviluppo). 
  48 
2.3.4. Case studies: Ordinary and Special Statute 
Regions in Southern Italy 
The research encompasses the horizontal (geographical) analysis, considering how 
different devolution paths has changed the role and characteristics of Central 
Government intervention in regions that have, or not, experienced specific institutional 
setting in terms of autonomy in policy making.  In order to test the hypotheses and 
expected results of the research, some relevant case studies have been identified.   
Previous paragraph have identified Italy as an important case study for the analysis 
of institutional change and regional policies. Italy, and Italian Mezzogiorno in 
particular, have constantly been part of the academic debate.  Since early ‘50s Italian 
approach to regional development has been object for studies and academic analyses.  
Throughout the period considered, evolution in institutions and policies came to 
present a very interesting case for the purpose of this research.  
The presence from early stages of formally different institutional settings (ordinary 
and special statute regions) among  regions of the same geographic region, sharing 
similar socioeconomic conditions is extremely interesting. Moreover, the evolution of 
regional policies had addressed horizontally all the Southern regions, allowing a 
comparative analysis of local responses. 
 
Two regions have experienced a devolution path that established a special status in 
terms of administrative, political and financial matters, within Southern Italy. 
However, the “special status” has not been leading to an unambiguous positive impact 
on the regional path toward convergence for both regions. Moreover, a unitary path 
has not been shown by ordinary regions, although having similar initial conditions.  
The case studies have been chosen according to formal Central-regional 
government relations (i.e. Special or ordinary regions), to be tested with effective 
devolution of powers; and similar initial socio-economic conditions. In order to 
explain the role of central-regional government relations, the regions have to be 
similar both in socio-economic and administrative terms.   
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The case studies identified are10: 
• Special regions. Sicily and Sardinia 
• Ordinary regions. Calabria and Puglia  
 
Although this complicates significantly the analysis, the choice of four case 
studies, representing different outcomes under similar institutional evolutionary paths, 
helps in understanding not only the effects of institutional change on policies, but 
contributes to identify other conditions that affect design and implementation of 
regional development polices. 
Within each regional framework, the research has been carried out with a vertical 
(sector) approach. Specific in depth analysis will be done concerning public spending. 
Specific attention has been given to the infrastructure, This sector has been chosen 
because it is the sector where the largest amount of resources has been invested both 
during the central government led regional policies, and during the EU Structural 
Funds.  
Moreover, recent academic debate is seriously questioning the economic 
efficiency of public spending in infrastructures, as return are not evident, and, 
according to “new economic geography” theories, that type of investment have 
negative impacts on poorer regions, generating negative effects in term of equity as 
well.  Both the reasons concur to make infrastructure investment an interesting case 
study for the purpose of this research. 
 
2.4. Outline of the thesis 
The subsequent chapters will focus on the causes of the policy changes; more 
specifically they address the processes of regionalization and Europeanization, and 
what this change meant for policy making and implementation in Italy but also in the 
broader context of regional policies in a variety of other EU member states.  
Besides Chapter 3, aiming at providing an analysis of the academic debate on the 
relevant theoretical aspects of this research, the following Chapters follow the 
methodological structure described in previous paragraphs of this Chapter. Referring 
                                                      
10 With specific reference to Ordinary regions, case studies have been selected identifying  the two regions that 
presented the higher degree of similarity based on a set of socioeconomic variables calculated in the base year, 
assumed to be year 1951. The set of variables was composed by: regional GDP, population, GDP per capita, 
geographic extension, population per square km, amount of Central Government funds allocated. 
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to Donahue classification, analyses have addressed institutional changes through 
investigation of political and administrative variables (Chapter 4), helping in setting 
up the framework within which regional policies have evolved. Chapter 5 and 6 
present the results of the study carried out on regional policy design and 
implementation (operationalized according to Table 2.3). The structure of the present 
document can be summarized as follows. 
Chapter 3. The debate on the dynamics of change in institutions and policies.  
This chapter presents a description of the academic debate on the main issues 
addressed by the thesis.  The literature review, accordingly, focuses on four aspects of 
the relevant literature for this thesis: devolution, Regionalization and Europeanization, 
paradigm shift and path dependence.  Within each aspect, I have tried to identify 
where this research locate in terms of contribution to the academic debate. Further 
elements on these aspects are developed in the last Chapter. 
Chapter 4 . Political and Administrative responses to regional and European 
adaptational pressures. This chapter presents the analysis of the Italian government’s 
response to the first adaptational pressure from below, i.e. the impact of 
rationalization.  First the chapter presents a “framing” of the process, identifying the 
actors (subjects), the instruments (objects) and the rules governing the central-regional 
government relations. The chapter presents an in depth analysis of the process in terms 
of policy making, and what role can be attributed to “path dependence”, as a 
mediating factor. This chapter mainly deals with Political and Administrative 
variables, as described in previous paragraphs. 
Chapter 5 . The regionalization process: policy and Financial aspects. This 
chapter describes the overall context within the “Fordist” paradigm and the 
institutional and policy choices made in achieving the objectives of regional socio-
economic development. This Chapter and the next deal with the “Policy” and 
Financial dimensions of the period characterized by a Centralized Regional policy in a 
progressively regionalized institutional framework. 
Chapter 6 The Europeanization process: policy and Financial aspects.  This 
chapter presents the results of the analysis of the response of the Italian central 
government to the second adaptational pressure from above, i.e. the Europeanization 
process.  The chapter presents an in depth analysis of the process in terms of policy 
making, and what role is to be attributed also to “path dependence”, as a mediating 
factor. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions. This chapter will attempt to draw together the various 
conclusions produced by the previous chapters, identify main results of the research 
and propose some further developments for research and analyses.  
 3. THE DEBATE ON THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE IN 
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES  
 
This chapter will provide an overview of the relevant literature to which the 
present research is aiming to contribute.  The mainstream the research is addressing to 
is the one of Political Economy, with specific attention to regional development.  
 
3.1. The regionalization and devolution processes 
The literature that is relevant to the thesis covers a broad area of Political Science 
and Economics in that it deals with the topics of institutional change and policy 
change. As discussed in Chapter 1, the definition used of institutions deals with 
structured behaviour based on rules.  The assumption is  that the content of policy 
changes is strictly related to the specific configuration of institutions, interests and 
ideas inherent in a given policy sector, and that within this context, the features of the 
articulation of normative and cognitive elements can determine the mechanisms of 
resistance, adaptation and/or transformation that constitute the reaction to such 
external pressures. 
 
However, as Howlett and Ramesh (1998) maintain, paradigmatic change can be 
slow while incremental change can be rapid, depending on the presence/ absence of 
new interests in the policy arena. In keeping with this line of reasoning, an incremental 
change in policy instruments can be extremely meaningful in a specific context, 
substantially improving performance and establishing the basis for a subsequent 
paradigmatic change. Therefore, as has been suggested in public policy analysis 
(Howlett and Ramesh 2002) and in organization theory (Wollin 1999), the real 
explanatory problem is not that of establishing whether one kind of change is more 
important than another, but that of trying to explain a whole spectrum of results when 
change takes place. 
One way to resolve this problem is to focus on the concept of policy paradigm. 
The assumption that is made is made here is that change will be increasingly ‘more’ 
revolutionary, the more difficult it proves for the old paradigm to overcome the 
anomalies present within the given socio-economic context. More specifically, I will 
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address how the two processes of Regionalization and Europeanization have had a role 
in framing institutions and policies.  The following chapter presents a review of the 
mainstream academic debate on these issues. 
 
3.1.1. Approaches and academic mainstreams 
“Regionalization” is perhaps the most significant institutional change that Western 
Europe has witnessed during the last three decades in that there has been a substantial 
shift towards regionalisation and power devolution from the central to the meso level 
of government in many of the Western European states (Sharpe 1993).  Aside from the 
cases of Germany, Austria and Switzerland, which already constituted federal states in 
the immediate post-war period—during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s I have seen 
the development and, in some cases, the completion of the regional devolution 
processes in Italy, Belgium, Spain, and France. This radical and almost concurrent 
shift from centralised to decentralised models of government has attracted many to the 
field of regionalisation. Zimmermann (1990) points out that the specific role of public 
institutions and public finance has hardly been directly dealt with regional economic 
performance, and only indirectly included via the analysis of publicly provided goods, 
such as infrastructure.  Conversely, Mény (1982) acknowledges that, specifically in 
Italy, the regionalisation processes were conceived as a means to foster economic 
growth in advanced regions, and to fight underdevelopment in lagging ones in 
addition to promoting democratisation at the sub-national level.  The task here is to 
evaluate the literature on decentralisation in the above terms.  
There are many kinds of reforms, which fall under the banner of decentralisation. 
It is therefore useful to follow Rondinelli (1990) and distinguish between different 
modes of decentralization along the following lines:  
• deconcentration - spatial relocation of decision making - i.e. the transfer of 
some administrative responsibility or authority to lower levels within 
central government ministries or agencies as, for example, in the British 
“quangos”;  
• delegation - assignment of specific decision making authority - i.e. the 
transfer of managerial responsibility for specifically defined functions to 
public organisations (e.g. local governments) outside the normal 
bureaucratic structure of central government; and  
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• devolution - transfer of responsibility for governing, understood more 
broadly - i.e. the creation or strengthening, financially or legally, of sub-
national units of governments, whose activities are substantially outside 
the direct control of central government.  
 
This study will focus upon the first and third modes of decentralization that I will 
look at from a regionalist point of view—i.e., the process of decentralizing powers to a 
regional level given its relevance for the Italian case over the last fifty years. 
The study of regional government has been dominated by two concerns, both of 
which have received a major impetus from practical policy concerns (Page and 
Goldsmith 1987). The first is the question of reorganization expressed in terms of the 
“best” way to organize regional government units to provide efficient and effective 
public services. In the 1960s and 1970s national governments brought forward 
proposals to create regional governments, change the size of governmental units, and 
assign different roles to sub-national institutions. In 1970 the first two countries to 
embark on such a radical operation were Belgium and Italy. In 1977 they were 
followed by Spain and in 1985 France undertook a much more watered down 
approach to the reorganization of sub-national units. Other countries—e.g., Portugal 
and the UK—undertook more limited experiments with the creation of asymmetrical 
regional units in parts of the national territory where national separatism in peripheral 
areas was on the increase. However, in both of these countries reforms of some of the 
core units of the central government--respectively continental Portugal and England—
were strongly resisted.  
The second major concern of policy makers with regard to decentralization was 
“what should be the powers and capabilities of regional government in modern 
states?” i.e. “how much decentralization is good and how should that regionalization 
be organized? 
With respect of the operationalization issues, there has been a concern with 
establishing the precise nature and significance of any change in central-regional 
relations; how far have the reforms introduced changed the nature of centre-periphery 
relations (Wright and Mény, 1985; Sharpe, 1993)? For Italy, Spain and France 
specifically, there is a body of literature that looks at the importance of regionalization 
as a factor in altering traditional patterns of central-regional relations (Mény 1982).   
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Regional devolution is a complex and heterogeneous process. From the high level 
of decentralization of certain federal states, such as Germany, and of some Spanish 
and Italian regions, to the more limited influence of regions in France, Italy stands out 
in providing data on the differentiated nature of the allocation and use of decentralised 
powers. In my scheme I need to distinguish between powers formally devolved and 
powers actually used. Consequently, conceptualising devolution and its consequences 
for policy making-implementation is far from a simple matter. 
Looking for a minimum common denominator, Donahue (1997) characterizes the 
process of devolution as being made up of three separate factors: decentralization of 
authority (administrative), legitimacy (political), and the decentralization of resources 
(financial).  Any form of devolution implies some degree of sub national legitimacy 
and some form of decentralization of authority and resources; consequently, any 
analysis of devolution should take these three factors into consideration.   
There is, however, a need for caution in examining evidence, because a simple 
list-based approach may overlook the interaction between the elements. The 
complexity of the devolution process derives from the interest-conflicts of the various 
actors involved, and the differences in legitimacy that they share. Most importantly, 
the interests of central and regional governments tend to be at odds across the 
component factors of devolution. While central governments would, ceteris paribus, 
devolve responsibilities (authority) to regional governments, with as few 
accompanying resources as possible, the regional governments would prefer the 
opposite case. The balance between these two extremes will depend upon “the relative 
strength, or, in political terms, legitimacy, of the two tiers of government” (Rodriguez-
Pose 1996).  The legitimacy of central and regional governments is determined for the 
most part by processes of history and respective political support. Allmendinger and 
Tewdwr-Jones (2000) identify the determinant factors of history, culture, language, 
religion and economic development.  
Poor political support for the regional cause would translate into a relatively weak 
regional legitimacy and therefore tend to promote a devolutionary process in which 
the central government favours progressive decentralization of responsibilities and 
often forcing regional and regional governments “to undertake increasing expenditure 
responsibilities on a static, and often narrowing, financial base” (Bennett, 1997). In 
contrast, a strong regional legitimacy, underpinned by high political support for the 
regional lobby, would favour a more rapid decentralisation of resources from the 
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centre, since there would be strong demand for transfers to sub national tiers of 
government. In general, the combination of historical and political factors in 
democratic countries shapes the legitimacy of governmental tiers, the relative strength 
of their respective lobbies, and hence the forms which devolution initiatives are likely 
to assume.  
In general, an understanding of the interaction between legitimacy and the transfer 
of resources and authority is imperative to the examination of devolutionary trends 
(Donahue, 1997). A case that depicts strong decentralization of resources displays no 
more evidence for devolution than one showing strong decentralization of 
responsibilities. It merely indicates a different type of devolution, driven by different 
levels of government and deriving, ultimately, from a different allocation of 
legitimacy across governmental tiers.  
Moreover, following from this, one should not necessarily expect cases to depict 
high levels of devolution of both resource and responsibility since forces are often 
operative to promote their mutual exclusivity.   This interpretation seems to be in line 
with the explanation of the Italian experience, given by Leonardi (1993), and the 
analysis carried out by Cassese (in Sharpe 1993). 
 
3.1.2. Determinants of regionalization and devolution  
The demands for the redistribution of power from the core to the periphery were 
supported by a variety of motivations. The first and most obvious demand originates 
from the existence of significant cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious differences 
between various parts of the nation-state.  Rousseau and Zariski (1987) observe that 
the historic forces affecting centralization have had a dialectical impact, as “every 
factor promoting centralization seems to have produced its own antithesis”. Thus, as 
the central state expanded its military, fiscal, and bureaucratic control it provoked 
resistance.   
The historical development of the welfare state carries with it its own paradox with 
respect to regionalization.  On the one hand the emergence of the welfare state had 
been one of the determinants of centralization in the post-war period. On the other 
hand, it has helped to develop a local system of lobbying to encourage a greater 
distribution of resources. The growth of central functions and central spending has 
stimulated the development of local lobbies (Beer 1977, Tarrow 1977).  “The growth 
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of functional specialization and technocracy at the national level has been increasingly 
offset by the recruitment of skilled technocratic professionals” at the regional level 
(Rousseau and Zariski 1987, p.15).  As a result, a growing confrontation between 
central and regional elites emerged (Tarrow 1977).  
The conflict between core and peripheral interests has tended to increase the 
importance of the linkages functions between core and periphery carried out by 
administrative and political elites. This has tended to overburden the linkage system as 
well as central state functions. As argued by Leonardi (1995) one of the important 
determinants of decentralisation in the Italian system was the overburdening of the 
centre by the accumulation of functions that were promoted by a widening welfare 
state system (pensions, education, housing and health) that in the end ground the 
decision making system to a halt. The consequences were that central responses to 
local demands kept getting longer and longer to the point that the linkage system 
became dysfunctional and was in no position to respond to local demands.  
The uneven rate of economic growth and development in modern democracies has 
become an increasingly evident factor in differentiating regions within a national 
territory.  This factor has been partly responsible for the mobilisation of demands 
posed by two sets of regions: those that have lagged behind in economic terms (e.g., 
Galicia in Spain and Sicily in Italy) as well as on the part of those that are most 
developed (e.g., Catalonia in Spain and Lombardy in Italy). In both cases the regions 
have demanded more power in determining their own development paths.  Smith 
(1985) argues that the establishment of regions in Italy and France represented “an 
attempt by the embattled central governments to assuage the economic grievances of 
the depressed periphery” (Rousseau and Zariski 1987).  
However, in both cases a uniform regional structure was introduced for both 
developed as well as underdeveloped areas. Central responses to regional economic 
grievances would be more logical if regionalisation were pursued in an asymmetrical 
fashion, as was the case with Scotland where economic grievances against the centre 
represented an important element in mobilising a demand for devolution during the 
1990s. The same argument can be made in relation to the two ultra peripheral regions 
of Portugal: in 1976 regional autonomy had to be provided in order to maintain them 
within the national context of Portugal.  
Regionalization has not only resulted from challenges emanating from below.  
According to Duchacek (1970) recent decentralizing trends have come about because 
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of initiatives from above.  Central authorities have tried to develop, in specific 
contexts, greater initiative and flexibility at local level, specifically with respect to the 
implementation of national programmes, in the attempt to off-load functions 
previously centralised to the periphery (Beer 1977). 
A final determinant of regionalization, in its decentralization-related aspects, is 
associated with the democratic definition of a nation-state. This is what I had in the 
case of Spain and Italy. In Spain a return to democracy necessitated a return to the 
regionalist state structure that existed prior to the Francoist regime and in Italy 
decentralisation was written into the Republican Constitution in 1947 as a response to 
the authoritarian centralisation experienced during the Fascist regime. Thus in both 
cases regionalisation was considered by the body politic as a more democratic solution 
to the building of new state structures to govern public policies. In the Italian case, the 
slogan that characterised the decentralisation drive was: “Bringing power closer to the 
people” (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1986). In this context, decentralisation 
contributes to political participation and makes possible the increase of citizen 
participation in public affairs through organised groups and referenda. 
Decentralisation makes it possible for a more meaningful control over policy decisions 
by “unpacking” governmental policies into specific areas associated with local 
economic and social demands (Dahl and Tufte 1973). 
Ylvisaker (1959) states that regionalization provides the individual citizen and the 
local group with more points of access, pressure and control in their dealing with the 
political and administrative system. Another normative consideration raised by the 
advocates of regionalization is the need to restrain abuses of power by the central 
government (Huntington 1959), with specific respect to minorities.  
Central to the regionalization drive is the argument that local governments are 
closer to the people and hence better equipped to extract information on local 
preferences and needs at lower costs (Oates 1999). By corollary, regionalization is 
expected to boost public- sector efficiency in service delivery, such that scarce public 
resources can be channelled into more productive, externality-generating uses at the 
nationwide level (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997). 
Moreover, accountability and transparency in policy making can be enhanced by 
bringing expenditure assignments closer to revenue sources and hence to the citizenry. 
Disenchantment with the ability of large central governments to provide goods and 
services efficiently, as well as the aggravation of fiscal imbalances and debt-overhang 
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problems, has also added fuel to the decentralization drive in a number of countries 
(Tanzi 1995).  
The focus of a growing literature on regionalization has been on the 
macroeconomic and public finance aspects of decentralization (Prud’homme 1995; 
Oates 1999).  I briefly quote the main issues addressed by this academic mainstream 
for sake of completeness, as my research do not cover the macroeconomic and public 
finance aspects of the regionalization process, but some specific contribution related to 
devolution are extremely relevant in the present case. 
 
Recent research on fiscal federalism has expanded the scope of the analysis and 
shown that the vertical structure of government may have important implications for 
political participation (Oates 1999) and governance (de Mello and Barenstein 2001).  
The ultimate argument for decentralization, however, relies in the view of 
decentralization as ensuring greater efficiency and more satisfactory economic 
performance.  There is a more compelling reason why decentralization may be 
regarded as essential to improving efficiency and performance: the necessity of a 
centralised system of communication leads to a high risk of overload and congestion 
of the administrative machinery (Dahl 1982).   
In addition to the number of historical and social factors that have contributed to 
decentralization, I need to consider another factor associated with the debate during 
the 1970s and 1980s—i.e., the efficiency argument. Rousseau and Zariski (1987) 
observe that “decentralization has acquired a halo of efficiency” and has been 
presented as an instrument to foster economic growth. 
Decentralisation can be defined as a two-dimensional policy institution that 
involves either decentralisation of a tax instrument, when local governments have the 
power to raise taxes, or decentralisation of expenditures when local governments bear 
the responsibility for implementing expenditure functions. This research will focus on 
the origins of funs in terms of transfers among levels of government, and not as pure 
fiscal revenues, as well as the expenditures of central and local governments. 
The huge amount of theoretical and empirical literature that studies the relation 
between decentralisation and government efficiency can be divided into two large 
areas the classical theory, and the second generation theory.  Chronologically, it is 
possible to start with Tiebout’s model of local public good provision (Tiebout, 1956), 
where decentralisation coupled with mobile households solves the problem of the 
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efficient provision of public goods. Essentially local governments compete in offering 
a mix of tax and public goods, and citizens "choose by their feet", deciding where to 
live according to their preferences about tax and public goods. The second and maybe 
most influential contributions is Oates (1972) Decentralisation Theorem that solves 
the trade-off between centralised and decentralised provision of public goods in favour 
of the former (centralisation) if average preferences across citizens of different region 
are equal, and the consumption of the public goods generates spill-over effects; 
whereas a decentralised provision maximises social welfare when preferences differ 
across regions and spill-over effects are absent.  Finally the most important 
contribution in the public-choice perspective of fiscal federalism is Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980) Leviathan hypothesis, according to which fiscal decentralisation is a 
mechanism for constraining the expansionary tendencies of governments.  
Oates (1972) and Tiebout (1956) offer a theoretical framework in which fiscal 
decentralisation can guarantee an efficient provision of public goods simply because 
local preferences are better satisfied than in the case of centralisation. Both previous 
approaches assume a benevolent government, but the Leviathan hypothesis is based on 
the opposite assumption whereby decentralisation is a means to reduce government 
size in order to stem its inefficient behaviour. 
Most of the early empirical works about the effects of decentralisation are aimed at 
assessing the relation between the size of government, measured in terms of general 
government revenues or expenditures, and some indicators of local governments’ 
degree of power, trying to provide a test for the Leviathan hypothesis.  One of the last 
studies in this field is that of Rodden (2003), whose main argument is that fiscal 
decentralisation might lead to a smaller or larger public sector depending on how it is 
funded: when decentralisation is provided by grants from general to local governments 
the Leviathan hypothesis may not hold and the expected outcome should be a larger 
public sector; instead, when the general government decentralises fiscal revenues the 
effect on total public sector might be negative. The hypothesis that expenditure 
decentralisation without local tax power can hinder the tax competition predicted by 
the Leviathan model was successfully tested. 
These aspects are particularly relevant for our research as we investigate different 
institutional settings and autonomy in the light of evolution in regional policies’ 
related expenditures. 
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Although not central to this thesis, and it is necessary to stress that limitation of 
this approach is that in these models, however, public expenditure is used as a 
dependent variable and it is implicitly considered as the output of government activity. 
The problem is that even if we assume that smaller is better according to the Leviathan 
hypothesis, it would be very difficult to assess the effect of the decentralisation on the 
efficiency of the government in these models. 
 
In the last twenty years the classical approach evolved together with the theory of 
fiscal federalism in what is sometimes called the second-generation theory of fiscal 
federalism (Oates, 2005). In this new (or second generation) literature the effect of 
fiscal decentralisation has been modelled to embody the political process and the 
possibility of asymmetric information across political agents. Differently from the 
classical approach governments are assumed to maximise their own objective function 
that does not imply the maximisation of social welfare. 
In this new framework the basic issue of whether to centralise or decentralise 
provision and/or funding of some public activities appears in a somewhat, but not 
completely, different light. The first stream of this new literature reconsiders the 
decentralisation theorem in a political economy contest. Here the main argument in 
favour of decentralisation hinges on the inefficient outcome of the centralised 
decision-making process rather than on the trade-off between preference matching and 
externalities typical of the original version of the Oates’ theorem. The second stream 
studies the trade-off between centralised and decentralised provision in principal agent 
models of electoral accountability. Essentially the electorate are the principals and the 
politicians are the agents and the presence of asymmetric information between them 
can be seen as the main reason why the government performance is inefficient.  
Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) explicitly depart from both main 
assumptions of the Decentralization Theorem, studying the trade-off between 
centralisation and decentralisation in a political economy setting. They consider a 
more realistic environment where provision of public goods can be set at a different 
level across regions in the case of centralization also. 
These two important contributions offer new arguments in favour of decentralised 
provision of public goods since they show that centralised provision can be welfare-
dominated even if the assumptions of the Decentralizaton Theorem fail. Thus, either 
under the classic approach or under the political economy perspective fiscal 
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decentralisation is largely seen as a powerful policy institution to boost efficiency in 
the public sector.  
In more recent literature the effect of decentralisation is estimated in models that 
adopt, as a dependent variable, some measures of general government efficiency like, 
for example, the perceived corruption or indicators of the output (or quality of the 
service) in particular sectors like health care and education in order to provide more 
direct evidence for the accountability and preference-matching argument. 
Recently Adam et al. (2008) identified the effect of fiscal decentralisation using a 
"two-stage approach". In the first stage, data envelopment analysis of a panel of 21 
OECD countries over the period 1970 to 2000 is used to compute country-specific 
efficiency indexes, assuming an underlying production process where public spending 
is considered as input and two composite measures of performance are assumed as 
outputs of the public sector. In the second stage, country-specific efficiency indexes 
have been regressed on an extensive set of alternative revenues and expenditures in 
fiscal decentralisation measures and some control variables. Their results strongly 
support the evidence of a positive and significant effect of decentralisation on 
government efficiency. 
In the presence of Soft Budget Constraint, local governments have the incentive to 
expand their programmes beyond their means, which builds perverse fiscal behaviour 
into the system and undermines the positive effect of decentralisation on efficiency. 
As summarised by Oates (2005), the main solution of this problem requires the 
implementation of an effective and reliable local system of taxation and 
intergovernmental grants in order to provide the revenues needed to finance local 
programmes.  
 
3.2. The Europeanization process: institution building 
and policy transfer 
3.2.1. Approaches and academic mainstreams 
The concept of Europeanization has gained prominence over the 1990s as a 
growing academic community has endeavoured to shed light on the EU’s institutional 
dynamics and its impact on national policies, politics and polities. Conceptualisations 
have varied widely in both their approach and application, leading some authors to 
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warn against the perils of conceptual “stretching”, and calling for a greater emphasis 
on theoretical clarity and analytical rigour (Redaelli 2000; Olsen 2002). This requires 
a clear definition of Europeanization, which will in turn allow trends to be evaluated 
and the extent of Europeanization to be gauged. As the domain of Europeanization is 
specified, attention is paid to clarifying the mechanisms of change. 
According to Yuill, et al (1997), a key question in the academic debate is whether 
the research focus should be bottom-up or top-down.  I will borrow this distinction to 
go through the academic debate on Europeanization. 
Most studies on Europeanization tend to adopt a top-down conceptualisation, 
focussing on the domestic impact of external pressures emanating from the EU.  A 
starting point was provided by Ladrech (1994) in his well-known definition of 
Europeanization as an “incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of 
politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy-making”.  Borzel’s (1999) 
definition draws more explicit attention to the “penetrative” nature of Europeanization 
as “a process through which domestic arenas become increasingly subject to European 
policymaking”. The vast majority of academic studies have tended to favour this top-
down perspective, examining the domestic impact of the EU across a variety of 
domains, such as political structures (Bulmer and Burch 2001), policy areas (Jordan 
2002; Knill and Lenschow 2001), interest representation (Kohler-Koch 1996), 
political institutions and policymaking styles and regional governance (Kohler- Koch 
1999; Boerzel 1999). 
As noted above, an important task for the study of Europeanization is to specify 
the mechanisms of change. Knill and Lehmkhul (1999) identify three such 
mechanisms. The first mechanism involves the imposition or prescription of an EU 
model with limited discretion at the national level. The second mechanism concerns 
changing domestic opportunity structures and a corresponding redistribution of 
resources and power. This mechanism does not impose an EU model and allows more 
discretion at the domestic level. The third mechanism is the weakest and relates to 
altering beliefs and expectations of domestic actors, following a cognitive logic. These 
three mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and it is possible that they all play a role 
in the adaptation process to varying degrees, depending on the domain/phenomenon 
under study. For the purposes of area designation, it is the first mechanism that has the 
most significance, given that the Member States are compelled to bring domestic 
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arrangements into line with specific conditions and criteria that have been set at the 
European level. This can also be referred to as “coercion”, following the institutional 
isomorphism (Di Maggio and Powell 1991) and policy transfer literature (Dolowitz 
and Marsh 1996). 
The key research task for the top-down approach is to account for variation in the 
domestic impact of EU pressures. Thus, Europeanization is taken as the independent 
variable and the adaptation of domestic institutions as the dependent variable. The 
literature highlights a number of potential responses in terms of domestic adaptation, 
ranging from absorption to accommodation or transformation (Boerzel and 
Risse2000). Broadly speaking, three key factors can be discerned when turning to the 
explanation of differential domestic adaptation. 
The first factor is the “goodness of fit”. As Risse et al (2001) put it: “the degree of 
adaptational pressure generated by Europeanization depends on the “fit” or “misfit” 
between European institutions and domestic structures”. The goodness of fit applies to 
both institutions and, as in the context of this study, policies i.e. policy goals, 
instruments/techniques used to achieve policy goals, problem solving approaches etc. 
According to Boerzel and Risse 2000, when the fit between European institutions 
and national institutions is low, adaptational pressure will be high leading to 
transformation, as States are forced to alter domestic policy to satisfy EU 
requirements. On the other hand, when the policy fit is high, adaptational pressure will 
be low and absorption can be expected as Member States incorporate EU 
policies/ideas without substantially changing existing practices. Finally, when the fit is 
of medium intensity, adaptational pressure will also be of medium intensity and 
accommodation can be expected as Member States mediate EU requirements, by 
adapting existing policy without fundamental change to core existing features and 
collective understandings.  
The second factor concerns domestic institutional structures. Unitary or federal 
territorial designs, the mix of public and private actors in the economy, political or 
organizational cultures, patterns of party competition etc. are variables that mediate 
the effects of Europeanization. Political obstacles or “veto points” (Tsebelis 1995) 
have received particular attention in the Europeanization literature (Haverland 2000) 
as “the more power is dispersed across the political system and the more actors have a 
say in political decision making, the more difficult it is to foster the domestic 
consensus or “winning coalition” necessary to introduce institutional changes in 
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response to Europeanization pressures” (Risse et al 2001).  This research will not 
address political factors, as in a regional context political system is not different 
among case studies.  
The third factor relates to actors’ preferences and strategies. These preferences can 
be exogenously defined, following “logic of consequentialism” (March and Olsen 
1998) from a rational choice institutionalist perspective (i.e. treating actors as utility 
maximising agents). Alternatively, preferences may be endogenously defined, 
following logic of “appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989) through sociological 
factors such as collective learning and socialisation processes. As an actor-centred 
process, learning can take the form of “single loop learning” (Agyris and Schön 1978) 
whereby actors acquire new information, alter strategies but pursue given interests. 
Alternatively, learning may be of a more fundamental nature involving a radical 
change of objectives associated with paradigm shifts. This second type of learning is 
known as “third order change” in the terminology of Hall (1993). 
The above conceptualisation is not without its shortcomings. First, the notion of 
adaptational pressure remains underspecified in the literature. Knill and Lehmkhul 
(1999) argue that the power of the “goodness of fit” in explaining outcomes is not 
universal but depends on the Europeanization mechanism in question. In instances of 
“negative integration”, for example, it has limited explanatory power (see also 
Haverland 2000). Second, the approach is rather static since it holds domestic 
institutions constant (Knill and Lenschow 2001). In reality, Europeanization is 
characterised by dynamic processes in which domestic and/or EU institutions evolve 
over time and in different directions. This aspect is particularly relevant in the 
historical component of the case studies. Third, Europeanization is an interactive 
process between the various levels and actors involved. Member States are not merely 
passive recipients of EU legislation, but also try to influence or shape EU policy to 
suit their own interests in order to minimise the policy misfit and subsequent 
adaptation costs. Indeed, in the context of area designation, the methodologies for 
allocating population quotas to the Member States were developed through a series of 
iterations, which took account of Member State views (and associated lobbying). 
Domestic actors, therefore, could influence the resulting match or mismatch. This 
draws attention to the importance of exploring the “feedback loops” and “uploading” 
of domestic preferences.  
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Furthermore, as new forms of policymaking emerge in the EU, the traditional 
vertical relationship between the Member States and the Commission is evolving. 
With the growth of softer forms of integration such as the open method of 
coordination (Hodson and Mayer 2001) more attention is being directed towards the 
horizontal relationships between Member States (a theme that is prevalent in the 
policy transfer and policy learning literature).  
Finally, this approach assumes the existence of a domestic policy comparable to 
the EU policy and does not therefore take account of policy or institutional voids. This 
is particularly relevant to countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain (or the new 
Member States) where EU membership has been associated with institutionalisation 
rather than institutional change per se and where domestic policies (such as the 
cohesion policy) did not pre-exist entry into the EU. In these cases it has been easier to 
make the shift to adoption of the EU due to the lack of existing policy path 
dependency, culture or institutional structures (SOCCOH, 2009)  
 
For the same reason this approach seems to be relevant in this analysis as Italian 
case was strongly characterized by an incumbent institutional setting as well as a 
regional policy. The bottom-up approach is captured well by the definition of 
Europeanization used by Risse et al (2001) as: “the emergence and development at the 
European level of distinct structures of governance”.  On the same academic 
mainstream, one of the conceptualisations offered by Olsen (2002) defines 
Europeanization as: “the development of governance at the European level. This 
signifies centre building with a collective action capacity, providing some degree of 
political coordination and coherence. Formal legal institutions and a normative order 
based on some overarching constitutive principles, structures and practices both 
facilitate and constrain the ability to make and enforce binding decisions and to 
sanction non-compliance.” 
Lawton (1999), on the other hand, distinguishes between “Europeanization” 
“Europeification”. The former describes the transfer of power from national 
governments to the EU level, whereas, the latter relates to the sharing of power 
between the two levels. Some authors question whether the bottom-up 
conceptualisation depicted above is Europeanization, or merely a new label for 
European integration (Schmidt et al. 2002). For Featherstone and Kazamias (2001) it 
is the uncertain and unpredictable nature of Europeanization that sets it apart from 
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neofunctionalism (Haas 1992). Indeed, given that the effects of Europeanization are 
“not necessarily permanent or irreversible” (Featherstone 2003) there is room for a 
more realistic account of European integration than can be offered under the 
teleological assumption base of the neo-functionalist lens. Whereas, for Howlett and 
Ramesh (2002), it is the “uploading” or “vertical policy transfer” element in the 
“development of EU institutions” that constitutes the key difference between this 
conceptualisation of Europeanization and European integration. 
As Olsen (2002) has argued, it is not important to know what “Europeanization 
“really is” but whether and how the term can be useful for understanding the dynamics 
of the evolving European polity. That is, how eventually it may help us give a better 
account of the emergence, development and impact of a European, institutionally 
ordered system of governance”. As already noted, understanding the “emergence” and 
“development” (bottom-up) can prove to be useful, and indeed necessary, for 
understanding the “impact” (top-down).  
Moreover, Europeanization can be both institution building at the EU level as well 
as influencing the domestic level. The relationship between these two processes is an 
interactive one (Bulmer and Burch 2001). The EU does not exist independently out 
there over and above the Member States. The EU is also the product of Member State 
actions. Indeed, Europeanization cannot be translated neatly into the positivist 
language of dependent and independent variables and clearly identifiable 
unidirectional chains of causation. Instead, “Europeanization denotes an interactive, 
iterative process between actors, domestic and European or both, and the EU level is 
occupied by varied and competitive actors” (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001). In 
other words, in order to use the concept of Europeanization to explain policy outcomes 
it is necessary to explain what causes Europeanization in the first place.  
A clear implication of the bottom-up conceptualisation is the need to investigate 
power relations. As Olsen (2002) argues, “the research challenge is to identify the 
relevant actors and the motivations and forces that determine their choices” Likewise, 
the first question that is raised as the basis for the Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) policy 
transfer framework is “who is involved in the policy transfer process?” For Olsen 
(2002) agency is ascribed a particularly powerful role: “Policy transfer is “action-
oriented intentional learning – which takes place consciously and results in policy 
action” and that a “necessary, but insufficient criterion for identifying policy transfer 
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is therefore to identify the agent(s) of transfer, to specify the role played by the 
agents(s) and the nature of the transfer that the agents(s) are seeking to make”. 
In this context it is important to examine the “uploading” (Boerzel 1999) or 
“projection” (Bulmer and Burch 2001) of preferences and policies. However, as 
Héritier (1996) has argued, the EU regulatory framework can be best described as a 
“patchwork”, given that no one state can consistently have its preferred model adopted 
at the EU level. 
Moreover, for analytical clarity it is important to specify what is being transferred 
or uploaded and to what degree. The policy transfer literature provides some useful 
organising concepts. First, to clarify the object of transfer, it is useful to distinguish 
between policy goals, content and instruments (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). 
Similarly, Hall (1993) differentiates between goals (the overarching objective of 
the policy), instruments/techniques (policies to achieve these goals) and levels (the 
precise settings of the instruments). Second, in terms of degree, four gradations of 
transfer have been identified (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996): copying (direct and 
complete transfer); emulation (transfer of ideas behind the policy or programme); 
combinations (mixtures of several different policies); and inspiration (where policy in 
another jurisdiction may inspire a policy change, but where the final outcome does not 
actually draw upon the original).  
Finally, it is also essential to understand the respective policy sectors under 
empirical investigation. Indeed, “comparison of the different dynamics of institutional 
spheres and policy sectors is particularly required when institution building is seen to 
involve changes in action capabilities…” (Olsen 2002). Or as Lowi (1964) has put it, 
“a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every 
type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of relationship”. In other words, 
policy determines politics.  
According to all the considerations of above this research follows a top-down 
approach in order to investigate political, administrative and policy (design and 
financial) aspects of Europeanization process and its effects on regional policies. 
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3.2.2. Convergence and “goodness of fit” in national policies 
and institutions 
Most of the literature on the domestic impact of Europeanization tends to analyse 
the outcome of domestic change in terms of the likelihood of convergence of policies 
and institutions among the member states. But measuring convergence and divergence 
is extremely tricky. Answers vary according to the level at which one looks for 
convergence (Knill and Lenschow (2001) and the issue supposedly subject to 
convergence. 
Thus, the thesis needs to specify what is meant by “policy convergence”: i.e. 
convergence in outcomes (which equals compliance with EU law and, thus, is not 
particularly interesting to observe) or convergence in policy processes and 
instruments. This is often confused in the literature, as a result of which I know 
surprisingly little about the degree of policy convergence not related to policy 
outcomes. 
As to the degree of institutional convergence, resource dependency and 
sociological institutionalist approaches generally lean towards convergence. Resource 
dependency predicts a redistribution of resources strengthening one group of actors 
over the others or reinforcing their mutual dependence. Arguments about institutional 
isomorphism (see above) suggest that institutions, which frequently interact, are 
exposed to each other, or are located in a similar environment, become more similar 
over time (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Meyer and Rowen 1991). However, there is 
empirical evidence that the outcome of the domestic effects of Europeanization is 
much more diverse than either resource dependency or sociological institutionalist 
approaches would expect. 
The most comprehensive empirical studies on the domestic institutional effects of 
Europeanization so far showed that most empirical instances of domestic institutional 
change fall in the 'mixed' category whereby some countries converged toward similar 
policy or system-wide structures, while others retained their specific institutional 
arrangements, state-society relations, or cultural understandings (Kohler-Koch 1999; 
Héritier et al. 2001). There is not a single empirical case in which convergence meant 
the complete homogenization of domestic structures across member states. There is no 
evidence that domestic institutional change meant the comprehensive rejection of 
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national administrative styles, legal cultures, societal relationships, and/or collective 
identities. 
The multi-level governance approach developed, in particular, by Marks/Hooghe 
(Marks 1996, Hooghe 1996) analyses an empowerment of the regions and the 
establishment of a third level in European policies as the result of European as well as 
regional political initiatives. Regions become a fully-fledged actor by support of the 
European level in a multi-level arena. Proponents of the multi-level governance 
approach point to two different developments in European policies, an “upward 
stream” in policy formulation and a “downward stream” in policy implementation 
(Benz 2000). Firstly, regional actors organised at the European level, in particular by 
the 'Committee of the regions' to represent their own interest bypassing to some extent 
their respective national governments. This strategy is welcomed and supported by the 
Commission. Secondly, they were introduced by the Commission in the negotiations 
of the structural fund programmes, which encompass not less than one third of all 
spending at the European level. The empowerment of the regions is dependent on their 
strength in the national institutional framework and the degree of regional 
mobilisation (Marks 1996, Jeffery 2002).  
The coherency and validity of these arguments has been called into doubt on two 
grounds. Regional policy has always been a compensation for increased market 
competition brought about by the European Single Act and the European Monetary 
Union. In addition, the Commission tried to link state aid control to structural fund 
programmes in a way that would reinforce the efficacy of the latter. The two processes 
of mobilisation from below and from above turned out to be contradictory rather than 
reinforcing: on the one hand, regions that benefit from structural fund programmes 
mostly lack the institutional capacity to make full use of them and the political clout to 
be empowered by them. On the other hand, regions that actively promote their 
interests at the European level are among the most developed regions in Europe. They 
benefit less from European regional policies, but have to bear a significant part of the 
national contributions and are also constrained by state aid control. Therefore, such 
regions may even become outspoken against European regional policy (Baden-
Wuertemberg and Bavaria in Germany are cases in point). In this regard, proponents 
of a multi-level governance approach often neglect later developments in European 
policy that have extended the partnership principle to include economic and social 
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partners; these developments effected regional governments since they were aimed at 
changing the rules of sub national governance. 
The research contained in the thesis aims at addressing some of the aspects that 
remain open in the theoretical debate. First, as argued above, the “goodness of fit” 
between Europeanization, on the one hand, and the domestic policies, politics, and 
institutional arrangements, on the other, varies enormously among the member states, 
and within the same member state’s regions. Only those EU countries, which exhibit 
similar domestic arrangements, also face similar adaptational pressures as the 
necessary condition for domestic change. Second, and quite irrespective of the 
pressures for adaptation, each member state has a different set of institutions and 
actors facilitating or inhibiting change in response to these pressures.  
Central to this research is whether institutions (either central or regional) facing 
similar pressures for adaptation are likely to converge around similar outcomes, 
because similar actors are empowered and are likely to learn from each other in 
searching for ways to respond to adaptational pressure (Börzel 1999). Thus regions 
with similar settings are expected to converge toward similar outcomes/responses. 
The facilitating factors identified by two logics of domestic change can explain the 
absence of full convergence and should lead us to expect only partial, or some 
“clustered convergence”(Featherstone and Radaelli 2003), where convergence is 
intended as a process of change toward similar policies or institutions. Here my 
research finds its main filed of application and, possibly, contribution to the academic 
debate. 
 
3.3. Mediating factors in institutional change: the role 
of paradigms, paradigm shifts, and path 
dependence 
3.3.1. Paradigms in policies and institutions 
In recent years, public policy analysis has experienced a fundamental shift in 
theoretical and analytical focus towards the question of just how ideas, principles, 
values and beliefs influence and constrain both the behaviour of policy-makers and the 
dynamics of the policy-making process (see Surel 2000). In an attempt to grasp the 
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cognitive and normative dimensions of policy-making, a range of concepts have been 
developed: frames (Schon and Rein 1994); belief systems (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993); and paradigms (Hall 1993). All these notions aim to define a coherent set of 
normative and cognitive elements, which, within specific policy sectors, establish the 
identity, worldview, and practices of all those players accepting the same paradigm 
(frame, belief system). This approach is both interesting and fruitful, especially when 
policy change is under analysis and the analyst is dissatisfied with the traditional 
structuralist approach whereby changes are considered to be the direct effect of 
exogenous pressures.  
Boerzel and Risse (2003) believe that the content of policy changes is strictly 
related to the specific configuration of institutions, interests and ideas inherent to a 
given policy sector, and that within this context, the features of the articulation of 
normative and cognitive elements can determine the mechanisms of resistance, 
adaptation and/or transformation that constitute the reaction to such external pressures. 
The social sciences have adopted the concept of paradigm from epistemology (Kuhn 
1970). A public policy paradigm is the series of beliefs and ideas of policy-makers 
(those who materially formulate and implement policy) with regard to: (a) those 
normative and ontological tenets, those fundamental values, which are based on a 
specific worldview, and which underlie the individual and collective identities that, in 
turn, distinguish and govern the definition of the meaningful problems and the 
objectives to be pursued in a given public policy sector; (b) the causal theories 
underlying the construction of sectoral strategies for action; and (c) the individual 
public policy instruments that are used daily within a given public policy sector 
(Jenson 1989; Hall 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1999). In other 
words, “policy paradigms are cultural frameworks that govern the policy process” 
(O’Sullivan 1999).  
An interpretative approach based on the above-defined concept leads to the 
hypothesis that each public policy sector contains a coherent series of beliefs about the 
“things to be done”, and about “how” they should be done, which is shared by the 
principal players within that sector. The “things to be done” constitute the hard core of 
the paradigm or system of public policy beliefs. This core includes the basic, 
inexorable values that are to dictate policy strategy; values that cannot be negotiated, 
that represent the affective component of the system of beliefs, the one that brings 
together all those who adhere to a given paradigm. “How” things are to be done 
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constitutes the cognitive component of a policy paradigm; that is, the series of cause-
and effect relationships by means of which the participants formulate their general 
strategy of intervention and choose individual public-policy instruments. The 
cognitive component constitutes what Capano (2003) defines as the protective belt of 
the paradigm’s hard core composed of those beliefs underlying the choice of those 
policy strategies and instruments, which can best preserve the basic values of the 
paradigm itself. 
Clearly, the nearer you get to the hard core, the greater resistance to change you 
are going to encounter, provided that, rather than believing in established values, you 
consider the means and ways of pursuing such values to be negotiable (albeit with a 
different likelihood of success). That is, in certain circumstances those players sharing 
a given paradigm may be encouraged to modify the cognitive components of their 
own system of policy beliefs, provided such changes do not affect the hard core, the 
affective component, and the fundamental values of the paradigm itself.  
According to Boerzel and Risse 2003, this hypothetical interpretation is more 
useful when analysing the processes of change, including those of administrative 
reform.  Paradigmatic change can be conceived of in terms of the deep transformation 
of all the constitutive elements of a public policy (policy goals, policy strategies and 
programmes as well as policy tools) (Capano 2003). Normal or incremental change 
refers to adaptive modifications to the setting or institutional arrangements of public 
policies (policy instruments, policy programmes and policy strategies) without any 
conscious modifications being made to policy goals or values. It is usual for these two 
kinds of change to be normatively conceptualized:  paradigmatic change is conceived 
of as a radical, real, pure mutation, while incremental change is seen as marginal 
adaptation. While paradigmatic change is defined as a sudden, discontinuous and fast 
mutation, incremental change is slow and gradual.  
These assertions are arguable however. In fact, as Howlett and Ramesh (1998) 
maintain, paradigmatic change can be slow while incremental change can be rapid, 
depending on the presence/ absence of new interests in the policy arena. In keeping 
with this line of reasoning, an incremental change in policy instruments can be 
extremely meaningful in a specific context, substantially improving performance and 
establishing the basis for a subsequent paradigmatic change. Therefore, as has been 
suggested in public policy analysis (Howlett and Ramesh 2002) and in organization 
theory (Wollin 1999), the real explanatory problem is not that of establishing whether 
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one kind of change is more important than another, but that of trying to explain a 
whole spectrum of results of change, together with why a specific systemic or policy 
context tends more towards revolutionary/evolutionary dynamics than other contexts 
do. 
Following Capano’s (2003) approach, one way to address this issue is to focus on 
the concept of policy paradigm. In this research I assume that change will be 
increasingly “more” revolutionary, the more difficult it proves for the old paradigm to 
overcome the anomalies present within the given context. Accordingly, one of the 
most important factors here is the presence or absence of an alternative paradigm.  
In fact, the crises caused by these anomalies do not necessarily lead to the 
replacement of the old paradigm by a new one – as Hall asserts – unless such an 
alternative paradigm (shared by a cohesive network of policy-makers), is already 
present. The lack of an alternative paradigm, in fact, gives the institutionalized 
paradigm the chance to eliminate the anomalies by adapting to external inputs, and re-
elaborating some of its more marginal features. The presence of just one paradigm, 
unchallenged by any alternative model, occurs when the public-policy sector is 
characterized by the presence of that type of closed network known as a policy 
community. In such a case, the institutionalized paradigm may be defined as being 
“hegemonic” (Howlett and Ramesh 1998).   
As Capano (2003) maintains, ambitious administrative reform projects as ones 
addressed in this research may therefore be seen as an attempt to replace the prevailing 
paradigm within public administration, in the case where collective, systemic 
dissatisfaction has arisen over the efficacy of policy measures taken by the said 
administration. This is not a question of dealing with small anomalies or partial 
problems, but rather of restructuring the entire organizational and processual 
framework: these structural anomalies de-legitimize the existing paradigm, and thus 
call for a new solution. The resolution of the crisis of the institutionalised paradigm 
will depend on the presence or otherwise of an alternative paradigm. Ceteris paribus, 
if the latter exists, then the “reform” may (although not necessarily) lead to a 
“revolutionary” modification of the way administration is conducted; however, should 
there be no such alternative paradigm, then it may well be that the old paradigm 
proves capable of overcoming the crisis by means of an “evolutionary” process of 
adjustment of its instrumental components. 
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As it emerges from the academic debate, the “ideational variable” (Capano 2003) 
is essential to any comparative understanding of the different trajectories of 
administrative modernization and reform.  It is within such a framework that I now 
attempt an interpretation of the evolution of Italian institutional and administrative 
aspects of regional policies’ reforms.   
 
3.3.2. Paradigm shifts 
Regional policy has been in existence in Western Europe for over sixty years.  
Over the years, regional policy has become a prominent part of the widening 
economic and social policy intervention undertaken by all Western European 
governments. From the mid-1970s, regional policy began to change, in the wake of 
slower economic growth and a new political orthodoxy.  The redistribution of 
economic activity was superseded by a focus on endogenous development. Economic 
development became “multi-level”, first with the formation of regional development 
agencies and then a widening range of special-purpose or directly elected regional and 
local bodies.  In recent years, it is possible to identify a significant shift in the 
“paradigm” of regional development policies, structures and level of interaction. This 
shift in the economic and structural aspects of the paradigm adopted for the 
conceptualisation and implementation of regional policy has already been noted by 
Bachtler (2001)11 and others (Capellin R., Garofoli G and others 1988, and Amin 
1999), but these previous studies have not clearly illustrated the impact of the change 
in terms of the mechanisms used to managed regional policy nor in the evaluation of 
the outputs of the policy (e.g., expenditures and private resources mobilized) or of its 
outcomes (rate and level of growth, jobs created, and changes in institutional 
interactions). Aim of this research is to do this with regard to the Italian experience 
with regional policy in the period starting in 1950.  
In establishing a framework for this research I will proceed with the identification 
of the main features of the shift in the regional policy “paradigm” during the last five 
to six decades. It will be argued that there has been a fundamental change in all 
                                                      
11 Bachtler has described this shift in the development approach as one in which previously the emphasis was on 
the role of central governments in using the levers of subsidies to firms, infrastructure and the location of public sector 
activity to one focusing on the decentralized approach, “characterised by decentralised intervention based on integrated 
regional development plans and strategies” (Bachtler 2001), designed and delivered by partnerships of regional and 
local actors. 
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aspects of how regional development is conceptualised and how regional policies are 
conceived and delivered. This is clearly evident in the adaptation of the scheme by 
Bachtler (2001) presented in Chapter 1 to illustrate the different approaches to 
centralized and decentralized European regional policies with regard to: conceptual 
basis, policy characteristics, policy structure, organization of intervention, and the 
evaluation of results. 
Crucial in this shift has been the creation of political and administrative 
institutions at the sub-national level capable of assuming the responsibility of 
activating the new decentralized paradigm. Once the institutions are present it is 
possible to engage in bottom-up planning, the mobilization of local government and 
socio-economic forces, and the formulation of multi-year programmes. Finally, the 
shift in paradigm has also made it possible to place emphasis on the measurement of 
both the outputs and outcomes of the policies being pursued and enhance the diffused 
“ownership” of the regional policy by the various components in the regional society. 
After 1945, following the period of emergency reconstruction of physical 
infrastructure and production capital, regional concerns gradually moved onto the 
Italian policy agenda. During this period there was an increasing emphasis across 
Europe on equality issues and questions of distribution.  At the same time, the severity 
of regional disequilibria increased in many countries given the general movement of 
workers out of agriculture and into the cities seeking industrial employment.  The 
result was an increase in both unemployment and significant migratory flows. The gap 
between core and peripheral areas began to become noticeable and decision makers 
had to begin formulating policies to meet these needs.  As a result, serious concerns 
arose about congestion levels and infrastructure provision in many of the major 
agglomerations, with attendant inflationary pressures.  The economic case for regional 
policy was that it would enhance national development by taking up the employment 
slack in the problem regions whilst relieving inflationary and other pressures in more 
prosperous, congested areas.  At the time, there was a general confidence in 
government intervention, a conviction that the problems facing the economy could be 
solved if only the appropriate planning were undertaken and the correct policies 
adopted (Myrdal 1957, Yuill and Nicol 1982). 
The central focus of regional policymakers was on the prospects of regional 
convergence – reducing economic disparities between regions, especially differences 
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between core and periphery12.  Conceptually, regional policies were based on 
traditional theories of regional development – models of land prices (von Thünen, in 
Hall 1968), industrial location (Marshall 1964) and settlements (Christaller 1966, 
Lösch 1954).  The common characteristic of these theories was that they were 
concerned with explaining variations in the location of economic activity with 
reference to the attributes of regions or urban areas, such as the cost of land, 
transportation costs, market size and the availability of workers. Policies to reduce 
disparities were, therefore, generally developed to influence these factors of 
production (e.g., by reducing investment or employment costs, subsidising transport 
costs, providing cheap land and premises in the problem areas, while, in some cases, 
increasing the costs of development in the core or congested areas. 
Bachtler (2001) has observed, “Although there were significant differences in 
policy emphasis among Western European countries, the approach to regional policy 
was broadly similar”.  The major issues of concern to regional policymakers across 
Western Europe were primarily underdevelopment and depopulation in rural areas. In 
addition, regional policy also attempted to address problems of geographically 
concentrated unemployment.  The main policy objective was equity (equalising 
variations in standards of living and employment across the national territory) and the 
efficiency of national policies in achieving these broad socio-economic objectives.  
Problem areas were defined as those generally suffering from slow economic growth, 
low incomes and high unemployment. 
Despite the broad range of policy instruments, the focus of policy was essentially a 
narrow one, concerned with influencing economic activity through industrial location.  
Assistance was generally provided in the form of business aid and hard infrastructure. 
The mode of organisation was essentially top-down: the design of policy, the 
delimitation of assisted areas and the delivery of instruments were undertaken by 
central government (with the exception of some federal countries).  Particularly in the 
case of regional financial incentives, the policy was essentially demand-driven and 
reactive, responding to individual project applications from companies in the problem 
areas, or to specific political demands for an equalization of economic opportunities 
and socio-economic well-being. 
                                                      
12 See Mény Y. and V. Wright 1985 for a critical discussion of the centre-periphery relationships, and Cassese 
1986 for a specific analysis of these dynamics in the Italian case. 
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After the oil shocks of the early 1970s, the importance of regional policy 
diminished.  Economic conditions in Western Europe were characterised by a long-
term slowdown in growth and with sluggish increases in productivity, inflationary 
pressures, restricted investment, persistent widespread unemployment and pressures 
on state budgets.  The scope for government intervention was constrained, and the 
potential for compensating migration flows - of particular importance for relieving 
labour market pressures in the poorer countries – was curtailed. 
In the course of the late 1970s, and particularly during the 1980s, the political 
agenda across Western Europe moved against active government economic 
intervention, especially through subsidies to firms,13 and toward the consolidation of 
a competitive European market perspective. This shift from a national to a European 
market perspective made it possible to overcome a number of the characteristics that 
had predominated in the previous period, such as, the emphasis on national 
champions, active state intervention in the economy, subsidization of loss-making 
firms, placing parts of the national economy off-limits from competition (e.g., banks 
and other financial institutions, basic industry, large public and private monopolies, 
etc.).  During the 1980s the policy focus shifted towards privatisation, deregulation 
and the liberalisation of markets, growing competition across and within national 
borders, and the move away from state subsidies.  
In a number of countries, the effectiveness of regional policy was questioned and 
criticised.  Regional policy moved progressively down the national policy agenda, 
downgrading the policy goals of reducing disparities and promoting regional 
convergence.  New industrialization paradigms focussing on the role of small and 
medium enterprises have found support form policy makers and economists (Piore and 
Sabel 1984; Garofoli 1991). 
As argued by several scholars (Sharpe 1993 and Leonardi 1995), the “retreat” 
(Bachtler 2001) of central government from active regional and industrial policies was 
accompanied by the rise of a new regional and local dimension in economic 
development.  This was partly attributable to regional institution-building which 
accompanied the increasing delegation of authority for certain economic development 
activities with a view to enhancing local identification with policies and increasing 
local responsibility for economic development. The trend was also due to a growth in 
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“bottom up” initiatives, as local authorities and other groups began to develop and 
implement their own measures to deal with growing economic and social problems.  
At the same time, regional policy thinking was shifting towards the promotion of 
endogenous development – by definition regional or local - with a rediscovery of the 
importance of entrepreneurship and small and medium enterprises (Capellin R., 
Garofoli G and others 1988; Fuà and Zacchia 1982; Cappellin 1990).  The reduced 
dimension of enterprises was no longer viewed as a transition stage in the 
development of the firm but rather as a positive characteristic of firms in making them 
capable of quickly shifting their production according to the demands of national and 
international markets. 
From the mid-1980s onwards, new concepts of regional development began to be 
discussed. The competitiveness of economies was increasingly attributed to the ability 
to innovate, move into new markets, and shorten the time between the production and 
distribution of manufactured products (i.e., the “just-in-time” approach aimed at the 
reduction of the warehousing of goods and time to bring them to market).  In this 
context, new theories of regional development came to the fore, especially those 
concerned with industrial milieu and the role of clusters and networks.  The challenge 
for regional development was to respond to an increasingly complex mix of regional 
and local problems and the need to develop a more sophisticated approach to 
improving both regional capabilities and attributes with measures that had important 
social as well as economic components. In order to achieve these objectives a new 
regional policy was necessary. Regions could no longer remain as mere spectators of 
development policies initiated from the top; the new economic logic required them to 
become active partners in the planning and mobilization of resources in the pursuit of 
local and regional development.  
Parallel to the shift taking place in the policy paradigm and the drop in the 
importance of regional policy in national policy making, there was a growing interest 
at the European level on the socio-economic consequences of the creation of a 
reinforced European market. Concerns began to be expressed (Delors, 1986; EC 
Periodic Reports) that the creation of an integrated market at the European level would 
give rise to increased regional disparities: i.e., the rich would get richer and the poor 
would get poorer. This concern reached its apex with the formulation of the Single 
European Act (ratified in 1986 by the twelve member states, including Spain and 
Portugal) and the initiation of a pro-active European regional policy. It was the 1988 
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reform of the Structural Funds that marked a new era in regional strategic planning 
promoted by the European level.  
Before, regional policy had been firm-centred, standardized, incentive-based and 
state-driven. This was certainly true in the case of the Keynesian legacy that 
dominated regional policy in the majority of advanced economies after the 1960s.  It 
relied on income redistribution and welfare policies to stimulate demand in the lagging 
regions and the offer of state incentives (from state aid to infrastructural 
improvements) to individual firms to locate in such regions.  
The achievements of such an “imperative” approach (Amin, 1999) had been 
modest in terms of stimulating sustained improvements in the economic 
competitiveness and developmental potential of the lagging regions. Keynesian 
regional policies, without doubt, helped to increase employment and income in the 
lagging regions, but they failed to secure increases in productivity comparable to those 
in the more prosperous regions and, more importantly, they did not succeed in 
encouraging self-sustaining growth based on the mobilization of local resources and 
interdependencies (by privileging non-indigenous sectors and externally-owned 
firms).  
Partly in response to these failings, more innovative policy alternatives began to 
be explored, informed by the experience of prosperous regions characterized by strong 
local economic interdependencies (e.g. Italian industrial districts, Baden Wurttemberg, 
and the emerging centres of development in Spain—e.g. Barcelona—and southern 
France—Lyon and Grenoble). It was a policy alternative centred on mobilizing the 
endogenous potential of the lagging regions through efforts to upgrade a broadly 
defined local supply-base (Camagni 1991; Garofoli 1991, 1992).  Amin observed in 
1999 that “This is not an approach with a coherent economic theory behind it, nor is 
there a consensus on the necessary policy actions” (Amin 1999), but despite these 
shortcomings the compelling features of the new approach were undeniable.  The 
axioms of the new approach contrasted sharply with those of the previous policy in 
favouring a bottom-up, region-specific, longer-term and plural-actor based approach.  
Conceptually, Amin (1999) has described the new approach as “against the 
individualism of the orthodoxy, it recognizes the collective or social foundations of 
economic behaviour, for which reason it can be described as an institutionalist 
perspective on regional development.” 
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3.3.3. Path dependence 
As stated in Crouch and Farrell 2002, the concept of path dependence is being 
used in highly deterministic ways in neo-institutionalist analysis, so that studies using 
this framework have difficulty in accounting for, or predicting, change. However, the 
original model from which path dependence theory draws predicts that alternative 
paths will be possible. It can be argued that actors will be able to use these when they 
perceive a need to change. 
The theory of path dependence builds upon mathematical modelling techniques – 
so-called Polya urn processes – in which early events in a series have a substantial 
effect on later ones. Path dependence thus seeks to capture the frequently observed 
phenomenon that performance of an action can in itself make more likely its 
subsequent performance (Arthur 1994). This is very different from the more familiar 
case in probability theory, where if one tosses a fair coin repeatedly, or if a blind agent 
repeatedly draws one of two balls, one red one white, from an urn and simply replaces 
them after each draw, there is an equal probability of either outcome. In both cases, 
the aggregated outcomes will tend towards a 50:50 ratio of heads to tails, or red balls 
to white balls, over repeated iterations. While one of the two possible alternatives 
might have a temporary dominance in the first few tosses or draws, this dominance 
will disappear over time. 
Path dependence, in contrast, seeks explicitly to model circumstances in which 
early events increase the possibility of later events of the same sort occurring. 
Douglass North (1990) argues that institutions too are subject to the forces of 
increasing returns. In what is perhaps the most influential application of path 
dependence theory, he seeks to explain a near-inexplicable puzzle for efficiency based 
approaches to economics; why it is that countries in the developing world have not 
converged on the more efficient set of institutions offered by the developed world. He 
argues that the divergences in the economic histories of North and South America may 
in large part be explained by the differing initial institutional matrices they inherited 
from Spain and Britain respectively. Most recently, Paul Pierson (2000a, 2000b) has 
sought to build upon this by offering a more general set of insights into institution 
building as a path dependent process. In Pierson’s argument, initial institutional steps 
may have a strong conditioning effect on later ones. Insofar as institutions generate 
learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations, they may substantially 
affect trajectories of institutional development, so that later institutions reflect these 
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earlier steps. Positive feedback may in turn lead to a single equilibrium that is likely to 
be resistant to change. As Pierson further points out (see especially Pierson 2000b), 
this provides an alternative to functionalist variants of rational choice institutionalism. 
Thus, path dependence gains much of its explanatory interest from its demonstration 
that persistently inefficient equilibria may result from initial choices.  
Even in situations where paths of institutional development are clearly 
inappropriate to the current environment, they may persist; the costs of moving from 
one path to another may be extremely high, and much too high for any individual actor 
to take on his own. However, major change does occasionally occur, and path 
dependence theory offers little guidance as to how changes of path may be modelled. 
While Arthur (1994) offers some preliminary contentions about the likely costs of 
changes, these do not serve (nor are intended to serve) as a theory. Two responses to 
this may be seen in the literature. Sophisticated applications of the theory (North, 
1990a; Pierson 2000a) acknowledge the difficulty. They seek to avoid determinism, 
arguing that short periods of wide-ranging change are likely to be succeeded by much 
longer periods in which change continues, but is relatively closely bounded (Pierson 
2000a); but they fail to advance arguments about what such wide-ranging change 
involves, and how actors will respond to it.  Less sophisticated versions misunderstand 
path dependence, arguing that paths are set at a given point in time, so that actors are 
ineluctably condemned to follow out a specific trajectory without possibility of change 
or exit.  
An application can be found in the account of Italian regional development in 
Putnam (1993). While Putnam suggests in his conclusions that change is possible, he 
does not seek to integrate this suggestion with the main body of his argument, which 
emphasises how the dead hand of path dependence weighs on current political 
outcomes.  
The principle of path dependency states that “history matters” in that initial and 
existing conditions shape present and future socio-economic behaviour. Even in 
purely economic terms, product development can be “locked-in” to paths of increasing 
or decreasing returns to scale (Arthur, 1989). Within dissenting institutionalism, path 
dependency is conceived more broadly to capture the reinforcing interactive effects of 
social, political and economic factors in locking in the trajectories of processes of 
change.  
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In this regard, Myrdal’s (1957) concept of circular interdependence and 
cumulative causation is a significant intellectual antecedent. As Kapp (1976) records, 
Myrdal formally elaborated on the principle of circular interdependence and 
cumulative causation to confront prevailing (neoclassical) beliefs in equilibrium 
tendencies. In Myrdal’s (1957) words, “In the normal case a change does not call forth 
countervailing changes but, instead, supporting changes, which move the system in the 
same direction as the first change but much further. Because of such circular causation 
a social process tends to become cumulative and often to gather speed at an 
accelerating rate”. In this view, socioeconomic structures and problems are created by 
a complex range of economic and social (or institutional) factors that are intrinsically 
interlocked and “it is useless to look for one predominant factor, such as the 
“economic factor”“ (Myrdal 1957). 
Myrdal’s principle is an hypothesis about the dynamics of embeddedness, in 
which “initial conditions”, in the form of prevailing attitudes, policies and established 
structures, are influential in shaping the momentum of a wide variety of economic and 
non-economic interlocking forces. Myrdal’s pioneering conception of cumulative 
causation is clearly linked to path dependency, and “locked-in” behaviour through 
emphasis on sequential, related and cumulating processes. If path dependency is not 
tied solely to cases dominated by disequilibrium and inequality, this approach implies 
that cumulative causation is at least an extremely significant expression of path 
dependent behaviour14.  
Within economic geography, path dependency often implies pejorative (corporate, 
regional and industrial) behaviour equated with lock-in to outdated modes of thinking 
by vested interests of (disproportionately) powerful corporations, unions and 
governments (Clark, 1986). Yet path dependency is a fundamental basis for socially 
progressive developments. 
For Hodgson (2001), the problem of historical specificity is complemented by 
recognition that geographic differences are to some extent “essential” or fundamental. 
This respect (within dissenting institutional economics) for geographic difference is 
                                                      
14 Path-dependent and cumulative causation processes may be socially virtuous or vicious, and both of these 
forms of trajectories are widespread. Myrdal (1957) was especially concerned with understanding the complex, 
engrained social problems of racism and poverty, initially in the USA and then Asia that were trapped by socially 
vicious processes of cumulative causation.  
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founded on the embeddedness of economies in which economic processes are 
socialized (and politicized), rationality is multi-faceted and that in different places 
people behave and think differently. 
Similarly, Barnes (1996) and Storper (1997) respectively claim that the global 
economy is replete with “local models” or “regional worlds of production” which are 
significantly different even as they are connected to one another. As Johnston (1984) 
observes, the uniqueness of regions is not based on their “singularity” or pure 
“localness”, but on the interplay between local (endogenous) and global (exogenous) 
dynamics. Moreover, global–local dynamics that shape social economies are not 
abstract, independent forces but instituted and interactive, in which global institutions 
are controlled outside the local, however the local is geographically defined (e.g. state, 
county, metropolitan area, community or the generic “region”).  
“In a dissenting institutional landscape, regions are themselves institutions, albeit 
complex ones” (Hayter 2004).  The idea of regions as institutions is captured by 
Holmén”s (1995) metaphor of regions as “meeting places for both endogenous (local) 
and exogenous (global) processes”. As “meeting places”, regions are where 
institutional habits, routines, values and conventions are shared and debated. Regions 
are complex institutions or meeting places because they organize or feature the 
interactions of “multiple voices” among multiple institutions that may be 
complementary or in conflict (Martin 2000).  
Economic geographers have recognized this tradition but its continuity and 
compass is not fully appreciated. To provide such an appreciation, this argues that the 
paradigmatic distinctiveness of dissenting institutionalism rests especially on its 
recognition that real world economies are embedded, have histories or evolve, and are 
different. The discussion is based around the region as an institution, albeit a complex 
one.  
 
3.4. Adaptation in institution and policies: alternative 
outcomes in academic debate 
As Kassim suggests (2003) we need to use the compliance to Europeanization by 
member states in its broadest sense given that European integration subjects national 
governments to unique and exacting pressures and imposes strict requirements on their 
participation in the processes of EU decision-making. The expectation of convergence 
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arises from two different perspectives: from rational choice institutionalism (Hall and 
Taylor 1996) and from the new institutionalism in organizational analysis (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991).  
According to the former, institutions in a shared institutional environment are 
likely to grow increasingly similar, as they converge around the most efficient 
organizational form. 'Optimization' (Harmsen 1999) takes place as member states copy 
from their counterparts the structures or procedures that have proved to be the most 
successful. The result is 'a gradual convergence of national practices around the most 
effective solutions to.” common problems”(Harmsen 1999). According to the latter, 
organizations in a common institutional environment are likely to become increasingly 
similar as a result of two additional factors: coercion -in an EU context, the 
obligations and pressures that flow from hard and 'soft' rules (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991); and mimicry—the copying by some organizations of the mechanisms or 
features of other organizations. 
An opposite thesis—the “continuing divergence” hypothesis—emerges from 
sociological institutionalism. March and Olsen (1984, 1989), its main exponents, 
contest the view that institutions are always efficient and argue that organizations are 
likely to respond to external pressures by interpreting them in terms of pre-existing 
structures and values. From this perspective, existing differences between 
organizations are likely to be reproduced, even when they are placed in the same 
environment, since their adaptation to outside conditions is likely to be mediated by 
internally generated “logics of appropriateness”. Applying this view to national 
coordination systems, Harmsen (1999) argues that a logic of divergence that is more 
likely to prevail. 
Several similarities emerge from the study of twelve member states (Kassim et al. 
2001). All have put in place specific arrangements for coordinating EU policy making; 
the responsibilities of existing actors have been adjusted and new ones created, 
coordination mechanisms have been introduced or developed, and special processes 
and procedures established. Although not insignificant, the similarities between the 
coordination systems created by the member states are overshadowed by the 
differences that emerge from detailed inspection. These differences are apparent even 
with respect to the seven features identified above. 
In comprehensive decentralized systems, found in Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands, issue coverage is extensive, but no single actor, 
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even the head of government, has the power routinely to impose solutions on the other 
players in technical policy fields. Coordination is led by the relevant technical 
ministry, which effectively decides the national standpoint, and tends to be minimal, 
compared to the positive, directive ambition that informs centralized systems. 
Although venues exist at the centre in all states that fall under this category—in 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands—or at the interstices between 
sectors, as in Belgium, the function of these arenas is to allow participants to exchange 
views and information, and not usually to resolve conflict between departments.  
Whether studying policies, politics, or polities, there are two conditions for 
expecting domestic changes in response to Europeanization. First, Europeanization 
must be 'inconvenient', that is, there must be some degree of 'misfit' or incompatibility 
between European-level processes, policies, and institutions, on the one hand, and 
domestic-level processes, policies, and institutions, on the other. This degree of fit or 
misfit leads to adaptational pressures, which constitute a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for expecting domestic change. The second condition is that various 
facilitating factors—be it actors, be it institutions—respond to the adaptational 
pressures, thus inducing the change. 
One can conceptualize the adaptational processes in response to Europeanization 
in two ways, which in turn lead to different emphases concerning these facilitating 
factors. Here, I refer to two variants of the 'new institutionalism' in political science, 
rational choice institutionalism, on the one hand, and sociological (or constructivist) 
institutionalism, on the other (see March and Olsen 1989, 1998; Hall and Taylor 1996; 
Risse 2002).  
From a rationalist perspective following the 'logic of consequentialism', the misfit 
between European and domestic processes, policies, and institutions provides societal 
and/or political actors with new opportunities and constraints to pursue their interests. 
Whether such changes in the political opportunity structure lead to a domestic 
redistribution of power, depends on the capacity of actors to exploit these 
opportunities and avoid the constraints.  This strand of the literature identifies two 
mediating factors with opposite effects influence these capacities:  Multiple veto 
points in a country's institutional structure can effectively empower actors with diverse 
interests to resist adaptational pressures emanating from Europeanization. Formal 
institutions might exist providing actors with material and ideational resources to 
exploit new opportunities, leading to an increased likelihood of change.  The logic of 
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rationalist institutionalism suggests that Europeanization leads to domestic change 
through a differential empowerment of actors resulting from a redistribution of 
resources at the domestic level.   
In contrast, a sociological or constructivist perspective emphasizes a 'logic of 
appropriateness' (March and Olsen 1989) and processes of persuasion. European 
policies, norms, and the collective understandings attached to them exert adaptational 
pressures on domestic-level processes, because they do not resonate well with 
domestic norms and collective understandings. Two mediating factors influence the 
degree to which such misfit results in the internalization of new norms and the 
development of new identities:  'Change agents' mobilize in the domestic context and 
persuade others to redefine their interests and identities.   A political culture and other 
informal institutions exist which are conducive to consensus building and cost-
sharing. Sociological institutionalism suggests that Europeanization leads to domestic 
change through a socialization and collective learning process, resulting in norm 
internalization and the development of new identities. 
The two logics of change are not mutually exclusive. They often occur 
simultaneously or characterize different phases in a process, of adaptational change. 
My research aims at providing an interpretation of how to link the two mechanisms 
and to specify conditions under which each logic is dominant. 
Whether focusing on policies, politics, or polity, the general proposition that 
Europeanization affects the member states is no longer controversial. As well, it can 
be identified an emerging consensus that Europeanization has a differential impact on 
domestic policies, politics, or polities (see Kohler-Koch1999; Kohler-Koch and 
Eising1999; Cowles et al.2001; Héritier et al.2001).  
The issue is no longer whether Europe matters but how it matters, to what degree, 
in what direction, at what pace, and at what point of time. In other words, the literature 
on the domestic impact of Europe has focused on identifying the causal mechanisms 
through which Europeanization can affect the member states. Most studies draw on 
several mechanisms to explain the domestic change they observe (see e.g. Héritier et 
al. 1996; Hooghe 1996; Haverland 1999; Knill and Lehnkuhl 1999; Börzel 2002; 
Héritier et al. 2001).  
We argue below that the different causal mechanisms can be collapsed into two 
logics of domestic change. While focusing on different causal mechanisms, most 
studies share the proposition that Europeanization is only likely to result in domestic 
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change if it is 'inconvenient'. There must be some 'misfit' (Duina 1999) or 'mismatch' 
(Héritier et al. 1996) between European and domestic policies, processes, and 
institutions. The 'goodness of fit' (Risse et al. 2001) between the European and the 
domestic level determines the degree of pressure for adaptation generated by 
Europeanization on the member states: The lower the compatibility between European 
and domestic processes, policies, and institutions, the higher the adaptational pressure. 
In brief, misfit and resulting adaptational pressures constitute the starting point for 
any causal mechanism discussed in the literature. Ultimately, adaptational pressures 
are generated by the fact that the emerging European polity encompasses structures of 
authoritative decision making which might clash with national structures of policy 
making, and that the EU member states have no exit option given that EU law 
constitutes the law of the land. This is a major difference to other international 
institutions, which are simply based on voluntary intergovernmental arrangements. I 
distinguish two types of misfits by which Europeanization exerts adaptational pressure 
on the member states. 
First, European policies might lead to a policy misfit between European rules and 
regulations, on the one hand, and domestic policies, on the other. Policy misfits 
essentially equal compliance problems. European policies can challenge national 
policy goals, regulatory standards, the instruments or techniques used to achieve 
policy goals, and/or the underlying problem-solving approach (Héritier et al. 1996; 
Börzel 2000). Such policy misfit can also exert adaptational pressure on underlying 
institutions (Caporaso and Jupille 2001; Sbragia 2001; Schneider 2001). As a result, 
all member states—including the 'big three', Great Britain, France, and Germany—
face significant, albeit different degrees of adaptational pressures when they have to 
download European policies (Börzel 2002; Cowles et al. 2001). 
Liberal intergovernmentalism, for example, implies that bargains are struck among 
the powerful member states at the level of lowest common denominator 
(Moravcsik1993, 1998). It follows that Britain, France, and Germany are unlikely to 
face significant adaptational pressures from Europeanization. This proposition is 
thoroughly refuted by the available evidence on Europeanization effects (e.g. Duina 
1999; Knill and Lenschow 2000; Cowles et al. 2001; Héritier et al. 2001). From a 
different theoretical angle, sociological institutionalism would expect that the more 
institutional structures at the European and domestic levels look alike (structural 
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isomorphism), the less adaptational pressures member states should face (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991; Olsen 1995).  
This latter argument points to a second type of misfit and adaptational pressure, 
which I need to distinguish from policy misfit. Europeanization can cause institutional 
misfit, challenging domestic rules and procedures and the collective understandings 
attached to them. European rules and procedures, for example, which give national 
governments privileged decision powers vis-à-vis other domestic actors, challenge the 
territorial institutions of highly decentralized member states which grant their regions 
autonomous decision powers (Börzel 2002).  
Policy or institutional misfit, however, is only the necessary condition for 
domestic change. Whether misfits produce a substantial effect at the domestic level 
depends on the presence of various factors facilitating adaptation and serving as 
catalysts for domestic change. Only if and when these intervening factors are present 
can I expect a transformation of policies, politics, or polities in the member states. 
The domestic effect of Europeanization can be conceptualized as a process of 
change at the domestic level in which the member states adapt their processes, 
policies, and institutions to new practices, norms, rules, and procedures that emanate 
from the emerging European system of governance (Olsen 1996). Rationalist and 
sociological institutionalisms identify different mechanisms of institutional change, 
which can be equally applied to the change of policies and politics. The two logics of 
change stress different factors facilitating domestic adaptation in response to 
Europeanization. 
Rationalist institutionalism embodies a 'logic of consequentialism' (March and 
Olsen, 1998), which treats actors as rational, goal-oriented, and purposeful. Actors 
engage in strategic interactions using their resources to maximize their utilities on the 
basis of given, fixed, and ordered preferences. They follow an instrumental rationality 
by weighing the costs and benefits of different strategy options taking into account the 
(anticipated) behaviour of other actors. From this perspective, Europeanization is 
largely conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure, which offers some 
actors additional resources to exert influence, while severely constraining the ability of 
others to pursue their goals. Liberal intergovernmentalists have suggested that 
European opportunities and constraints strengthen the action capacities of national 
executives enhancing their autonomy vis-à-vis other domestic actors (Moravcsik 
1994).  
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The two logics generate different propositions about the degree and direction of 
domestic change. Both take misfit as the necessary condition of domestic change and 
converge around the expectation that the lower the misfit, the smaller the pressure for 
adaptation and thus the lower the degree of expected domestic change. But the two 
logics depart on the effect of high adaptational pressure. 
The rationalist institutionalist perspective suggests that the more Europeanization 
provides new opportunities and constraints (high adaptational pressure), the more 
likely a redistribution of resources is, which may alter the domestic balance of power 
and which may empower domestic actors to effectively mobilize for policy change by 
overriding domestic veto points. Medium adaptational pressure is also likely to result 
in domestic transformation if there are supporting formal institutions. In the presence 
of multiple veto points, however, medium adaptational pressure will be at best 
accommodated, if not absorbed, even if this means non-compliance in case of policy 
misfit. Finally, the mere absorption of low pressure of adaptation may be prevented by 
formal institutions, which support domestic actors in exploiting modest new 
opportunities. 
Sociological institutionalism, by contrast, argues that high adaptational pressure is 
likely to meet strong institutional inertia preventing any domestic change. New norms, 
rules, and practices do not simply replace or harmonize existing ones. Profound and 
abrupt changes should only be expected under conditions of crisis or external coercion 
(Olsen 1996). Actors are more open to learning and persuasion, if new norms and 
ideas, albeit 'inconvenient', are compatible with collectively shared understandings and 
meaning structures. Therefore, medium pressure for adaptation is most likely to result 
in domestic transformation, at least in the long run. Processes of adaptation evolve 
along institutional paths.  In sum, the two logics predict opposite outcomes under 
conditions of high adaptational pressure. Moreover, sociological institutionalism 
would expect domestic change beyond absorption only as the result of a long-term 
process of incremental adaptation.  
 
Unfortunately, the available empirical evidence does not allow us yet to evaluate 
these propositions. Further systematic research is necessary to link the various causal 
mechanisms. This research contributes investigating  how paradigm shift and path 
dependence acted as mediating factors within the dynamic described above.  
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NextThe next chapter will address political and administrative (Chapter 4) 
responses to regionalization and Europeanization. Chapter 5 and 6 are focused on 
regionalization and Europeanization (respectively) with an in depth analysis of 
evolution dynamics in regional policy design and implementation. Case study analysis 
helps in providing  additional elements and understanding. 
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4. POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO 
REGIONAL AND EUROPEAN ADAPTATIONAL PRESSURES  
 
This Chapter investigates the evolution of political and institutional variables as 
defined in Chapter 2, informing the framework for regional policies in Italy. 
 
4.1. Framing the process: subjects, objects, and rules  
4.1.1. The framework: the Italian Constitution 
Under its 1948 Constitution Italy is a unitary State with four levels of government: 
central State, regions, provinces and communes.  Apart from the introduction of new 
electoral rules enhancing political stability, which have affected all these levels, the 
past four decades has brought particularly rapid change for Italian sub-national 
government.  The powers of regional and local authorities have been strengthened, 
notably by measures enacted in last Nineties, and their administrative powers have 
been increased15.   
The Italian constitution of 1946 had foreseen the creation of the regions from the 
beginning, but it was not until 1972 that the fifteen regions with “ordinary statute” 
were really created as functioning sub-national planning and policy entities.  At the 
beginning of the 1990s a strong tendency towards federalism could be observed in 
Italy within the context of a broader institutional reform process.   
 The power earmarked for the Regions were encompassed in the Article 117 of 
the Constitution (1948), which empowered the regions to decide matters dealing 
with city and provincial government, local police, fairs and markets, public works 
projects and aqueducts, ports, mineral waters, quarries, hunting and fishing, 
agriculture, and craftsmanship.  In subsequent articles (118-133) the Constitution 
provided the basic framework for regional governments’ structures, their 
components (art121), defined their financial sources (art 119) and relation with 
                                                      
15 Legge Costituzionale 22 novembre 1999 n.1 “Disposizioni concernenti l’elezione diretta del Presidente della 
Giunta regionale e l’autononomia statutaria delle Regioni”, published on the Italian official Bullettin n.299 December 
22nd 1999. 
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local governments (Art 118,130, 133) and stipulated the nature of the central 
government authority over the regions (Art 123-127).)  
 The Constitution also made the distinction between five regions, of which two in 
the Mezzogiorno (Sicily, Sardinia, Val d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, and Friuli 
Venezia Giulia) that were allocated “particular conditions of autonomy” and whole 
special statutes were adopted separately through specific pieces of legislation.  Sicily 
and Sardinia special statutes have been drafted in 1949.  The statutes of the other 
regions were to be implemented according to uniform criteria.  There was no 
differentiation of powers among “ordinary regions”. 
The Constitution left many gaps to be filled by subsequent legislation, through 
transitional norms16. One of these, the VIII encompassed the creation of regional 
governments within one year.  The regional election bill was finally introduced in 
Parliament on March 10th 1967.  The bill became Law (n.104) only on February 17th 
1968: the Law provided for the election of regional councils based on universal 
suffrage, and the holding of regional elections at the end of 1969, which was later, 
moved b legislation to 1970.  The Law n.249 February 18th 1968 was encompassing an 
overall reform of Central Government institutions in preparation for the 
implementation of regional devolution. 
In the subsequent years, the process of devolution has been characterized by two 
different approaches.  The first approach (1970-72) was dominated by national 
governmental and administrative groups.  The second approach (1973-77) was 
controlled by the Parliament. 
At the beginning of 1970 the government set out to introduce two bills that would 
implement the regional reform.  The first, Law 281 May 16th 1970, identified the 
financial resources to be provided to the regions, set out that the Parliament would 
pass “framework” legislation establishing the parameters for regional legislative 
activities, and allocated to the Government the responsibility for preparing the decrees 
transferring the regions’ their constitutional administrative responsibilities.  The 
second Law, n.775 October 28th 1970, obliged the Government to formulate decrees 
for the purpose of reforming the central government institutions.  The regional 
elections took place on June 7th 1970, and the Regions started to operate in the 
changed institutional framework starting 1971. 
                                                      
16 “Disposizioni transitorie” in the original text. 
  94 
After the first two years, the specification of administrative functions to be 
devolved was left up to the national bureaucracy to decide, since each ministry had to 
draw up its own devolution decrees. The financial arrangements made the regions still 
strictly dependent upon the Central Government.  The decrees promulgated in 1972 
created an institutional framework where the regions have been subordinated to 
nationally determined policies.   
During 1972-73 the Central Government undertook a change in the structure of 
local government finances.  The Government centralized all taxing powers and made 
regional governments largely dependent on “transfers” form the Central Government. 
The second period has begun in 1973.  In September 1973, the Inter-parliamentary 
Commission, with Lombardia, Emilia Romagna and Toscana as the most active 
players,17 started to act in order to prepare a new bill on devolution and regional 
autonomy.  The pressure towards a new law on regional autonomy has been increasing 
during 1974.  The First Commission on Constitutional Norms and Local Government 
was assigned the task of redrafting the administrative and institutional framework for 
regional governments.  This process led to the approval of the Law 382/1975. Law 
382 delegated to the government the responsibility of completing the devolution of 
power in accordance to specific criteria: all the powers attributed by the constitution to 
the regions had to be transferred to the regions from the Ministries of Central 
Government bodies presently acting in that areas; the remaining administrative 
functions that had not been passed in 1972 reform had to be decentralized; all the state 
expenditures that directly or indirectly were attributable to the regions had to be 
eliminated, all agencies in areas of regional responsibility that bridged more than one 
region had to be transferred; the regions had to have full administrative and legislative 
powers within the limitations of national and European Community directives18.  In 
1977, the regions rejected the draft decrees presented concerning the procedures of 
devolution “either in qualitative and quantitative terms.”19 
The Decree of the President of the Republic (DPR) n.616/1978 encompassed 
relevant changes in the definition of the regional competences, but it had affected only 
partially the structure of Central Government, neither in the bureaucratic aspects, nor 
                                                      
17 See also Leonardi 1993, p.228. 
18 See also Camera dei Deputati L’attuazione della “382”, Rome 1977. 
19 Leonardi 1993, pag230 
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in terms of legislative procedures.  In the period between the end of 1970s and the 
beginning of the 1980s, the regions faced with the problem of the economic crisis, and 
with recurring budget reductions by the Central Government (1978 and 1979). 
In 1980 the Inter-parliamentary Commission suggested the creation of a State-
Regions conference. The members of the conference, called for the first time on 
October 12th 1983, were: the president of the Regions, the Prime Minister, and the 
Ministers of Treasury, Regions and Budget.  The joint Conference between regions 
and National Government (Conferenza Stato-Regioni) was to discuss all the matters 
related to EU affairs, to serve as forum for the information exchange and to prepare 
common positions of the Italian Regions.   
 
The evolution in the nature of the State-Regions Conference is the result of 
national institutional dynamics that informed the institutional change in the recent 
decades.  The Conference has been an instrument of information, from the Central 
State, for the Regions.  The Law n.59 March 15th 1997 changed its role dramatically.  
According to Law n.59/1997 the Conference became the main instrument of co-
ordination between the Central Government and the Regions.  With the Decree Law 
n.281 August 28th 1997 it became mandatory for the Central Government to consult 
the Conference with respect of any legislative act concerning the aspect encompassed 
in Regional competencies. This model was “qualitatively different”20 from the one 
implemented in the first years of the process of devolution.  The first ten years’ 
approach was focused on the separation of sector responsibilities between Central and 
Local Government; the new one was based on the inter-relation between the two 
levels of government, approaching the principles of “partnership,” also encompassed 
in the European Union institutional framework.  
 
4.1.2. The actors: Structures of government 
The following paragraphs describe the different administrative actors relevant for 
the present analysis.  The description encompasses the political and administrative 
settings in each level of administrative “space”.  The present research will consider the 
Italian Mezzogiorno, and, more specifically four Regions (and their provinces, and 
                                                      
20 Leonardi 1993, p.233. 
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communes), considered as Case Studies: two ordinary regions (Calabria and Puglia) 
and two Special statute regions (Sicily and Sardinia).  Accordingly, hereafter I present 
a brief description of the administrative features of each level of government 
encompassed in the area examined: 
 2 “special statute” Regions, Sicily and Sardinia, created with the 1947 
Constitution.  The President of the Region is elected by universal direct suffrage, 
and represents the Region, promulgates laws and regional regulations.  The Giunta 
regionale (Regional government) is appointed and may be dismissed by the 
President of the Region, who may appoint members outside of the Regional 
Council 
 2 “ordinary” Regions: Calabria and Puglia.  Within the Consiglio regionale 
(Regional council), 80% of its members are elected by universal direct suffrage 
under the proportional system from provincial lists, and the 20%is elected by 
direct universal suffrage under the majority electoral system from regional lists 
(Art.1 Law 43/1995).  Under the new Art.122 of the Constitution, the Regions 
may draw-up their own electoral system.  Legislative and supervisory powers are 
delegated to the President of the Council, which is elected by the Council and 
steers its work.   
 23 Province (provinces), located respectively in Calabria (5), Puglia (5), Sicily (9) 
and Sardinia (4).  President of the province is elected by Universal direct suffrage; 
Consiglio provinciale (Provincial council) is elected by universal direct suffrage: 
it only provides general policy guidance; decision-making body, approves budget 
estimates and disbursement; the Giunta (executive committee) has wide-ranging 
powers to implement guidelines set by the Council  
 1.434 Comuni (local authorities), located respectively in Calabria (409), Puglia 
(258), Sicily (390), Sardinia (377).  Municipal council elected by universal direct 
suffrage, majority system for areas with a population of less than 15,000 otherwise 
proportional system; has general powers and approves budgets; decision-making 
body; Giunta (executive committee) appointed by the mayor, who delegates some 
powers to it, acts in accordance with the Council's guidelines.  Sindaco (Mayor) in 
municipalities with populations of 15,000 or under is elected under the majority 
system by universal direct suffrage.  In the event of a tie, a second round is held 
between the two candidates with the highest number of votes (Art.5 Law 
81/1993).  With populations of over 15.000, elected by universal direct suffrage 
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with an absolute majority of valid votes.  If no candidate gains this majority, a 
second round is held (Art.6 Law 81/1993). 
 
4.2. The Regionalization in institutions: administrative 
and political aspects 
The power earmarked for the Regions were encompassed in the Article 117 of the 
Constitution (1948), which empowered the regions to decide matters dealing with city 
and provincial government, local police, fairs and markets, public works projects and 
aqueducts, ports, mineral waters, quarries, hunting and fishing, agriculture, and 
Handcraft.  In subsequent articles (art.118-133) the Constitution provided the basic 
framework for regional governments’ structures, their components (art.121), defined 
their financial sources (art.119) and relation with local governments (Art. 118,130, 
133) and stipulated the nature of the central government authority over the regions 
(Art. 123-127). 
The Constitution also made the distinction between five regions, of which two in 
the Mezzogiorno (Sicily, Sardinia, Val d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, and Friuli 
Venezia Giulia) that were allocated “particular conditions of autonomy” and whole 
special statutes were adopted separately through specific pieces of legislation.  Sicily 
and Sardinia special statutes have been drafted in 1949.  The statutes of the other 
regions were to be implemented according to uniform criteria.  There was no 
differentiation of powers among “ordinary regions”. 
The Constitution left many gaps to be filled by subsequent legislation, through 
transitional norms21. One of these, the VIII encompassed the creation of regional 
governments within one year.  Accordingly, as noted in Leonardi 199322 “the founding 
fathers of the Italian Republic expected a quick and thorough transfer of powers the 
regional level.”  During the subsequent years the Governments avoided the devolution 
of powers and acted in order to ensure that, whenever it would happen, the regions 
would be under the control of the Central Government (Law 62/1953).  The ruling 
political party (Christian Democrats) was strongly reluctant to allow the creation of 
the regional governments, while the left parties (Socialist Party and the Communist 
Party) were backing the passing of the regional election bill. 
                                                      
21 “Disposizioni transitorie” in the original text. 
22 Leonardi R. The Regions and the European Community, London 1993, page 222. 
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The regional election bill was finally introduced in Parliament on March 10th 1967.  
The bill became Law (n.104) only on February 17th 1968: the Law provided for the 
election of regional councils based on universal suffrage, and the holding of regional 
elections at the end of 1969, which was later, moved to 1970.  The Law n.249 
February 18th 1968 was encompassing an overall reform of Central Government 
institutions in preparation for the implementation of regional devolution. 
In the subsequent years, the process of devolution has been characterized by two 
different approaches.  The first approach (1970-72) was dominated by national 
governmental and administrative groups.  The second approach (1973-77) was 
controlled by the Parliament.   
At the beginning of 1970 the government set out to introduce two bills that would 
implement the regional reform.  The first, Law 281 May 16th 1970, identified the 
financial resources to be provided to the regions, set out that the Parliament would 
pass “framework” legislation establishing the parameters for regional legislative 
activities, and allocated to the Government the responsibility for preparing the decrees 
transferring the regions’ their constitutional administrative responsibilities.  The 
second Law, n.775 October 28th 1970, obliged the Government to formulate decrees 
for the purpose of reforming the central government institutions.  The regional 
elections took place on June 7th 1970, and the Regions started to operate in the 
changed institutional framework starting 1971. 
After the first two years, the specification of administrative functions to be 
devolved was left up to the national bureaucracy to decide, since each ministry had to 
draw up its own devolution decrees. The financial arrangements made the regions still 
strictly dependant from the Central Government.  The decrees promulgated in 1972 
created an institutional framework where the regions have been subordinated to 
nationally determined policies.   
During 1972-73 the Central Government undertook a change in the structure of 
local government finances.  The Government centralized all taxing powers and made 
regional governments largely dependent on “transfers” form the Central Government. 
The second period has begun in 1973.  In September 1973, the Inter-parliamentary 
Commission, with Lombardia, Emilia Romagna and Toscana as the most active 
players,23 started to act in order to prepare a new bill on devolution and regional 
                                                      
23 See also Leonardi 1993 
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autonomy.  The pressure towards a new law on regional autonomy has been increasing 
during 1974.  The First Commission on Constitutional Norms and Local Government 
was assigned the task of redrafting the administrative and institutional framework for 
regional governments.  This process led to the approval of the Law 382/1975. Law 
382 delegated to the government the responsibility of completing the devolution of 
power in accordance to specific criteria: all the powers attributed by the constitution to 
the regions had to be transferred to the regions from the Ministries of Central 
Government bodies presently acting in that areas; the remaining administrative 
functions that had not been passed in 1972 reform had to be decentralized; all the state 
expenditures that directly or indirectly were attributable to the regions had to be 
eliminated, all agencies in areas of regional responsibility that bridged more than one 
region had to be transferred; the regions had to have full administrative and legislative 
powers within the limitations of national and European Community directives24.  In 
1977, the regions rejected the draft decrees presented concerning the procedures of 
devolution “either in qualitative and quantitative terms.”25 
The Decree of the President of the Republic (DPR) n.616/1978 encompassed 
relevant changes in the definition of the regional competences, but it had affected only 
partially the structure of Central Government, neither in the bureaucratic aspects, nor 
in terms of legislative procedures.  In the period between the end of 1970s and the 
beginning of the 1980s, the regions faced with the problem of the economic crisis, and 
with recurring budget reductions by the Central Government (1978 and 1979). 
In 1980 the Inter-parliamentary Commission suggested the creation of a State-
Regions conference. The members of the conference, called for the first time on 
October 12th 1983, were: the president of the Regions, the Prime Minister, and the 
Ministers of Treasury, Regions and Budget.  The joint Conference between regions 
and National Government (Conferenza Stato-Regioni) was to discuss all the matters 
related to EU affairs, to serve as forum for the information exchange and to prepare 
common positions of the Italian Regions.   
The evolution in the nature of the State-Regions Conference is the result of 
national institutional dynamics that informed the institutional change in the recent 
decades.  The Conference has been an instrument of information, from the Central 
State, for the Regions.  The Law n.59 March 15th 1997 changed its role dramatically.  
                                                      
24 See also Camera dei Deputati L’attuazione della “382”, Rome 1977. 
25 Leonardi 1993, pag230 
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According to Law n.59/1997 the Conference became the main instrument of co-
ordination between the Central Government and the Regions.  With the Decree Law 
n.281 August 28th 1997 it became mandatory for the Central Government to consult 
the Conference with respect of any legislative act concerning the aspect encompassed 
in Regional competencies.   
This model was “qualitatively different”26 from the one implemented in the first 
years of the process of devolution.  The first ten years’ approach was focused on the 
separation of sector responsibilities between Central and Local Government; the new 
one was based on the inter-relation between the two levels of government, 
approaching the principles of “partnership,” also encompassed in the European Union 
institutional framework. 
 
4.3. Europeanization in the institutional framework 
The Italian response to the adaptational pressures created by the introduction of 
cohesion policy through the reform of the Structural Funds regulations in 1988 has 
been difficult indeed, especially with regard to the southern regions. At best, the 
adaptation has been slow and partial in nature. At the worst, it has been characterised 
by active resistance. The reasons for these difficulties can be attributed to two factors: 
1) the impact of path dependence—i.e., up to 1992 the country had a national regional 
policy that persisted for a period of forty-two years and it left a legacy that was 
difficult to overcome in terms of national administrative practices; 2) the main 
beneficiaries of the cohesion policy—i.e., the southern regions—suffered from a 
significant lack of administrative capacity that rendered them incapable of fully 
exploiting the opportunities afforded by the cohesion policy in creating a different and 
less dependent relationship vis-à-vis the centre. This latter characteristic was 
particularly acute in the larger southern regions—i.e., Campania, Calabria, Puglia and 
Sicily—vis-à-vis the smaller southern regions—i.e., Abruzzo, Molise, Basilicata and 
Sardinia—that managed to eventually exit from the policy. I will analyse the stages of 
this difficult transition in this chapter. 
 
                                                      
26 Leonardi 1993, p.233. 
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4.3.1. Changes at the national level  
What is interesting to note with regard to the introduction of the European level 
cohesion policy in Italy is that it had a minimal impact in reorganizing the structure 
for the management of national regional policy. In fact, the new European policy was 
not allocated for its administration to the Ministry for Extraordinary Interventions for 
the South. Instead, a new Ministry without portfolio was created, Ministry for 
European Community (EC) Affairs, to manage the policy while the financial 
allocations from Brussels were given to the Ministry of the Budget to allocate. The 
lack of any integration between the national and European regional policies inevitably 
led to significant delays in implementing the EC policy while it allowed the national 
regional policy to operate in a complete vacuum vis-à-vis the regional or EC levels. 
In the 1980s several government structures were in charge for the administration 
of the European Regional Policies: the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, Budget, etc.  
During that period, a process of internalization within the Ministry of Budget took 
place: from the creation of the Ministry for the coordination with the Regions (1980), 
to the institution of the Department for European Policies within the Presidency of the 
Council (1987).  The Department was in charge of only the promotion, the 
formulation of guidelines and of the verification of the activities linked to the 
implementation of EU-led Regional Development Polices.  The management of the 
financial resources was delegated to the Ministry of Finance, which was responsible, 
as well for the drafting of the Italian Community Support Framework (i.e., the Italian 
plan for less developed areas). 
Since 1975, Italy’s institutions have had to interact with the European Commission 
on issues involving development as well as the need to coordinate national policies in 
relation to the growing body of European regulations and directives.  During the first 
ten years, Italian institutions were unable to interact effectively within the European 
framework.  One of the possible causes was attributed to the fragmentation of 
interventions allocated to different ministries and managing authorities at the central 
level.  The need for coordination with respect to relations with the European 
Commission was finally resolved with the creation of a special unit located within the 
Prime Minister’s Office—i.e., the Ministry Without Portfolio for the Coordination of 
the Community’s Policies in 1980 (Ministero per le Politiche Comunitarie).  In 1987, 
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers created, within its competences, the 
Department for EU Polices.  The Department was in charge only for the promotion 
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and verification of the activities linked to the implementation of Commision-led 
development polices.  The management of the financial resources was, instead, 
allocated to the Ministry of Finance, which was responsible, as well of drafting the 
Italian programme for cohesion policy. Thus, from the beginning there was a 
separation of the “political” side of cohesion policy that was maintained in the Prime 
Minister’s office and implemented through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Office of Italy’s Permanent Representative Office in Brussels and the technical side 
managed by the Ministry of Finance and Programming, as was the case with the 
management of the Fund for the South.   
The Decree-Law n.96 of 3 April 1993 provided for the creation of the Observatory 
for Regional Policies.  It was the first instrument or attempt at the central level to 
monitoring the dismantling of the Agensud that had taken over in 1985 from the Fund 
for the South and the implementation of a national regional policy for southern Italy to 
be coordinated with the EU Structural Funds.  The Observatory was constituted by 
five technical members (see art.4 D.L.96/1993), appointed by the national 
government. However, the Observatory last a short period of time and was eventually 
abolished in 1995.  During the same year, the Cabin for National Management 
(Cabina di Regia Nazionale)27, was set up by Law n.341 of August 8th 1995. The 
Cabina took over the role previously played by the Observatory. It was placed in 
charge of co-ordinating the different authorities at the national and regional levels in 
charge of planning and implementation of EU cohesion and national funds.   
At time, the National Cabin for the Management of development funds was 
dramatically modified: with the Decree Law n.430 December 5th 1998 that created the 
Department for Development and Cohesion Polices28, The new Department for 
Cohesion Policies was placed in charge of all of the responsibilities previously 
delegated to the Cabin but it was physically allocated in the new Ministry of the 
Economy which brought together the previous Ministry of the Treasury and the 
Ministry of Finance and Planning. The role of the Department has been extended 
through the years: in 1999 the Presidential Decree (n. 38) of February 20th allocated 
to the Department all responsibilities for initiatives concerning the use of Structural 
Funds. Thereby, the role previously carried out by the Interministerial Committee for 
                                                      
27 “Cabina di Regia Nazionale” in the original definition. 
28 “Dipartimento Politiche di Sviluppo e Coesione” in the original definition. 
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Economic Programming (CIPE) in authorizing the allocation and use of Structural 
Funds was placed squarely in the hands of the Department.   
By 1998 the new institutional infrastructure had been created to oversee and finally 
bring together national regional policies and EU cohesion policies.  The Department 
for Development and Cohesion Policies assumed control over the country’s entire 
effort in the field of regional development policies of the national or European variety.  
One of the essential characteristics of the new Department was that it re-emphasized 
the technocratic control over the formulation and implementation of regional policies 
in Italy and it was able to keep political input or control over the Department to a bare 
minimum.  This was possible, in part, because the management of the EU cohesion 
policy required the state to follow EU regulations and specifications of how the policy 
was to be structured. Therefore, it was easy for the technocratic elements within the 
Department to refer to the EU regulations as a means of keeping political interference 
at a distance. In the past “political interference” in many cases resulted in a slow-down 
in the efficient management of the policy and in constant efforts to re-programme 
measures and projects in order to satisfy the demands of political elites. Given the fact 
that the political elites responsible for the policy rotated frequently, political 
interference in the programming of interventions would have required a constant 
redefinition of the programmes and a drastic slowing down of the implementation 
process and expenditure of the funds. Italy continued to demonstrate a significant 
difficulty in using the funds according to the predetermined timetable and continued to 
be a significant under-performer in the expenditure of Structural Funds and using them 
to mobilize a sustainable model of economic development.  
 
4.3.2. Changes at the regional level 
The gradual process of devolution that has characterised the transfer of policy 
responsibility from the national to regional levels that has been underway since the 
regional reform of 1970 and the passage of the national decrees in 1976/77 have 
produced some dramatic changes in the institutional settings regarding regional 
development policies in Italy.  Further reforms were to follow in 1997 and 2001 with 
the reform of the Constitution.   
The rounds of institutional reform that were relevant to the regional development 
policies have taken place in 1972 (first minimal devolution of powers), 1977 (more 
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substantial devolution of powers according to articles 117 and 118 of the Constitution) 
and 1997 (creation of regime of co-management or exclusive management of 
development policies by the regions).  With Law n.59 1997 the full devolution of 
powers —i.e., article 5 of the Constitution—placed the regions in a central position in 
the management of development policies. .   
The new art.118 of the Constitution introduces the principle of “subsidiarity”, in 
regulating the relationship between centre and periphery.  The Article underlines the 
necessity for each regional administration to act as an independent administrative 
body, pursuing economic and social development, also in competition with other 
regions.  On the other hand, it has deleted the objective of “enhancing the value of the 
Mezzogiorno” previously found in art 119.  The ultimate consequence of this change 
has been the cancellation of the “constitutionalization”29 of the effort to pursue a 
higher economic and social cohesion at the national level. 
Where the Italian regions were able to capitalise on the new institutional 
configuration offered by the EU’s cohesion policy was in being able to create direct 
ties with the Commission through the opportunity presented by: 1) the creation of the 
Committee of Regions and the establishment of regional offices in Brussels and 2) 
establishing a dialogue with the Commission in improving the management of 
regional operational programmes. Both of these factors significantly strengthened the 
regional-EU portion of multi-level governance and provided the regions with an 
alternative channel and the ability to side-step the national level in establishing an 
exchange of information and experiences with the Commission, thereby leading to a 
greater level of Europeanization of regional policies and management practices.  
 
4.4. The Europeanization of institutions 
The challenge facing state institutions in this second stage of Europeanization (i.e., 
post-2000) is the building of an institutional discourse, capable of directing the 
reframing centre-periphery relations involved in the alignment of Italian regional 
policy with regard to the country’s Community framework setting out it overall multi-
year development programme. 
In fact, what was characteristic of the first stage of Europeanization (1988-1999) 
has been the substantial absence of a strategic policy. The challenge facing state 
                                                      
29 SVIMEZ: “Riforme Federaliste e politiche di sviluppo del Mezzogiorno, Il Mulino 2002, pag.31. 
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institutions in this second stage of Europeanization is the building of an institutional 
discourse, capable of directing the reframing centre-periphery relationships involved 
in the realignment of Italian regional policy in relation to its overall European strategy. 
What characterised the first stage of Europeanization was the substantial absence of a 
strategic policy discourse, capable of merging the aims of 'local development’ and of 
'regional governance' - emerging from intergovernmental dialogue, social practices, 
and scholarly debates- and of linking them in view of the achievement of higher levels 
of institutional performance' in dealing with requirements of subsidiary, partnership, 
and additionality in implementing EU regional policies. 
Rather, it may be stated that what characterized this first stage in the 
Europeanization of regional policy is the result of a process of functional adjustment 
to the persistence of structural inconsistencies between what was required by the 
regulations and what took place at the national and regional levels in the 
administration of the operational programmes. 
The stage following the realignment of the national regime of regional aids - 
coincident with the initial phase of implementation of the CSF 1994-1999 – 
represented the beginning of a change in the Europeanization of Italian regional policy 
precisely as it witnessed the outset of a new strategic attitude on the part of state 
actors. 
The crucial features that characterized this change in perspective were: 
• the development of a more proactive negotiating capacity on the part of the 
Italian government towards the Commission, resulting in framework 
agreements on measures in bringing the management of Structural Funds 
in Italy up to the European norm; 
• the ongoing restructuring of political-administrative competencies in EU 
regional programming, the consolidation of a key 'gate keeping' role within 
the framework of reform of state executive and ministerial structures; 
• the development of an embryonic intergovernmental strategy linking 
supranational and sub-national negotiations within a unitary policy 
discourse. 
 
Since the end of 1980s, significant initiatives had been taken in overcoming gaps in 
responsibility and competencies between state and regional administrations, with 
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reference in particular to the implementation of Community policies: the 
establishment of a Department for Community Policies in the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministries (1987), the enactment of a framework legislation defining 
procedures for applying Community Law (1989), and the creation of a standing State-
Regions Conference providing a stable institutional arena for consultation on 
intergovernmental policy matters (1988) represented crucial steps in this direction.  
However, such improvements did not significantly affect the reality of a rather formal 
than substantial decentralization of power and responsibilities, which is widely 
recognized in analyses of the period (Leonardi, 1993).  
The response on the part of the regions to the new exigencies required by the 
reform of the Structural Funds was structurally inhibited by the lack of an adequate 
reform of the state’s system of public administration and the lack of a coherent design 
of regional decentralization in the area of regional development. Altogether, these 
factors contributed to the fact that during the first phases of Structural Funds 
programming, 1989-93, did not lead to a significant restructuring of intergovernmental 
relations. Structural Funds Programming in the aftermath of the 1988 reform hardly 
affected the specific approach adopted in Italy in relation to the regional governance 
dimension of development policies. 
A significant shift in attitudes, however, began to manifest itself around the mid 
1990s. Not by chance, the introduction of new state strategy became aligned with the 
adoption of the new CSF for 1994-1999, following the reform of Structural Funds 
regulations introduced in 1993 and then reconfigured in 1996. While it is widely 
recognized that the 1993 reform represented the occasion for a nation-state 
governments to regain some control of the Structural Funds programming process, for 
Italian state actors the beginning of a new programming period constituted the first 
occasion for introducing a new approach to the evaluation of programmes and 
establishing a new relationship between the national and regional levels.  
Two aspects that were of particular significance for the Italian political-
administrative structure was the extension of integrated programming to the whole of 
the country through the formulation of the Community Support Frameworks for 
Objective 1 and 2 regions, and the establishment of an initial subsidiary principle 
which recognised the central role played by the regions in the implementation of 
operational programmes.  
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As had already become evident with the implementation of, first, the IMPs after 
1986 and then the first cycle of the cohesion policy between 1989 and 1993 the quality 
of the programmes and their implementation proved to be highly differentiated, 
reflecting the differences in economic structures and political and administrative 
capacities found in each single region.  
In the phase of implementation, problems loomed large. Difficulties in 
implementation were related to inconsistencies and duplication in the central 
administrative apparatus, as well as in the regions’ difficulties in fully accepting their 
new role. Factors related to differentials in administrative capacity, furthermore, 
played a major role. While a good performance was achieved in northern regions in 
the administration of Objective 2 programmes, there were major problems with 
Objective 1 programmes, especially in the larger regions of the Mezzogiorno (Puglia, 
Sicilia, Calabria, and Campania) where an almost complete implementation deadlock 
occurred. 
One of the major reasons for the difficulties in implementing community 
programmes was related to the consequences of this change in governmental attitude: 
the demise of the relative “lean” style of operation of Agensud and the dispersion of 
competencies among the regions, the lack of central control over the planning of 
interventions and the disbursement of funds , and the need to coordinate national and 
regional operational programmes represented a completely new challenge compared to 
the simple centralist rationale that governed the Intervento Straordinario. Most of the 
ministries had inherited competencies almost overnight and had to completely update 
their internal substantial and organizational expertise. In this, the legacy of the 
Intervento Straordinario exerted a considerable constraint to changing the attitudes of 
involved actors.  
The reform of the Italian regional policy framework was postponed until 1992 in 
that the national government differed to the Agensud on matters dealing with regional 
development. It did not at all encourage the regions to fully take up the task of 
decision maker and implementing body offered by the cohesion policy. The start in the 
new programming era was difficult but nevertheless clearly in continuity with the 
experience gained by some of the regions with the IMPs. In the first phase of 
programming of the reformed Structural Funds, an attempt at was made by the Italian 
state administration to reduce the provision of co-funding for the Intervento 
Straordinario, in favour of the more innovative regional operational programmes.  
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The response of the Commission created the basis of a new dialect between the 
state and the European level. It proposed the establishment of six priority areas around 
which to structure development measures (such as SMEs) and away from traditional 
transport infrastructure (roads) interventions.   
Again, major problems arose in the implementation phase. The Commission took a 
more active role where problems were likely to arise, for instance by admonishing 
national administration in case of delays in providing co-funding and trying to prevent 
a constant rethinking of the contents of the operational programmes. However, the 
delays accumulated between 1989 and 1992, forced the country to revise all of its 
national and regional operational programmes in light of the extension of the 
implementation period to 1996. 
The programming process favoured an improvement in state-regional relationships. 
In other words, the national level had to reluctantly acknowledge that the regions had 
been given a central role in the management of the EU cohesion policy and that it was 
no longer possible for the central state to monopolise the process. In Italy the 
coordination of programming was attributed to the Ministry for the Mezzogiorno, as 
the managing authority of the ERDF, but the multi-fund character of the new 
programming rationale and the need for integration with ESF and EAGGF, required a 
significant amount of coordination with the Ministries of Agriculture (EAGGF) and 
Labour for the ESF. 
A few years later there was a change in state programming competencies. In 1993 
and 1994, three decrees related to the termination of the Intervento Straordinario 
transferred all matters concerning programming of the Structural Funds to the 
Ministry of Finance and Budgeting and assisted by a Central Service for Cohesion 
(Servizio Centrale per la Coesione) which was later to become the Department of 
Regional Policy and Cohesion with the unification of the Ministries of Budgeting and 
of the Treasury. 
The Department for Community Affairs had since 1988 acted as the de facto 
leading authority for Community Initiatives (the programmes directly managed by the 
Commission, such as Interreg), taking responsibilities that had never been formally 
assigned through legislative decrees but through an informal division of labour that 
was soon to be contested by other bodies at the national level.. In 1997, the Ministry 
of Public Works was appointed as the leading body responsible for both Community 
Initiatives (e.g., Interreg and Urban) and for activity concerning the development of 
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the ESDP (European Spatial Development Perspective) was in fact assigned to it. All 
these processes represented for the Department of Community Affairs a net loss in 
direct influence in these areas of European policy. 
Following the abolition of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, a structural reform of 
state competencies had became indispensable and inevitable. According to the general 
redistribution of programming competencies to ordinary regions and local 
administrations and to the related redefinition of the central authority of state 
administrations, the Ministry of Finance and Budgeting had been in first place 
reconfirmed in its responsibility for the coordination and supervision of economic 
programming. In the course of the following years, the ministry progressively 
assumed the overlapping responsibility in all areas of programming related to 
territorial development policies. 
This trend towards a re-concentration of competencies in the Ministry of Finance 
and Budgeting was enhanced by the demise of the Intervento Straordinario and by the 
need to align several programming activities to the logic of the reformed Structural 
Funds: besides taking responsibility as the national heading authority of the ERDF, the 
ministry was entrusted with the coordination and supervision of all territorial 
programming tasks related to the Structural Funds and to the application of other 
Community regulations, like the mapping of areas for regional state aids. 
The new role of the Ministry of Finance and Budgeting obviously implied a take-
over of Community-related tasks previously performed by the Department for 
Community Affairs. This shift in competencies, albeit realized in a rather sudden 
manner, was clearly in line with the traditional role of the Ministry in matters of 
economic programming, and was certainly justifiable in light of the administrative and 
technical complexity of the tasks involved, for which the structure of the Department 
for Community Affairs was not equipped to carry out in an adequate fashion. 
Nevertheless, the concentration of responsibility in the Ministry of Finance and 
Budgeting or responsibility for the management of Structural Funds presents a striking 
example of how a significant reform, that was to prove crucial for the Europeanization 
of Italian regional policy, was in fact the outcome of an ‘autocratic’ decision taken in 
manner that potentially could have raised a considerable inter-institutional conflict. In 
other words, the shift in responsibility was not based on a considerable internal debate 
or on an understanding of its ramifications on horizontal interaction among the core 
ministries or vertical relations with the European level of policy making.        
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The reform of ministerial competencies in Community matters was basically 
completed in 1997 and was aligned according to spending capacities. According to the 
rationale of the reform of the Presidency of the Council of Ministries, the Department 
for Community Affairs given its lack of spending capacity had to shift the 
responsibilities for Community policies to other ministries with portfolios even if 
these ministries had little competencies or sensitivities for Community matters. The 
most important change is the fact that this process marked a further step towards the 
assumption of a strategic leadership in Community issues by a ‘super-ministry’ of the 
Economy. As a matter of fact, the transfer of competencies to the Ministry of Finance 
and Budgeting carried out in 1994 established the Ministry as a major strategic actor 
in the area of inter-governmental relationships and in the management of Structural 
Funds. 
Considering the first programming periods after the 1988 reform, Italian 
performance implementing the Structural Funds was dramatically low. At the time of 
expiration of the CSF 1989-1993, such concerns became the subject of negotiations 
between the Italian Ministry of Budgeting and DG XVI, formalized in a protocol in 
1995. What become known as the ‘Masera-Wulf-Mathies agreements’ entailed 
significant concessions to Italy – particularly by granting delays in implementing 
programs included in the CSF 1989-1993 – but also introducing the definition of 
genera criteria for Structural Funds implementation. The new measures introduced 
were applied in particular to the implementation of the CSF 1994-1999: given the first 
intermediate evaluations of Objective 1 regions; negotiations with the Commission 
were in fact taken as an opportunity to undertake last minute changes in the 
operational programmes. 
The new programming criteria introduced by the agreement introduced the 
possibility of changing the allocation of expenditures from to regional to national 
programmes on the basis of the “lack of performance” in regional programmes and the 
possibility of the state to allocate to itself the remaining funds. The basic principle on 
which this procedure was based was the fixing of objectives of spending to be reached 
at the end of each year, as requested by fund regulations. A similar approach was 
adopted for Objective 2 regions. 
As a matter of fact, the Commission’s concessions to the Italian government 
provided by the Masera-Wulf-Mathies agreements were granted under the condition of 
a clear commitment to the rationalization of Italian administrative structures and 
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procedures involved in EU regional programming.  The new CSF for Objective 1, 
approved by the Commission in June 1994, stressed the need for reversing criteria for 
the selection of projects, the improvement of surveillance, the introduction of an 
effective monitoring system, and for the provision of technical assistance for regional 
administrations in the management of the funds. This required a series of measures: 
• A clear identification of responsibilities on programme initiatives, within 
the involved administrations; 
• A qualitative and quantitative improvement of personnel and structures 
responsible for implementation and monitoring; 
• An improvement of the administrative capacity of structures responsible 
for the cohesion policy. 
This concept was based on the creation of a national Cabina di Regia and of its 
reactions with the regional Cabina di Regia. The Cabina di Regia was basically 
entrusted with supervising the financial aspects associated with the implementation of 
Community Programmes, in guaranteeing the smooth functioning of the new 
budgeting instrument of the “rotating fund” (Fondo di Rotazione per l’attuazione delle 
Politiche Comunitarie) that served to co-finance Structural Funds expenditures. 
Formally, the role of the national Cabina was to supervise the functioning of the 
structure of the decentralized network of regional steering groups as a means of 
improving the operation and the monitoring of programmes. 
The Cabina di Regia was, actually, instrumental to a governmental strategy for 
strengthening the management capacity of state administrations in Structural Funds 
programming. Managing the Cabina di Regia Nazionale thus became a formal 
component of the broader role attributed to the Servizio Centrale per la Coesione, later 
to become the founding nucleus of the Department for Development and Cohesion 
Policies, created in 1997 in occasion of the reform that brought together the Ministry 
of Finance and Budgeting and the Ministry of the Treasury into one Ministry of the 
Economy. The sort of institutional redundancy expressed by the coincidence of the 
activity of the two bodies was probably the reason that eventually led to the expiration 
of the Cabina di Regia Nazionale, as provided for in the National Financial Act for 
1999. 
An early expression of the emergent Europeanization strategy in Italy was the so-
called “re-entry strategy” (percorso di rientro), a strategy defined within the Ministry 
of  the Treasury in 1997 in relationship with the intermediate performance evaluations 
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of the CFS 1994-1999 for Objective 1 regions and with the first application of 
reprogramming rules. In essence, the strategy of the re-entry strategy consisted of a 
self commitment on the part of the Italian government to a set of scheduled 
benchmarks for regaining speed and effectiveness in the implementation of Structural 
Funds programmes and expenditures, in view of reaching a “normal” average by 2001, 
in coincidence with the start of the new 2000-2006 programming period. 
The most significant innovation, in term of linking organizational restructuring 
with new policy orientations, was clearly represented by the creation of a department 
devoted to the coordination of Community programmes with national measures, tools 
and initiatives of regional policy at the state, regional, and local level: the Department 
for Development and Cohesion Policies (Dipartimento per le Politiche di Sviluppo e 
Coesione, DPS). 
The main areas of activity of the DPS consisted in the programming of public 
investment and in the “entrepreneurial promotion” of territorial development. The 
former task was to be carried out without direct responsibilities in spending, mainly 
through the definition of a “gatekeeping” role in decision-making and ensuring a clear 
set of criteria for defining competitive as well as distributive priorities according to a 
strategic view of development. The main tools for this purpose were defined as:  
• The coordination of the implementation of EU Structural Funds programmes at 
the national and regional levels; 
• The management of “institutional programmatic agreements” (intese 
istituzionali di programma), with the regions concerning large infrastructural 
investments; and 
• State-regional concerted agreements on investment initiatives involving joint 
responsibilities and actions from central and peripheral administration 
introduced by legislation on “negotiated programming”. 
An important improvement introduced after the constitution of DPS was related to 
the monitoring and evaluation activities. Responsibility for monitoring (financial, 
procedural and physical) was unitarily assumed by the IGRUE (Ispettorato Generale 
Rapporti con l’Unione Europea), a body situated in the Department of State 
Accounting. Later legislation (law 144/1999) provided for a system of technical 
support units assigned the tasks of monitoring and evaluating public investments 
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(Nucleo Tecnico di Valutazione) that was established in each central and regional 
administration and coordinated through a linkage with the Ministry of Treasury. 
The new Ministry of the Treasury also became the main actor in the constitution of 
the new state development agency Sviluppo Italia, meant to provide a rational 
framework for managing state intervention in support of large territorial development 
initiatives involving private capital from within the country and abroad that had a 
particular focus on investments in the Mezzogiorno and the country’s other “depressed 
areas”.  
The new agency incorporated all previous existing agencies entrusted with sectoral 
competencies that had been developed in the course of the Intervento Straordinario as 
well as introduced in the aftermath of its demise, unifying their management 
structure30. Despite is previous association with the country’s regional policy; 
Sviluppo Italia was not allocated a specific role in relation to the Structural Funds. 
Rather it operated as a separate agency on its own and in relation to an independent 
stream of public financing provided by the central government. As a result, its 
selection of projects was completely separated from the institutions and programmatic 
contents of the cohesion policy at either the national or regional levels. In summary, at 
the end of the 1990s the country found itself with four separate agencies at the 
national level involved with the management of regional policy: 1) the DPS given the 
overall coordination of the EU cohesion policy, 2) the individual ministries that 
managed the national operational programmes; 3) Sviluppo Italia assigned the task of 
attracting large foreign and domestic investment projects; and 4) CIPE that handled 
the national regional policy. In addition to these four groups of actors, I had the 
regions responsible for their separate operational programmes. 
Though the DPS was given formal responsibility for keeping together the national 
and regional operational programmes it did not have the administrative personnel or 
political power to carry out this task in an effective or efficient manner. All that it had 
at its disposal was the Evaluation Unit who provided technical assistance in evaluating 
programmes, but the Unit could not in any way interfere with the management of 
operational programmes unless called in by the management authorities of the 
programmes. The result was that each managing authority was responsible for its own 
                                                      
30 According to Legislative Decree 1/99 (Restructuring of promoting bodies and companies and institution of 
Sviluppo Italia) the following companies were incorporated in Sviluppo Italia: SPI, Itainvest, IG-Societa' per 
l'imprenditorialità giovanile, Insud, Ribs, Enisud, Finagra, IPI. 
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programme and very little could be done by the DPS other than for it to encourage the 
individual managing authorities to follow its guidance. 
 
 
Box 1.  Milestones in Devolution Process in Italy 
 
1944  Single text on local authorities 
1946 – 1963 Establishment of five "special statute" regions  
1953  Law 62/1953: limited statutory self-governance for "ordinary" regions 
1968  Law 108/1968 establishes the system for electing regional councils in "ordinary" regions 
1970  Regional councils are elected for the first time in 15 "ordinary" regions 
1971  Law 1102/1971 establishes upland communities 
1972 and 1977  Transfer of administrative powers to the "ordinary" regions and local authorities 
1990  Law 142/1990 confirms the principle of the statutory self-governance of local authorities; new 
distribution of powers; creation of "metropolitan areas"; a priori control of local authority 
activity is abolished 
1990  Law 241/1990 on reform of public administration  
1993  Law 81/1993 introduces the direct election of Mayors and provincial Presidents 
1995  Law 43/1995 amends law no.  108/1968 on Regional Councils  
1997  Law 127/1997 curtails supervision of local authority activity 
1997  Law 59/1997 transfers administrative powers and tasks to the Regions, municipalities and 
provinces and lists State-held administrative responsibilities 
1998  Legislative decree 112/1998 implements administrative devolution  
1999  Constitutional law 1/1999 provides for the direct election of Presidents of the "ordinary" Regions 
and statutory self-governance of the Regions  
2000  Legislative decree 267/2000 Single law on local authorities 
2001  Constitutional law 3/2001 - Reform of title 5 of the Constitution; grants the Regions residual 
legislative powers grants and provides for their involvement in the EU decision-making process; 
it represented the end of Central government supervision of the administrative activities of local 
and 
2001  Constitutional law 2/2001 governing local authorities extends direct election of Presidents of the 
Region to universal direct suffrage in Regions with special status and extends statutory self-
governance•  
2003  Law 131/2003 on implementing reform of Title 5 of the Constitution regional authorities  
 
 5. THE REGIONALIZATION PROCESS: POLICY AND 
FINANCIAL ASPECTS 
This Chapter presents the results of the analyses carried out on policy and financial 
variables in the Regions selected as Case Studies, in order to investigate the aspects 
related to change in regional policies in terms of design and financing of policies. 
These aspects are considered as relevant to assess the level of effective devolution 
with respect of Regional Policies.  
 
5.1.  The centralized paradigm: origins and 
consequences   
5.1.1. Origins 
Since the end of the Second World War nation states have been struggling with the 
problem of using public policies to guarantee a measure of equity in the distribution of 
economic development and opportunities, irrespective of social class and territorial 
location. From a territorial perspective, nation states have found it difficult to always 
guarantee an equitable distribution of socio-economic resources to the inhabitants of 
both “core” and “peripheral” areas (Krugman and Venables 1995; Puga 1999). The 
persistent differences between core and peripheral areas also bring into question the 
efficiency of national economic and social policies in resolving the problems of the 
socio-economic groups to be targeted by the policy.  Core areas have been defined in 
the literature as those areas of the nation-state: where there is a high concentration of 
economic activity; where economies of scale predominate; where salaries are 
relatively high; where capital is abundant and available at lower interest rates; where 
the infrastructure grid guarantees swift and easy access to markets; and where the 
dominant political and cultural institutions are located. Peripheral areas are, instead, 
characterised by the opposite characteristics: low level of economic activity, absence 
of economies of scale, low salaries, scarcity of capital and higher interest rates, lack of 
adequate infrastructure, and absence of important political and cultural resources. In 
order to bridge the gap between core and peripheral areas nation-states have engaged 
in a number of development schemes, which have attempted to alleviate the conditions 
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of the less developed areas. These types of policies have been commonly referred to as 
regional development policies.  
The reason why the term “regional policies” has been used to characterize policies 
attempting to achieve a better socio-economic equilibrium within the country is due to 
the fact that these policies are focussed on specific territorial entities—i.e., regions—
and normally do not address the entire national territory (Armstrong and Taylor 2000).  
If the latter were the case, then it is more common to refer to development policies as 
“sectoral”—i.e., covering various sectors of the national economy such as agriculture, 
industry or specific services. Such policies are thus implemented on a nation-wide 
basis, irrespective of territorial specificity or in one region vis-à-vis another. This 
definitional distinction between regional and sectoral policies does not mean that 
regional development strategies are devoid of a sectoral component. On the contrary, 
it is common to find in regional development policies an emphasis on the development 
of particular sectors in particular areas. Therefore, sectoral and regional development 
strategies are not -from a theoretical and practical perspective- diametrically opposed. 
Where they do differ is in the definition of territorial scope and concentration. 
Regional policies are oriented toward the development of specific regions or parts of 
the national territory. Sectoral policies, on the other hand, are usually applied on a 
blanket basis throughout the national territory and their objective is to develop the 
overall national economy.   
Another important aspect of regional development policies is associated with the 
institutions responsible for the formulation and implementation of the interventions. In 
my case, the relevant institutions and actors are represented by national and sub-
national political and administrative entities operating within governmental 
institutions. In the Italian case regional government institutions have been created 
during various phases of the nation’s post-war history, and according to the 1947 
Constitution they were allocated a central role in the implementation of development 
policies (see Articles 117 and 118).  
However in Italy as well as in other countries, the dictates of the Constitution have 
not always been implemented in an efficient and effective manner. In the immediate 
post-war period regional development policies in France, the UK and Italy were 
predominantly the responsibility of national authorities.  To a certain extent national 
authorities assumed the task of balancing levels of territorial development as part of a 
national political responsibility to promote the development of the entire country and 
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to achieve equitable results for all citizens. On the other hand, such an approach was 
understandable in Italy (and also in the UK and France) because regional level 
institutions did not exist: all three countries had highly centralized governmental 
structures and national governments were the predominant central actors in the pursuit 
of equitable social and economic outcomes. In Italy it was not possible to allocate the 
responsibility of regional development policies to regional institutions because the 
latter simply did not exist throughout the country.31, and where they did exist, such as 
in the four special regions, there powers were not exercised in deference to the 
activities undertaken by the national government. Instead, regional development 
policies were formulated by the central state authorities for the regions rather than by 
the regions for themselves. I will argue that the centralisation of regional development 
policies did not take place not only due to the fact that regional government 
institutions did not exist but rather to the fact that the dominant development paradigm 
emphasised the role of central institutions vis-à-vis that of the regions.32  
 
5.1.2. Consequences: the Italian implementation 
The Italian case, thus, illustrates two important changes over time with regard to 
the development paradigms involved in the formulation and implementation of 
regional policies: the first involves the economic model used to influence the 
formulation of development strategies and the second deals with the institutional 
structure (centralised versus decentralised) used to formulate and implement the 
chosen policy.  
Between 1950 and 2000 there was a parallel shift in the development paradigm in 
both instances. Not until the late 1970s and early 1980s did the development paradigm 
change to emphasize the role played by decentralised institutions (i.e., regions) in the 
formulation and carrying out of regional development policies.  According to my 
analysis, this change was not exclusively linked to the fact that regional institutions 
began to exist on a uniform basis but rather to a broader shift in the economic thinking 
                                                      
31 In Italy the twenty regions were created in phases. During the 1946-49 period, the “special regions” were 
created in Sicily, Sardinia, Val d’Aosta and Trentino-Alto Adige. In 1964 another special region was created in Friuli-
Venezia Giulia. The remaining fifteen “ordinary regions” had to wait until 1970 before they were constituted (See 
.Mossetto 1980, Morgan 1986, Leonardi 1993).. 
32 In fact, the development policy for the South could have been “regionalised” in the cases of Sardinia and 
Sicily, but the national authorities chose not to for the reasons that will be elaborated in this chapter. 
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that underpinned the development paradigm: the emphasis on the positive role played 
by sub-national institutions in the tailoring of development strategies to local needs 
and opportunities.  
By the beginning of the 1950s the country found itself already characterized by a 
dual economy. In the North economic growth and expansion were well underway as 
the country’s traditional industrial heartland (the northwest triangle connecting the 
cities of Turin, Milan and Genoa) saw significant public and private investment in 
basic infrastructure and industrial plants. The objectives of the investment programme 
were to expand industrial production in the manufacturing of steel, ships and 
expanding the country’s stock of trains, trucks and automobiles. (See Clough 1956; 
Chenery 1956, 1962; Cohen 2001; Fanfani 1996; Saraceno 1969, 1982; Cafiero 2000).  
These investment programmes were not conceived as regional development policies 
for the northwest of the country. Instead, they were defined as policies to develop the 
country’s overall industrial base. The fact that this base was concentrated in only one 
portion of the country was not seen as a fundamental problem because the emphasis 
was on the rapidity and effectiveness of the industrialization programme rather than its 
territorial balance or diffusion.  
One of the central components of the country’s economic strategy was the repair 
and extension of the national infrastructure grid in relation to vital road, railroad and 
port facilities that were damaged during the Second World War. However, this 
national thrust in repairing the country’s infrastructure and productive facilities under-
emphasised the position of the South, which had been, relatively unscathed by the 
ravages of the war.  
Historically, the South had not witnessed the creation and growth of significant 
industrial enterprises prior to the Second World War. Instead, the emphasis in the 
South was focussed on the development of the agricultural sector. Attempts at 
industrialisation had taken place (for example, the Bagnoli steel plant in Naples), but 
they were sporadic and did not constitute a critical mass in transforming the economic 
base of the various areas in the South. 
One of the reasons for the lack of emphasis on the repair and development of the 
infrastructure and industrial base in the southern regions was due to the fact that the 
South had been less affected by the destruction of the country’s economic base. Two 
months after the overthrow of Mussolini’s regime (July 1943) the Germans shifted 
their forces to the North in response to the Allied landing in Anzio (southern Lazio) 
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and the abandonment of Rome by Italy’s king, Victor Emanuel, in September 1943. 
Those two events led to a concentration of German forces in the centre and north of 
the country, and during the following two years a protracted struggle to liberate the 
rest of Italy ensued.  Between September 1943 and June 1945 the Germans retreated 
northward in what proved to be a long and protracted struggle. During this same 
period the activities of Italian partisan forces against the Germans were largely 
concentrated in the centre and north of the country. Between the allied bombing of 
strategic positions and the partisan’s sabotage of infrastructure, the country’s 
economic base emerged shattered from the Second World War. 
The other reason why the South was not the initial beneficiary of national 
industrial reconstruction efforts was tied to the predominantly agricultural nature of 
the southern economy. As is illustrated in Table 5.1 in 1951 while agriculture 
accounted for 36.8 per cent of the Italian working force, in the South it represented 
56.3 per cent of all workers employed. The level of industrial employment also 
favoured the other parts of Italy: 25.9% versus only 13.1% in the South.  
Table 5.1 Italy and Southern Italy in 1951 
Gross Domestic Product (1951)   
 Southern Italy  Rest of Italy 
Agriculture 33,1 19,1 
Industry 18,4 34,2 
Building and constructions 6,6 4,8 
Services 41,9 41,9 
Total 100 100 
   
Employment (1951)   
 Southern Italy  Rest of Italy 
Agriculture 56,3 36,8 
Industry 13,1 25,9 
Building and constructions 6,0 5,8 
Services 24,6 31,5 
Total 100 100 
Source: Cassa per il Mezzogiorno 1983 
 
In 1950 Italy embarked on a major restructuring of the South’s agricultural sector 
by: 1) the distribution of the South’s large landholdings to landless peasants and 2) the 
rationalisation of agricultural production—i.e., shifts from subsistence to market 
oriented agricultural products. Thus, during the 1950s the duality of the Italian 
economy became more acute as the North reinforced its industrial base and the South 
underwent a reform of agricultural holdings and production, thereby producing a 
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substantial transfer of population from the South to the North. Under these socio-
economic conditions it became imperative for the national government to come up 
with a solution to the growing territorial disequilibria. The response was the creation 
of an ad hoc regional development policy for the South.   
  
5.2.  Policy choices: sector priorities and policy 
management 
Italy has always been an important case study and reference point for students of 
regional development and regional policy. But developments in the country were 
particularly important during the 50's, when Italy started to experience a spectacular 
process of development (the so called economic miracle) in the North, and undertook 
to actively tackle the problems associated with its less developed areas in the South. 
Chenery (1955, 1962), Eckaus (1961), and others contributed many important studies 
on southern Italy and presented the problem in the international literature. Williamson, 
in his seminal article on regional inequality and the process of national development, 
wrote about Italy as follows: “The evidence on Italian regional dualism suggests 
optimistic projections regarding the future size of the North-South problem as Italy 
passes into mature stages of growth and rapidly ascends into high-income classes” 
(Williamson, 1965). 
In fact, 30 years after Williamson's analysis it can agreed that Italy has passed into 
a “more mature stages of growth” but the regional dualism still persists.  Actually, 
Carello (1989) identified three economic systems within one Italian economy.  Carello 
suggests that the origin of the “dualism” or “pluralism” of economic systems comes 
from the organization of the newly unified Kingdom of Italy beginning in 1861.  In the 
conception of the Governors of the Kingdom of Sardinia Carello argues, the 
Northwest was the centre, the Northeast the semi-centre and the Kingdom of two 
Sicilies was considered the periphery. 
 
5.2.1. Policy and Political priorities 
The literature on development policies in the Italian South or “Mezzogiorno” is 
extensive, but there is no agreement on its overall socio-economic impact or 
implications for politics and institutional development. It has been argued that the 
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combination of politics, the creation of centralised institutional mechanisms, and the 
formulation of regional economic policies has either had no significant effect on 
economic growth trends in the South or, in certain cases, has even rendered more 
difficult the prospects of economic growth in southern regions. Numerous authors 
studying lagging regions in Europe have reached the conclusion that the origins of the 
persistence of backwardness in southern regions should not be sought in the analysis 
of economic barriers but rather in the institutions and political conditions created in 
the pursuit of centralised development policies for the southern regions (Trigilia 
1992).  
From this point of view, political conditions and the long tradition of political 
intervention in the areas of the Italian Mezzogiorno have not only been incapable of 
encouraging the development of economic activity but have also had pernicious 
effects on local entrepreneurship and investment and market strategies (Cafiero 2000). 
Whenever the terms “economic growth” and “Italian Mezzogiorno” come together, 
they generally describe what has been considered an exceptional situation. Several 
decades of robust institutional intervention, by means of the implementation of an 
active development policy, have not succeeded in laying the foundations for an 
autonomous economic development strategy and for the development of a robust civil 
society. In contrast to what was experienced in the new growth areas in the centre-
north (e.g., Veneto, Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna), political and institutional intervention 
in the Mezzogiorno has been accompanied by the development of a strong legacy of 
socio-economic and political dependency of southern regions on the public sector and 
the national political process (Trigilia 1992).  
In developed countries, regional policies started to be implemented in the first half 
of last century, allowing Chenery (1962) to write that “only a handful of countries 
have followed a fairly consistent (regional) policy for a period as long as ten years”.  
Chenery, again, notes “Southern Italy is of considerable interest because the Italian 
government attempted to carry out the theoretically attractive procedure of developing 
external economies by massive doses of public works while leaving the direct 
investment (…) to private individuals” (Chenery 1962). 
The development of the South has been one of the main goals in Italy since 
reunification. The permanence of strong territorial disequilibria within the country has 
had a negative influence on the Italian economy as a whole, and in several periods 
threatened social and political stability.  The new policies for the Italian Mezzogiorno 
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were initiated in a moment of deep crisis for southern society: the economic crisis of 
the Thirties, the Fascist dictatorship, and the Second World War and its aftermath 
deepened the problems from which the South had always suffered.   
The core idea behind the Italian government’s approach to the development of the 
South was based on the notion that the post-war reconstruction presented a unique 
opportunity for fostering the industrialization of the South.  The main supporter of this 
approach was Rodolfo Morandi (Ministry of Industry).  In January 1947 he announced 
the creation of the SVIMEZ programme33.  The programme was backed by the banks 
(Bank of Italy, National Bank for Labour, Commercial Bank, Credito Italiano, Bank of 
Rome) and by the major industrial enterprises (FIAT, Pirelli).  As Morandi clearly 
stated, the reconstruction would undertake a “basic structural reorganization” of the 
southern economy and the creation of a more integrated Italian market.  In order to 
implement the economic unification of Italy, Morandi aimed at inserting “into the 
economic system of the South (what is) a ‘booster’ capable of bringing quick results. 
And this can only be done by industry” (Morandi 1947, quoted in Saraceno 1969). 
Thus, the path traced by Morandi was based on the building of the physical 
infrastructure that was lacking in the South and creating incentives for the relocation 
of (large) industry into southern regions. 
The choice of centralized government structures to implement regional policies 
can be described as subject to “historical path dependence” and “contingent” political 
determinants.  Historical “path dependence” was mainly related to the heritage of the 
post-fascist structure of the State, which had been characterized by a relevant 
predominance of centralized structures and an intrusive presence of the central 
government throughout the territory and the economy.  During Fascism local 
authorities and mayors were directly appointed by the central government while the 
“contingent” determinants were related less to strong theoretical convictions rather 
than to an “imitative” reaction to what happened elsewhere.  Much of the initial 
literature on the industrialisation of the South was posited on the role of the state in 
spurring development through public investment or the encouragement of private 
investment through public grants. There was a basic distrust in civil society and 
endogenous factors and, instead, a strong reliance on external (foreign) entrepreneurs 
                                                      
33 The conceptual framework was developed on the basis of interviews (during 2005-2006) with SVIMEZ 
(former study centre for the Cassa) officials, and the SVIMEZ president M. Annesi. SVIMEZ still functions as a study 
centre for the Mezzogiorno that is financed by public and private grants. 
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and state direction of the economy.  
An analysis of the Parliamentary debate that preceded the creation of the Cassa per 
il Mezzogiorno in 1950 shows that the reference model for the centralized paradigm to 
regional policy and government intervention in the economy of Southern Italy was 
provided by the example and success of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the 
U.S. (see the speech by Giorgio Amendola, on 20 June 1950, p. 19796-19826)34.  The 
TVA was a centrally organized agency whose mission it was to harness the Tennessee 
River and economically develop the surrounding territory (among others, Kenneth 
Hare 1947; Mason 1936, Ackerman 1953). The experience of the TVA served to re-
emphasize a deep seated distrust of locally driven strategies.  In retrospect, it seemed 
to present the ideal example of a top-down, centrally driven economic development 
initiative that had wide success and consequences.  
As a result, when Italy embarked on a strategy for developing the South it chose to 
create an autonomous central agency, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno or Casmez, as a 
technocratic body whose mission it was to develop not only a river valley but also 
almost one-half of the Italian territory or eight regions.  The theoretical underpinnings 
for the Casmez were twofold: on the one hand, the concept of regional imbalances 
(developed a few years later by Myrdal and Perroux)35 suggested that government 
intervention through special, ad hoc agencies could be in a position to balance the 
forces of the market.  In 1957 Myrdal suggested, “The play of forces in the market 
normally tends to increase rather than decrease inequality between regions”.  
Moreover, Myrdal considered the regional growth process as a “cumulative process”, 
leading to virtuous and vicious circles for rich and poor regions’ growth paths.  The 
argument went that the free flow of production factors favoured the rich areas and 
reduced the economic potential of the poorer areas.  Accordingly, the reduction of 
regional imbalances could only be achieved through the intervention of the 
government in the economy with specifically oriented regional policies.  For Perroux 
(1958, quoted in Stuart Holland 1976) this central form of intervention had to be 
focused on the creation of “new industrial growth poles” to serve as magnets for 
                                                      
34 See also others comments and abstracts form the Parliamentary Debate in Bini P. 1976, Il Mezzogiorno nel 
Parlamento Repubblicano 1948-1972. The experience of the Tennessee Valley Authority had been explicitly quoted in 
the proposal by Raffaele Mattioli (December 26th 1946) concerning the use of the UNRRA. The idea had been to 
create “an agency with no constraints or ties, through a directive inspired by the planning criteria of the T.V.A. 
(Cafiero 2000) .  
35 For a more comprehensive analysis see Stuart Holland (1976). 
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industrial development, in order to activate Myrdal’s positive cumulative effects.  
According to the approach advocated by Perroux, growth poles needed to be located in 
large metropolitan areas capable of attracting capital and skilled labour from the 
surrounding areas and serve as motors for accelerated economic growth that would 
eventually spill over to less developed rural areas.  The “growth pole theories” 
introduced into the “development equation projected a significant role for national 
economic planning and political decision-making” (Leonardi 1994).  The theory 
basically states that growth can be planned and concentrated by geographic area in 
development poles though central decision-making bodies. 
In Italy, the idea of creating a development agency as an autonomous body 
responsible for implementing public policies at regional level had already emerged in 
the late 1940s inside of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(later World Bank). Domenico Menichella, the Director of the Italy’s Central Bank, 
backed the proposal and when the national government made the proposal to launch a 
series of “extraordinary” projects to develop southern Italy the idea of a special 
national development agency had already been widely accepted. The Cassa’s role as 
an autonomous technocratic agency was defined as the “implementing body” of 
polices identified by the Government and the Parliament for purpose of developing 
southern Italy. In this manner, the technocratic character of the Cassa could be kept 
distinct and separate from the political considerations represented by the Government 
and Parliament.   
The objectives of the Cassa were the general promotion of the “economic and 
social progress of Southern Italy”; although no further programming documents were 
prepared in order to define territorially and in quantitative terms the policy guidelines.  
The main operating principles, as reflected in Perroux’s later theories concerning 
spatial polarization, were addressed toward the creation of development poles.  The 
instruments identified for the implementation of the regional polices were, initially, 
financial (loans and grants) and then direct state intervention through the creation of 
public firms to participate in the production of steel, the building of ships, the 
manufacturing of cars, the refining of oil and the manufacturing of chemicals. As 
theorized by Perroux, these activities supported by public and private capital were 
designed to have a spill over effect on the local economy and thereby promote the 
overall development of the regions in southern Italy.    
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One of the essential elements to the policy initiated in the 1950s to develop the 
South was the distinction made between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” interventions. 
In the case of the Cassa its investments were not conceived as a substitute for ordinary 
national economic investments. If anything, they were considered “additional” 
investments that represented an effort to promote economic development above and 
beyond what the national government did throughout the country.  The “ordinary” 
interventions (national investment programmes) were to be carried out by the national 
public administrative structure while the “extraordinary” interventions (special 
investment programmes earmarked for the southern regions) were to be carried out by 
a special agency. For the latter, the Cassa, had at its disposal significant economic 
resources and its objectives were to establish the bases for autonomous development 
in the South.  “Indicative planning” or the setting of broad general objectives was the 
main strategy used for the implementation of specific projects in support of the 
development of the Mezzogiorno (Cafiero 2000).  
The first development objectives for the Cassa were designed within a ten-year 
temporal context—that is, the objectives of the programme were to be achieved within 
a ten-year period even though the selection of the projects and allocation of financial 
resources to the national budget were carried out on a year-to-year basis.  The purpose 
of the ten-year programme timeframe was to establish the basic framework for, first, 
the restructuring of agriculture and the birth of new industries. But before those two 
objectives could be reached, an enormous effort had to be dedicated to the building of 
the South’s basic infrastructure grid.  That effort was designed to be carried out during 
the 1950s and 1960s (Cafiero 2000); but it soon became evident that ten years were 
not enough to reduce the infrastructure gap, which existed between North and South.   
By the end of the 50’s it was clear that the overall development of the 
Mezzogiorno would require a much longer effort and greater investment in both 
capital and human resources, otherwise much of the financial allocations which had 
already been spent would have been wasted (Clough 1956, and Chenery 1962).  Based 
on these considerations, the life of the Cassa was extended into the 1970s and 1980s, 
and as the Cassa extended and expanded its activities its initial technocratic nature 
began to give way to more political considerations in both its strategy as well as in its 
decision making structure. 
In the 1960s a new approach was emphasized. Agricultural ceased being a primary 
priority and it was substituted by industry as the main objective of the Cassa’s 
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activities.  A larger percentage of the extraordinary funding began to be devoted to the 
establishment of large industrial complexes in Sicily and in other areas in the South.  
Private industries benefited from substantial incentives and subsidies if they 
established plants in southern Italy, and leading public and private groups rushed 
towards the Mezzogiorno.  Nevertheless, according to Giannola (1982), this process 
was two-edged: while large industrial consortia were settling in the South, local 
industrial sectors were unable to cope with competition from small and medium-sized 
firms located in the North and Centre of the country or the large public firms being 
created in the South.  However, a decade later the ten-year plan procedure and the 
ambitious industrialization programme was affected by the economic crisis of 1973, 
and in the second half of the 1970s public intervention began to slowly decline on the 
heels of a series of plant closures and financial scandals. 
By the beginning of the 1980s it became clear that the significant level of public 
investments directed towards infrastructure and the attraction of large industrial plants 
had not created the preconditions for accelerated economic growth.  Indeed, as Trigilia 
(1992) points out, those areas of the Mezzogiorno, which had performed best, are 
those which have been capable of reducing their dependency on public intervention 
and where the Cassa had not operated.  Unemployment rates and employment in the 
tertiary unskilled sector continued to increase, and criminal organizations and the 
underground economy continued to spread (Zamagni, 1993).  D’Antonio (1991) 
suggests that the insufficient level of economic growth had rendered the South 
economically dependent on the rest of the North and on central handouts.  According 
to D’Antonio, “the policy for the South became very dependent on a role of the State 
as a deus ex machina providing necessary finance”.  
As the internal documents indicate36, the guiding concepts of the Casmez did not 
undergo a significant revision during the first thirty years of its existence.  They 
remained anchored to the Myrdalian development postulates. The policy became 
rooted in the past and depended upon an increasingly strong political base to keep it 
alive. D’Antonio (1991) has argued that “The philosophy behind the extraordinary 
intervention was not altered for more than three decades, while the local economy and 
society in general, underwent significant changes which radically modified the socio-
economic conditions under which regional intervention was conceived”. 
                                                      
36  Source: Annual report of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, various years (1950-1980)  
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What emerges from this analysis of the Cassa’s development approach was that 
though the regions were created throughout Italy in 1970 their emergence had no 
“effective” impact on the restructuring of regional development policies undertaken by 
the central authorities. In other words, the regional institutional framework changed 
due to a progressive shift from a centralized to a decentralized form of government, 
but there was no parallel shift in the regional policy “paradigm” implemented by the 
national government through the Cassa.  It was as if regional institutions and regional 
development policies operated in a complete vacuum within the Italian policy making 
context during the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, the southern regions were consistently cut 
out from having any input in the formulation and implementation of either the 
ordinary or the extraordinary state interventions in the pursuit of economic 
development policies.   
 
5.2.2. Regional Policy management in Italy 
Italian regional development policies have had to address the problem of territorial 
disparities in economic conditions from the unification of the State.  A large body of 
literature has analysed both the economic and normative aspects of the evolution of 
Italian Regional Policies.  However, relatively few studies have focused on the aspects 
relevant for the analysis of public policies. 
Public policies have been undergone a long and complex process of devolution for 
the central government to the regional authorities, encompassing different aspects of 
the management of the territory.37 
Regional development policies in Italian Mezzogiorno can be analysed focusing on 
three main periods: 1950-65; 1965-86; and 1986-2000 coincident with the two past 
programming periods of the Structural Funds.  Each phase will be examined through 
its main normative milestones, and in terms of institutional settings with respect to 
objectives, principles and programming procedures.   
                                                      
37 Regional and local governments have been characterized by a tendency towards devolution of Regional and 
Structural Policy.  The formulation and implementation of Regional and Structural policy have become major 
competency of the regions.  Accordingly, the programming and planning responsibilities are at Regional Level.  In the 
specific, the Provinces have the responsibility over the support to local development and urban planning, while the 
responsibility over local economic development are devolved to the lower government levels (Municipalities).  The 
basic planning instrument for the whole country is  administered at central level.  , Central Government is in charge of 
developing the general concepts concerning spatial planning.  Regional authorities have been involved in spatial 
planning on the basis of Central Government national guidelines.  Regions have been in charge of the formulation and 
implementation of regional plans and guideline for local activities in spatial planning.  Specific and detailed territorial 
master planning have been devolved to Municipalities. 
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The First Phase 1950-1965 
In the First Phase (1950-65), the Regional Development Polices has been 
characterized by a specific institutional framework; different form the other public 
policies.  Its policy has been decided by the Central Government and the Parliament 
and implemented by a dedicated agency, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno.   
The main objective of the Government was to create a public body in charge of 
financing and implementing the programmes of extraordinary intervention in different 
sectors in Southern Italy.  Originally, the Draft Law had foreseen a large financial and 
managing independence to the Cassa; the final text encompassed the institution of a 
Committee of Ministers, nominated by the Council of Ministers.  Along the 
administrative process of the Cassa, it had been changed also its character of “public 
body”, making it an entity in charge of the implementation of the plan established by 
the Council of Ministers (Law 646/1950).   
During this phase, the main policy features of Italian Regional Development 
interventions have been the ones described in the following paragraphs.  With respect 
to the objectives, the interventions, have been addressing the “economic and social 
progress of Southern Italy38” (see art.1 Law 646, August 10th 1950).  However, it 
must be noted that it has not been possible to identify further accompanying legislative 
acts which could narrow and specify this general definition as well as in territorial 
(where) as in quantitative terms (how much money).   
The basic principle has been the territorial concentration; the main instruments 
identified for the implementation of the policy have been reduced interest loans and 
grants.  The procedures for the selection of projects have been characterized by a well-
developed system of standardized technical evaluation criteria. The framework was 
encompassing an ex post annual monitoring and evaluation system, linked to the 
drafting of the annual Balance Sheet of the Cassa.   
The Annual Balance Sheet had to be approved by the Auditors, and submitted at 
the end of every Fiscal Year to National Court of Accountants39.  The relevant 
difference between the Cassa and the other central government institutions is that only 
the Cassa had no ex ante approval by the Court.  Accordingly, the system was only 
                                                      
38 “rafforzamento economico e sociale del Mezzogiorno e delle Isole” in the original text. 
39 Corte dei Conti 
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partially lacking of a monitoring mechanism, but this was implicit in the 
“extraordinary” nature of the Cassa.  
Concerning the evaluation of the interventions, the Cassa had been performing an 
annual evaluation of the economic and social impacts of its interventions internally.  
The annual evaluation has been presented in the Report in annex to each annual 
Budget. The analysis has allowed assessing that this practice has been carefully 
carried out until mid Seventies. After that year, the impact evaluation is progressively 
disappearing form Cassa’s official documents. 
Concerning the programming phase, the Council of Ministers has been in charge of 
contributing in drafting the plan of interventions to be financed through the Cassa per 
il Mezzogiorno, according to the development strategy defined by the Cassa.  The 
Parliament had a relevant function, as it has been responsible of the approval for the 
multi-annual financial endowments of the Cassa.  The financial resources of the Cassa 
have been assigned through specific laws, which represented the direct link between 
the Parliament and the Regional Development Policies.   
The institutional framework has been set up in such a manner that there have been 
no room at all for any authority except Central Government and its ancillary 
institutions.  The Regions, at that time, were not a relevant body administrative, and 
the provinces had no power with respect to regional development.  This remained 
unchanged about until the Seventies. 
The main relevant point to be made concerning the first phase of regional 
development policies is that the institutional settings briefly described above allowed 
reducing significantly the political bargaining in this area of the public interventions.  
The institutional settings designed by Menichella40 allowed the Cassa and its managers 
to be, at least in this first phase, relatively immune from political interferences.   
Within the institutional framework of the first phase of Regional development 
policies, the Central Government has assigned a determinant role to Cassa. Its 
activities have been largely independent from the Central Government. The President 
of the Cassa and the Board of Directors have been appointed internally, and the 
members could not have any political post.   
                                                      
40 Donato Menichella (Biccari 1896-Roma 1984), has been the Governor of the Bank of 
Italy at the time of the creation of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, in which he had a relevant 
role. 
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The Cassa has been able to manage itself with relative high level of independence.  
The general approach has been particularly focused on the achievement of 
performance objectives through the actions of highly skilled bureaucrats.  The 
approach described above, appears to be significantly close to the one pursued under 
the EU cohesion policies.   
The Second Phase: 1965-1986 
The Second Phase of “extraordinary intervention” is considered as starting from 
1965 until 1986, and more extensively until 1989.   
The period of activity of the Cassa has been extended from 10 to 12 years with the 
Law n.949 July 25th 1952.  Its activity has been initially focused on external 
economies, taking the shape of a pre-industrialization programme.  Later, two laws 
have widened the competences of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno: law n.634 July 29th 
1957 and law n.717 June 26th 1965.  The Cassa has been moved towards a more 
integrated approach for the industrialization of the Mezzogiorno.   
Year 1965 represents a milestone in the process of change in the role of Central 
Government with respect of Regional Development Polices.  The Law 717/65 
represented a strengthening of the link between the Cassa and the Central 
Government.  The Law had foreseen to give to the Minister of the Extraordinary 
Interventions in the Mezzogiorno the presidency of the Committee of Ministers, 
overseeing the Cassa’s activities.  As well, the Minister had been empowered of 
relevant monitoring responsibilities over the Cassa’s activities: the Minister has been 
responsible of approving the programmes, the annual Budgets, and the decisions 
concerning the human resources.  As well the Minister has been in charge of 
proposing the appointment of the President and of the Board of Administrators of the 
Cassa.   
With respect to the relevant aspects for the present research, the most significant 
amendment to the original institutional settings in Law 717/65, is linked to the 
introduction of the “coherence opinion” to be expressed by the Minister for 
Extraordinary Intervention in the Mezzogiorno.  The expression was concerning the 
admission of the project to facilitated credit arrangements.  This represented the first 
significant introduction of “third party” control on the activities of the Cassa.  In 
principle, this would act as an external monitoring, but it had turned itself more in 
terms of a stronger political control over the activities of the Cassa, rather than an 
efficiency incentive. 
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During the Seventies, the Law n.183 May 2nd 1976 introduced a more pragmatic 
approach toward the extraordinary intervention, encompassing the periodical revision 
and programming.  Every five years it has to draft a programme identifying the targets 
in terms of employment and GDP to be achieved, the initiatives for the 
industrialization, and the procedures of coordination between the ordinary and 
extraordinary interventions.  The Law reformed the administrative framework of the 
“extraordinary intervention in the Mezzogiorno. On the one hand introduced the 
Permanent Commission for Mezzogiorno (made of 15 member of the Chamber of 
Deputies and 15 members of the Senate); on the other increased the role of the 
Committee of Southern Regions, giving it the competences of control over the 
programming and implementing of the ordinary and extraordinary interventions in the 
Mezzogiorno41.  The Permanent Commission had the competences over the co-
ordination between the regional development policies and the economic policies at 
national level.  
According to Law n.183/76 the regions have had the necessity of identifying the 
criteria to those the Regions would have to comply concerning the implementation of 
Cassa’s special projects42.  With the Law 183/1976 the institutional framework has 
been subject to an in depth change. The change led to an increase of the control of the 
Central Government over the activities of the Cassa through the Permanent 
Commission and the Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE) that 
had the power to revoke a financing.  As well, the Law raised the capacity of the 
regions of influencing the regional development policies. 
The Cassa was supposed to terminate its institutional life on December 1980.  It 
has been subject to several Decrees of extension until 1986.  The last years have been 
characterized by a long series of proposals and amendments to the incumbent settings.  
The most relevant amendments are encompassed in the Law 651/1983.  The 
intervention was supposed to be divided in three main areas (interventions, incentives, 
technical assistance and vocational training); its implementation was divided in three-
                                                      
41 See La Spina, A. “La politica per il Mezzogiorno” Il Mulino 2003 
42 The special projects (35) of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno started in 1972 and continued 
until 1982. The project have been in different sectors: Agriculture development (PS.4 
Zootechny, PS.11 Citrus fruits, PS23 Irrigation; PS.24 Forestry; PS.34 Commercialisation), 
Hydro schemes (PS.13, PS.14 Puglia and Basilicata, PS15, PS25 Sardinia; PS29 Lazio, Tronto, 
Abruzzo and Molise, Campania, PS30 Sicily); Industrial development (PS.1 Port of Cagliari; 
PS.2 South-Est Sicily, PS22 Reggio Calabria); Urban areas (PS31 Naples; PS32 Palermo); 
Environmental intervention in the Gulf of Naples (PS3); Development of inner areas (PS33); 
Research and Development (PS35). 
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year long programming periods, subject to the approval of the CIPE.  In August 1984, 
one of the Decrees promulgated in order to extend the Cassa’s life was not converted 
into Law, and the Cassa was put in liquidation. 
Specific institutional and policy features have characterized the second phase in 
Regional Development Policies in the Mezzogiorno.  With respect to public policy, 
the Italian regional development policies were drafted in the pursuing of the 
“economic and social progress of the southern regions” with no further specifications 
concerning neither quantitative objectives, nor the scheduled time to achieve such 
objectives.  The Law 717/65 added the principle of programming to the one 
concerning the territorial concentration already present.  The programming objective 
remained only a formal prescription, with no actual implementation. 
The policy instruments have been the same of the previous phase: facilitated loans 
or grants dedicated to promote regional development.  The procedures became 
significantly more discretional compared to the previous phase, due to the requirement 
of the “opinion” by the Ministry.   
With respect of the institutional framework, similarly to the previous period, the 
relationship between executive and legislative powers has remained substantially 
balanced: the implementation of the policies was among the responsibilities of the 
Government; the juridical base was a Law approved by the parliament; the financing 
was subject to budget instalments decided by the Parliament at central level.   
Concerning the centre-periphery relationships, relevant has been the continuity 
with the previous phase.  The prevalence of a strong centralization of powers with 
respect to regional development policies was present in the programming phase and in 
the implementation phase.  Although the Law 183/76 encompassed the devolution of a 
large scope of specific responsibilities to the Regions, that has been a clear example of 
“formal devolution”.   
The second phase of the Regional Development policies is different from the first 
one with respect of the level of conflicts between Central Government and the 
Regions.  In the first phase the competences and the role of the Cassa had not been 
subject to relevant political discussion.  The second phase has been characterized by 
an increasing “demand for power” by the Regions.   
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Box 2: Regional Development Policies in Italian Mezzogiorno: Chronology of the First and Second Phase 
 
Law 646/1950:  Creation of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. 
Law 298/1953: Creation of ISVEIMER, CIS, IRFIS, and credit institutes operating 
respectively in continental Southern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia.   
Law 634/1957: Promotion of industrial development areas, prorogation of the life of the 
Cassa for further 5 years; 
Law 555/1959 and Law 1462/1972: Identification of the industrial poles.   
Law 717/1965: Prorogation of the life of the Cassa until 1980, enlargement of its 
responsibilities, increases the power of the Ministry for extraordinary 
intervention in the Mezzogiorno.   
Law 853/1971: Official recognition of the “negotiated programming” between Central 
Government and the entrepreneurs; abolition of the Committee of 
Ministers, and delegation to the CIPE concerning the responsibilities of 
coordination and review both of the programming of interventions 
submitted by the Ministry for Mezzogiorno, and of the actions for 
implementation by the Cassa.   
Law 183/1976: Five-years programming periods for all the investments in Mezzogiorno; 
parliament commission on Mezzogiorno; more financial endowments to 
the Cassa.   
Law 675/1977:  Industrial restructuring 
Law 651/1983: Three-years programming periods for all the investments in Mezzogiorno 
defined by the CIPE.   
D.p.r. August 6th 1984:  Suppression and liquidation of the Cassa 
Law 64/1984: New rules for the extraordinary intervention in the Mezzogiorno; creation 
of Agensud.   
 
During the first phase (1950-65), Italian regional development policies were 
characterized by a specific institutional framework that was separate from the other 
public policies carried out by the national administrative apparatus. The central 
decision making body was represented by the central government (Prime Minister’s 
Office and Cabinet) and Parliament (Commissions in House and Senate responsible 
for Development Policies) while the responsibility for implementation was allocated 
to the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno whose offices were located in Rome.  The Cassa 
never established local offices in the southern regions. In practice, the Cassa was 
largely independent and autonomous from the central government given that the 
President of the Cassa and the Board of Directors were appointed internally, and the 
members of the board could not hold political office. In essence, the Cassa was 
conceived as a technical agency that was to a large extent self-sufficient and 
autonomous from day-to-day interference from the national political organs.  Thus, the 
central organs represented by the government and Parliament were seen more in the 
role as general overseers of the process rather than day-to-day participants in the 
activities of the Cassa. The text of the law passed in 1950 that created the Cassa (Law 
646/1950) provided for a political organ (i.e. a Committee of Ministers selected by the 
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Cabinet).  This Committee was to provide political guarantees and accountability for 
the activities of the Cassa  
Law 646/50 defined as the target of the Cassa’s activities the “economic and social 
strengthening of Southern Italy43” (see art.1).  The basic principle was that the 
interventions of the Cassa had to be territorially concentrated and that the main 
instruments identified for the implementation of the policy was the provision of loans 
and grants at reduced rates of interest.  Figure 5.1 presents the formalization of the 
decision-making and implementation process associated with the activities of the 
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno.   
Figure 5.1 Conceptual Framework for Regional Development Policies in Italy (1950) 
 
Source: Developed by the author based on interviews in 2004-2008. 
 
The “project cycle” started with the analysis of the economic initial conditions 
carried out by the “Studies Department” of the Cassa.  Then the process foresaw the 
phase of the selection of priorities, based on the principle underlying the activities of 
the Cassa: the extraordinary intervention projects were to be additional in nature to 
ordinary development policies carried out by the national government—i.e., ordinary 
transport policy, ordinary industrialization policy, ordinary agricultural development 
policy, etc. However, the projects to be undertaken by the Cassa were selected 
internally through the support of in-house experts or external academic experts. 
Concerning the decision-making phase, the Council of Ministers was in charge of 
contributing inputs (ideas, objectives, specific foci, etc.) in drafting the plan of 
                                                      
43 In Italian the title was: “rafforzamento economico e sociale del Mezzogiorno e delle 
Isole” . 
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interventions to be financed through the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Parliament had a 
relevant function, as it has been responsible of the approval for the multi-annual 
financial endowments of the Cassa that had to be allocated on a yearly basis. 
Therefore, it was theoretically possible for Parliament to discuss the operations of the 
Cassa during the budgetary debate or during hearings of the specialized parliamentary 
committees.  A panel of engineers and sector-specific experts employed by the Cassa 
was in charge of the detailed preparation of projects, either for special or integrated 
projects.  The procedures for the selection of projects were characterized by a well-
developed system of standardized technical evaluation criteria.  As well, the structures 
of the Cassa were in charge of “assigning” the tenders for the undertaking the 
investments on a competitive basis and in monitoring the construction phase.  
The Cassa had an internal system of efficiency evaluation with respect to the 
financial resources utilized and the economic and employment impacts generated.  
These evaluations were encompassed in the Annual Report of the Casmez, and 
provided the basis for the choice of the projects for the next programming cycle.  The 
Cassa, as other organs of the State, was subject to external financial audit by the 
national Court of Auditors on a yearly basis.  However, the relevant difference 
between the Cassa and the other central government bodies was that the Cassa did not 
need an ex ante approval by the Court of Auditors in order to begin expenditures.  In 
this sense, the general oversight system applied to the Cassa lacked a part of the 
monitoring mechanism: the a priori approval of the proposed budget to be spent. Thus, 
the oversight exercised over the Cassa was entirely ex-post (after the fact), but this 
was an explicit consequence of the “extraordinary” nature of the Cassa’s activities.  
With regard to the effectiveness evaluation (i.e. socio-economic impacts of the 
interventions), the Cassa performed this task internally as part of its annual evaluation 
of the economic and social results of its interventions.  The annual evaluation was 
presented in a Report that formed an annex to each annual budget. This practice 
continued until the mid Seventies. After that, the impact evaluation progressively 
disappeared from the Cassa’s official reporting. 
The institutional framework devised for the Cassa in 1950 provided no room for 
the participation of any other body, except for the Central Government and its 
ancillary institutions, and even in this case the direct interaction with the day-to-day 
activities of the Cassa were quite limited. Given that the Regions did not exist on a 
uniform basis throughout the South, the two that did exist (Sicily and Sardinia) were 
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not included in the deliberation or evaluation process. Even when the other six, 
ordinary southern regions (Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Molise and 
Puglia) did come into existence in 1970 they were also locked out of decision-making. 
Therefore, the Cassa’s institutional structure provided no opportunity for consultation 
with the regions on the projects to be carried out by the Cassa within the territories 
governed by the regions. Provincial administrations did exist on a uniform basis, but 
they had no power or responsibilities with respect to regional development policies.   
What was most surprising in this allocation of decision-making and 
implementation responsibilities was the continuous and systematic lack of any 
regional or local input into the process.  The Cassa basically represented a classical 
top-down development policy for the regions but not by the regions.  Two years after 
it came into existence the life of the Cassa was extended from 10 to 12 years with the 
Law n.949 July 25th 1952, but this legislation did not change the overall objectives or 
institutional structure associated with the Cassa.  Its activities continued to be focused 
on creating those external economies that could promote the economic development of 
the area without any input from the regions.  In 1957 the Ministry for Extraordinary 
Interventions in Mezzogiorno was created in order to provide more direct political 
direction to the activities of the Cassa, but it took time for this innovation to change 
the way the Cassa operated.   
The Second Phase of the “extraordinary intervention” started in 1965 and 
continued until 1986 or more extensively until 1989, and its modified structure is 
presented in Figure 5.2. What changed after 1965 was the introduction of the presence 
of an executive body, the Ministry for Extraordinary Interventions, into the decision 
making structure of the Cassa.   
Figure 5.2 Conceptual Framework for Regional Development Policies in Italy (1965) 
 
Source: Developed by the author based on interviews in 2004 -2008 
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The second phase begins with the passage of law n.717 of June 26th 1965. This 
law served to widen the Cassa’s scope in the field of economic development but it 
began to change the role assumed by the central Government (i.e., the Ministry for 
Extraordinary Interventions in the Mezzogiorno) in relation to regional development 
polices as is illustrated in Figure 5.2.  The law foresaw the allocation of the presidency 
of the Committee of Ministers to the Minister for Extraordinary Interventions in the 
Mezzogiorno.  The Minister was also allocated the responsibility of monitoring the 
Cassa’s activities through the approval the programmes for interventions, the annual 
Budgets, and decisions concerning personnel of the Cassa.  The Minister was also 
given control over the appointment of the President and of the Board of Directors of 
the Cassa. With the allocation of a direct role in the affairs of the Cassa, the Ministry 
of Extraordinary Interventions began to encroach on the relative autonomy and 
independence of the Cassa from political considerations of the Minister in charge and 
of the entire Cabinet. During the second phase the Cassa witnessed a slow process of 
“politicisation” and an undermining of its purely technocratic role in the control and 
oversight of development policies.  The overall expenditure of the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno in the period 1951-1980 has been of about 23 billion Euros, equal to an 
average of 758 Meuro per year, and 98 Meuro in each region (considering 8 regions) 
per year. At the time, the expenditure was equal to 0,7%of national GDP or 3,3% of 
the Mezzogiorno’s GDP. With respect to the evolution of expenditures and its 
impacts, the analysis of the Cassa’s budgets over the thirty year period shows an 
average growth rate of the annual expenditures of about 7%, compared to an average 
regional GDP growth rate of 4,5% as illustrated below. 
In the four periods identified by the Law financing the Cassa (1951-1965; 1966-
1970; 1971-1975; 1976-1980) the expenditures of the Cassa and its impacts on the 
regional economy have changed. The following table presents the relative figures. 
Table 5.2  The Activity of the Cassa and the national economy 
 1951-1965 1965-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 
Total expenditures 764  1.229  2.346  2.982  
National GDP  132.250  222.659  273.273  315.266  
Mezzogiorno GDP  31.505  53.218  65.045  74.395  
as % of National GDP 0,58% 0,55% 0,86% 0,95% 
As % of Mezzogiorno GDP 2,43% 2,31% 3,61% 4,00% 
Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of official Cassa per il Mezzogiorno annual budgetary data, various years 
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The expenditures in the period 1950-1965 increased at an average growth rate of 
the 5,1%, at 21,8% in the second period (1966-1970), at 20,6% in the third period 
(1971-1975).  Conversely, in the last period (1976-80) it declined at a rate of 6,2% per 
year.  A comparison between the increase in expenditures and national GDP growth in 
the 1950-1970 period shows that expenditures have been equal to 0,58% of GDP in 
the first period to, rise to 0,86% in 1971-75 and increase again to 0,95% in the 1976-
80 period. 
 
5.3. Policy implementation: interventions and 
instruments 
The expenditures of the Cassa were addressing two main macro-sectors: 
construction of infrastructures of general interest and interventions in support of 
productive sectors.  The latter saw the presence of public bodies, like Isveimer, Irfis, 
Cis, Insud, Finam, Fime, and others. Isveimer, Irfis and Cis were assigned the task of 
developing industrial credit market in the three main geographic areas of the South 
(southern continental Italy and the islands of Sicily and Sardinia), and were located in 
what was considered at the time the “capital” of southern Italy—i.e., Naples—and the 
regional capitals of the two southern islands—i.e., Palermo and Cagliari.  The other 
institutions were active as shareholder through financial participations (Insud) in the 
industries set up in the South44.  Finally, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno was the 
majority shareholder in all of these firms associated with some aspect of public 
investments in southern Italy. The role of private actors was, as a result, completely 
excluded and considered to be superfluous to the policy.  The breakdown of the 
financial resources that was distributed between these two main sectors of intervention 
by the Cassa over the four periods is presented below: 
                                                      
44 The other institutions--Finam and Fime-- were respectively the operative and financial instruments for the Cassa in 
agriculture and mechanical industry. 
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Table 5.3  The Cassa’s expenditures: breakdown (Meuro, current prices and percentages) 
 1951-1965 1965-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 
Total expenditures 764  1.229  2.346  2.982  
in infrastructure 242 424 866 1299 
in productive activities 522  805  1,480  1,683  
     
Total expenditures % 100% 100% 100% 100% 
in infrastructure 32% 34% 37% 44% 
in productive activities 68% 66% 63% 56% 
Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of official Cassa per il Mezzogiorno annual budgetary data, various 
years, 1951-1980 
 
Overall expenditures increased significantly in both sectors over the four periods.  
The overall increase in infrastructure investment was around 440%, while in 
manufacturing the increase was 230%.  With respect to the total amount of 
investment: 37,5% was invested in infrastructure projects while 62,5% were invested 
in the productive sectors.  During the first three periods (about 25 years) the balance 
between the two types of expenditure is constant with infrastructure investments rising 
progressively: from 31,7% in the first period, 34,5% and 36,9 during the subsequent 
two other periods to finally arrive at 44% during the last period. However, aid to 
productive investments continued to represent over half of all investments during all 
of the four periods. Disaggregating the investments in infrastructure, significant 
differences are present from one sector to another as is illustrated in Table 5.4. The 
data in the table demonstrated that the largest investments during the four periods took 
place in the provision of adequate water supplies and in waste management. 
Table 5.4 Interventions in the sector of infrastructures (Meuro, current prices) 
Infrastructures  1951-1965 1965-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 Total 
Water pipelines 108   184   351   658   1.301  
Road works 76   114   213   228  631  
Ports and Airports 1   30   46   45  122  
Hospitals 1   29   21   62  113  
Services in rural areas -   5   148   172  325  
Urban areas -  -   2   74  76  
Others 56   62   75   60  253  
Total general  242  424  856   1.299  2.821  
Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of official Cassa per il Mezzogiorno annual budgetary data, various years 
 
In Italy such investments not only refer to dams and aqueducts but also the 
treatment of waste water illustrative of the fact that in the South the public supply of 
water resources for civil uses as well as in agriculture and manufacturing was never 
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adequately provided by public sources. As a result, the largest part of the resources of 
the Cassa (about 45%) was dedicated to the regular supply of water to the inhabitants 
and producers in the South. The problem associated with the provision of adequate 
water supplies continued to plague the South well after the end of the national 
extraordinary intervention for the South. It was finally solved at the beginning of the 
new millennium with the investments made by the Structural Funds to provide the 
final connections to residences, farms and factories that had not been completed 
during previous decades.  
The other main sector to receive public investments was the provision of road 
networks (24%). In this case, the roads built never represented major highways but 
rather the ordinary public roads that made it possible to link one town to another or to 
move up and down the peninsula   Road works presented another sector that was 
brought to completion through the intervention of the European Structural Funds. 
These two sectors of water supply and road works were initiated during the period 
between 1950 and 1992 but they were never brought to a satisfactory conclusion 
during that period to have a major impact on the economic prospects for the South. 
Cassa investments seemed to be deemed important if they began construction rather 
than in bringing construction to completion, thus feeding a general sense of 
inefficiency and mismanagement in the use of public funds. 
Other public infrastructure such as ports and airports were marginal at first and 
only began to attract major investments during the latter period of the Cassa’s 
activities. The project by project approach did not help in identifying the interactions 
between various types of investments—roads, ports, airports, and water supply—to 
formulate an overall development strategy for the South or to focus on one area or 
region in framing an integrated development scheme. That type of overall integrated 
planning had to wait until the arrival of the national operational programmes financed 
by the Structural Funds after 1989.  
Analyzing the expenditures of the Cassa down even further as shown in Tables 5.5 
and 5.6 that during the first period the investments of the Cassa predominated in the 
agricultural sector where the interventions in water supply and waste water 
management were concentrated along with the provision of road infrastructures in 
rural areas.  During the second period, after 1963, the interventions were dedicated to 
the manufacturing with some attention being paid to port and airport facilities vital to 
the development of the tourist sector. The data also show that after 1959 the Cassa 
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started to invest in services in depressed areas and only after 1974 did it begin to 
concentrate on investments in urban areas. 
Table 5.5 Value of interventions in productive sectors (Meuro, current prices) 
Productive sectors 1951-1965 1965-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 Total 
Agriculture 437   265   387   428  1.517  
Industry 41   454   999  1.171  2.665  
Tourism 19   24   52   59   154  
Craftsmanship and Fisheries 12   41   25  -   78  
Participations etc 13   21   17   25   76  
Total  522  805   1.480   1.683   4.490  
Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of official Cassa per il Mezzogiorno annual budgetary data, various years 
Table 5.6 Percentage of interventions in productive sectors (Meuro, current prices) 
Productive sectors 1951-1965 1965-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 
 Agriculture 84% 33% 26% 25% 
Industry 8% 56% 68% 70% 
Tourism 4% 3% 3% 4 
Craftsmanship and Fisheries 2% 5% 2% 0% 
Participations etc 2% 3% 1% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of official Cassa per il Mezzogiorno annual budgetary data, various years  
 
The major role of the Cassa in the development of the productive sector in the 
Mezzogiorno in the period between 1950 and 1965 amounted to around 270 Meuro 
per year, equivalent to 68,3% of overall financial investments. From 1966 to the end 
of its activities the Cassa has invested up to 870 Meuro per year, equal to the 56,5% of 
overall investments. What is interesting is that despite these investments the gap 
between industry in the South and the North was not reduced. In fact, the type of 
industrial investments earmarked for the South—heavy industry and large industrial 
plants—served to increase the gap and prevented the South from participating in the 
major industrial transition that took place in the Centre-North of the country identified 
with the rise of industrial districts and the flowering of small and medium enterprises. 
One of the surprising aspects of the development strategy developed by the Cassa 
in consideration of the geographic and climatic conditions present in the South was the 
utter lack of attention paid to the tourism sector. During the period when the Cassa 
was active it only invested 2.2% of overall financial resources in tourism. No specific 
attention seems to have been allocated to the development of resorts, the creation of 
yacht harbours, investments in archaeological discoveries, the building of museums or 
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the conservation of beaches, parks or wildlife preserves. Investments in tourism 
increased slightly from the insignificant amount of 10 Meuro per year of the first 
period to 12 Meuro per year in the second and 32 Meuro per year during the last 
period.  
The financing of the craft industry and fishing also received little attention from the 
Cassa, amounting to an infinitesimal 1.1% of overall financing for two sectors that had 
traditionally represented important backbones of the southern economy.  Average 
annual spending reached its highest during the period 1966-1970 with 22 Meuro per 
year, and in the last period the level was expenditure was close to zero. 
When I turn to the regional breakdown over the four periods (Table 5.7) analysed, 
the largest percentage of resources were invested in Sicily (20%) and Campania 
(19%). The two regions receiving the lowest percentage of resources were Basilicata 
and Puglia. It has to be noted how the breakdown of financing does not show any 
strong correlation with the number of inhabitants in the recipient regions and re-
enforces the conclusion that interventions were more driven by political considerations 
rather than calculations of equity or efficiency. The low of expenditures in Puglia are 
particularly notable given the region’s agricultural sector and some highly visible 
industrial plants in Brindisi and Taranto. 
Table 5.7 Expenditures of the Cassa del Mezzogiorno and resident population: regional 
breakdown 1951-1986 
Regions Average breakdown (1951-1986) Average population breakdown (1951-1986 
Abruzzo-Molise 13% 6% 
Campania 19% 27% 
Puglia 10% 20% 
Basilicata 10% 3% 
Calabria 13% 11% 
Sicily 20% 25% 
Sardinia 15% 8% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of official Cassa per il Mezzogiorno annual budgetary data, various 
years and ISTAT website 2004. 
 
The nature of industrial investments in the South brought to the forefront the role 
of national industrial holding companies such as IRI (Institute for Industrial 
Reconstruction) but also the role played by ENI (The National Agency for 
Hydrocarbons) created in 1953 and the Agency for Industrial Participation in the 
Manufacturing Sector (EFIM) that was created in 1962.  The enterprises controlled by 
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these managing authorities were present both in services and manufacturing and in all 
parts of the country. IRI had major manufacturing investments in the North as well as 
in the South as was the case with ENI and EFIM. What was important for the 
investment strategy of the public corporations was that a majority of their investment 
was supposed to take place in the South. 
Looking at the only data that are available in relation to the level of gross investment 
per year (i.e., gross investments include new investments as well as major 
maintenance expenditures), during the period of the extraordinary intervention 
investments in the manufacturing sector in the Mezzogiorno were approximately 15 
billion euro and presented the following evolution through time.   
Table 5.8  Cassa’s activities in the state owned firms sector and the national economy 
Periods Average expenditure per year % on the investment in the rest of Italy 
1951-55 61 18,9 
1956-60 147 27,4 
1961-65 1.069 100,6 
1966-70 984 114,5 
1971-75 2.295 180,6 
1976-86 865 73,9 
Average 1951-1986 890 105,1 
Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of official Cassa per il Mezzogiorno annual budgetary data, various years  
 
Breaking the first period, 1951-1960, into two five year periods as presented in 
Table 5.8, the Cassa was not a significant player in the provision of financing for 
state-owned enterprises. That changed after 1961 when the Cassa’s related 
investments in state owned firms accounted for an equivalent amount of investment on 
the part of state enterprises in the rest of the country. During the 1960s investments 
were stabilized at a level of approximately one thousand billion Euros. It reached its 
peak in the 1971-75 period when it made available 2295 billion Euros. The level of 
funding was reduced in soon therefore as the two oil shocks began to impact on large 
industry and accelerated the down-sizing of industry in Italy and in the rest of the 
western world. However, was is interesting is that the decline of public investments 
was greater in southern Italy than in the rest of the country as the regions came into 
existence and began to demand a greater accountability of the national funds that were 
invested in their surrounding territory.   
The change in the intensity of the Cassa’s activities through the instrument of 
publically owned firms is even more relevant when I consider the last column of the 
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table which compares the concentration of investments in the Mezzogiorno with those 
in the rest of Italy. The investments in the period 1971-80 are of particular interest in 
understanding the specific character of the system of public investments.  During that 
period, the investments moved from the maximum of 1.700 billion euro in 1972 to the 
295 billion Euros in 1974.  Such a sharp reduction is attributable mainly to the 
reduction of net investments, due, in turn, to the completion of the programme of 
construction of large plants and to the beginning of the process of disinvestment in 
large industrial plants. The sectors that were particularly impacted were those related 
to steel manufacturing, mechanical, aluminium, oil refineries, textiles and nuclear 
activities (see Table 5.9). 
Table 5.9 Activities of state owned firms in productive sectors (Meuro, current prices) 
Sectors 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 Total 
Steel making  3.078  2.014   5.820  1.185  12.097  
Chemicals  558   767   2.006   885  4.216  
Mechanical  326   778   1.292   520  2.916  
Aluminium  -   260  663   95  1.018  
Refineries  447   225  119   140   931  
Concrete  106   91  297   37   531  
Minerals  25   174  270   108   577  
Nuclear  299   3   -   6   308  
Electronics  -   59  167   126   352  
Shipbuilding  41   66  106   53   266  
Textile  44   58  122   39   263  
Other  420   425  617   329  1.791  
Total 5.344  4.920  11.479  3.523  25.266  
Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of official Cassa per il Mezzogiorno annual budgetary data, various years 
 
 Breaking down the investments by productive sector I find that the state firms 
were heavily engaged in “basic industry”, specifically in the steel-making sector, 
which absorbed 48% of the total investments.  In the period 1961-65 the largest part of 
the investment went to   the steel making sector (Taranto started in the 1961), while 
the chemical plants (10%) and refineries (8%) and mechanics (6%) were allocated a 
residual part of the resources. 
In the following period, while the level of investment in steel making was reduced  
(from 58% to 40%), investments in chemical and petro-chemical activities were 
increased (15,6%), and the mechanical sector (car manufacturing - the Poligliano 
d’Arco Alfasud plant was inaugurated in 1968) received three times the amount of 
resources allocated during the previous period  (15,8%). During the period between 
1971 and 1975 there was a significant increase of investments in manufacturing, 
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focussing on steel making (51%) and chemical (23%) plants. However, five years later 
the level of investment was reduced by more than 70% due to the impact of de-
industrialisation and the loss of competitiveness of large publically run firms. 
Table 5.10 Activities of the state owned firms in the productive sectors (Meuro, 
percentages) 
Sectors 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 
Steel making  57,6% 40,9% 50,7% 33,6% 
Chemical 10,4% 15,6% 17,5% 25,1% 
Mechanics 6,1% 15,8% 11,3% 14,8% 
Aluminium 0,0% 5,3% 5,8% 2,7% 
Refinery 8,4% 4,6% 1,0% 4,0% 
Concrete 2,0% 1,8% 2,6% 1,1% 
Minerals 0,5% 3,5% 2,4% 3,1% 
Nuclear 5,6% 0,1% 0,0% 0,2% 
Electronics 0,0% 1,2% 1,5% 3,6% 
Shipbuilding 0,8% 1,3% 0,9% 1,5% 
Textile 0,8% 1,2% 1,1% 1,1% 
Other 7,9% 8,6% 5,4% 9,3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author’s calculation on the basis of official Cassa per il Mezzogiorno annual budgetary data, various years 
 
With respect to the regional breakdown of the activities related to publically owned 
firms, only Molise and Calabria were not awarded large plants (with more than 1.000 
employees).  In other three regions the interventions were focussed on specific sectors: 
steel making in Puglia, chemicals in Basilicata, chemical and aluminium in Sardinia. 
In the remaining three southern regions-- Sicily, Abruzzo and Campania –investments 
were concentrated on mechanical, textile, shipbuilding and electronics plants. 
The evaluations of the activities of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno have to take into 
account the “extraordinary” objectives that have been the starting point in the creation 
of the Cassa itself.  The Cassa was considered to be an “extraordinary” instrument in 
the design of regional development policies. However, the analysis of the data 
presented here and the demise of the investment strategy associated with large 
industrial firms operating in the public sector illustrate all of the limitations of the 
strategy. By the end of the 1970s the Cassa had run its course and the relevance of the 
original TVA oriented strategy began to manifest all of its shortcomings. By 1985 the 
Cassa passed into history and was replaced by the Agency for the South, but it too was 
doomed by the impact of the new economic paradigm that had begun to take hold in 
Italy, emphasizing the role of small and medium firms and the role of sub-national 
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institutions (regions and communes) in the formulation of territorially specific 
economic development policies (Leonardi Nanetti, 2007). 
 
With the creation of the ordinary regions in 1970 the implication was that a 
thorough restructuring of regional development policies and of the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno would take place.  In fact, Law n.853/1971 prescribed that the regions 
should take over competences in several fields previously under the control of the 
Cassa (Annesi 1973). However, in the governmental decrees of 1972 that transferred 
powers, resources and personnel to the regions, the central government made no 
mention of the activities managed by the Cassa.  Conversely, the central government 
re-emphasized its control of development policies in the South: it did not alter in the 
slightest the decision-making and implementation model previously illustrated. 
Instead, the regions were given mere “spectators” roles in the administration of 
national regional development policies in the South four years later.  
In 1972, a decision of the Constitutional Court concerning the juridical status of the 
Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, on the one hand left ambiguous its relationship with the 
Regions, but on the other hand clearly ratified the role of the Cassa as it continued its 
policy of “pursuing the general interests of the State” instead of pursuing the general 
interests of the regions (Ammannati 1981)45. 
Figure 5.3 Conceptual Framework for Regional Development Policies in Italy (1976) 
 
Source: Developed by the author based on interviews(2004-2008).   
 
With Law n.183 of May 2nd 1976, the regions were inserted on a “consultative” 
basis in the decision-making process with regard to national regional policies (see 
                                                      
45 The decision of the Constitutional Court is the following: Constitutional Court 10-17 February n.28, in Giur. 
Cost 1972, 117. 
Committee of 
Regions 
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Figure 4.1).  In comparison to previous provisions, the 1976 law accepted the fact that 
the regions existed and that they had to be brought into the process in some manner. In 
this light, it is clear that the 1976 legislation attempted to introduce a more pragmatic 
approach toward the extraordinary intervention, encompassing the periodical revision 
of the projects through the introduction of a limited form of programming, and 
providing a role for the regions.46 
However, the most important innovation introduced by the law was the 
reorganization of the administrative framework of the Cassa through a re-enforcement 
of the role of the central government.  Law 183 created a “Permanent Commission” 
that had the responsibility of co-ordinating regional development policies and 
economic policies at the national level.  Thus, through the activities of the Permanent 
Commission the “extraordinary” nature of regional policies began to give way to the 
“ordinary” need to link regional development policies with the formulation of national 
economic policies in order to maximize the impact on regional growth and 
development.  Another innovation introduced by the law was the insertion of the CIPE 
(Inter-Ministerial Committee for Economic Planning) into the workings of the central 
government on decisions relating to the Cassa. 
While the role of the central government was being reinforced, the law awarded the 
regions the role of identifying the criteria to be used in the identification of the 
projects to be undertaken by the Cassa47.  The changes brought about by the 1976 
legislation began to restrict the role of the Cassa to that of implementing body of the 
decisions taken by the central Government authorities. In effect, the Cassa’s previous 
role as decision-maker was transferred to the Permanent Commission and to the Inter-
ministerial Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE). Within the reorganized 
decision-making process the CIPE was given the power to revoke financial allocations 
to the Cassa.  Though the Law raised the capacity of the regions to begin influencing 
                                                      
46 See La Spina, A. “La politica per il Mezzogiorno” Il Mulino 2003. The Law introduced the Permanent 
Commission for Mezzogiorno (made of 15 member of the Chamber of Deputies and 15 members of the Senate); on the 
other increased the role of the Committee of Southern Regions, giving it the competences of control over the 
programming and implementing of the ordinary and extraordinary interventions in the Mezzogiorno. 
47 The special projects (35) of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno started in 1972 and continued until 1982. The 
projects were organized for  different sectors: Agriculture development (PS.4 Zootechny, PS.11 Citrus fruits, PS23 
Irrigation; PS.24 Forestry; PS.34 Commercialisation), Water projects (PS.13, PS.14 Puglia and Basilicata, PS15, PS25 
Sardinia; PS29 Lazio, Tronto, Abruzzo and Molise, Campania, PS30 Sicily); Industrial development (PS.1 Port of 
Cagliari; PS.2 South-Est Sicily, PS22 Reggio Calabria); Urban areas (PS31 Naples; PS32 Palermo); Environmental 
intervention in the Gulf of Naples (PS3); Development of inner areas (PS33); and Research and Development (PS35). 
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the central government’s choice of regional development policies through the 
definition of the criteria by which projects were to be selected, they were not given a 
role in either the decision-making or the implementation process. 
The last years of the second phase were characterized by a long series of proposals 
and amendments designed to change the existing structure.  In fact, the most important 
amendments were contained in the subsequent Law 651/1983 that divided national 
regional policies into four main areas (interventions, incentives, technical assistance 
and vocational training); the time framework for implementation was organized into 
three-year long programming periods; and the decisions of the Cassa were subjected to 
the approval of the CIPE.  In August 1984, one of the Decrees necessary for the 
promulgation of the Cassa’s life was not converted into Law; this caused the Cassa to 
cease to exist. It was replaced in 1986 by the Agency for the Promotion of the 
Development of South (AGENSUD), which had been in charge of carrying out the 
necessary acts for the transition of the Cassa’s human and financial resources to the 
Regions and to other structures set up to substitute the Cassa. 
From the above discussion, it is evident that the second phase of Italy’s regional 
development policies was different from the first with respect of the level of conflict 
between the central government and the regions.  In the first phase the competences 
and the role of the Cassa were not subject to relevant political discussion given the 
hands-off position assumed by the central government during the 1950s. In addition, 
in the 1950s the regions practically did not exist, and if they did exist as in the case of 
the special regions, they never applied pressure on the government or the Cassa for a 
role in decision-making.48  The second phase, instead, was characterized by an 
increasing “demand for power” by both the political organs of the central government 
and the regions. It was easy for the central government to enter the activities of the 
Cassa because it had the power to introduce new rules and procedures governing the 
Cassa as the creation and reinforcement of the Ministry for Extraordinary 
Interventions in the South or the creation of the CIPE bore witness.  Instead, the 
regions had no such power, and they had to wait until the national government was 
ready to delegate to them a new role in regional policies.  This possibility began to 
evolve during the 1970s as new legislation on regional governments (law 382/1975) 
undertook to transfer additional powers to the regions.  In 1976 and 1977 a broad 
political front was created between the national government, the major political 
                                                      
48 This aspect is particularly relevant with regard to the southern regions of Sicily and Sardinia. 
  149 
parties, the trade unions, and the regions to push for a significant and more sustained 
devolution of power to the regional level.  The long-term impact of this front was 
evident in the proceedings of the “Conferenza del Mezzogiorno” (conference on the 
Mezzogiorno), held by the Cassa in March 198349.  Specifically, the position of the 
regions was expressed in the speech of Mr. Mascino, Vice-president of the Committee 
of the Regions of the Mezzogiorno50:  He presented on behalf of the regions a clearly-
stated request for a more direct involvement of the regions in the formulation and 
implementation of regional development policies, and within his presentation a biting 
criticism of the logic and practical consequences of the “extraordinary” intervention 
was offered.  The position of the Central Government was clearly expressed by the 
Minister for the Regions, Fabio Fabbri, during the same conference51.  The Minister 
took into consideration the problem of the “risk of conflict between the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno and the Regions”, and foresaw a possible solution only when the regions 
were in a position to become autonomous in the conduct of regional planning and 
capable of spending funds efficiently.  In fact, the Minister welcomed the possibility 
that the regions could become more involved in national regional planning.  Moreover, 
he proposed a further devolution of socio-economic competences to the ordinary 
regions and thereby reducing the gap between them and the special statute regions.  
However, these proposals never got off of the ground due to the fact that 1) the Cassa 
ceased to exist in 1983 and 2) the new Agency for the South was even more 
centralized that the Cassa. 
 
The Third Phase (1986-2000) represents a period in which substantial change took 
place in the formulation and implementation of regional development policies in Italy: 
as the Cassa was abolished and the national government promised to give the regions a 
greater role in regional policies and a significant development was taking place at the 
European level. In 1986 with the implementation of the Single European Act the 
European Community began to put into place a European regional development policy 
(to become known as “cohesion policy”) that was radically different from the 
approach previously adopted by the Italian national government. In effect, the 
                                                      
49 See the proceedings of the “Conferenza del Mezzogiorno …La Civiltà della Ragione”, Rome 22-23-24 March 
1983, published by Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. 
50 Proceedings of the “Conferenza per il Mezzogiorno”, pagg.225-227 
51 Proceedings of the “Conferenza per il Mezzogiorno”, pagg.235-238 
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European version of regional policy began to move in the direction of transferring 
primary responsibility for the policy from the national to the regional level.    
At the national level some timid steps were being taken to involve the regions more 
directly in the formulation of regional policies. One of the first steps in this direction 
was also taken in 1986. With the passage of Law n.64 March 1st 1986, a new 
relationship was defined between the central and regional governments.  The Law 
provided for the formalization of different forms of interrelations between the two 
levels of Government in the form of: the so-called “negotiated programming”52.  The 
first two instruments created to bring about negotiated programming were set into 
motion by the CIPE Decree of July 16th 1986, and institutionalised by the Law 
n.64/1986. They were the “Institutional Consultation for Programming” and 
“Framework Programming Agreement”53.  Both provisions addressed the 
implementation and the financial aspects of regional policies rather than the 
programming or decision-making phases of the process, but they did not provide any 
direct input into the activities of the new Agency for the South.   
Soon it became evident that the devolution features expressed by Law 64/86 were, 
by their very nature, merely formalistic changes; they did not undertake to effectively 
transfer powers in this policy area from the national to the regional governments.  The 
regional programming exercise made possible by the 1986 legislation did not provide 
any interaction between the regions and the national Agency. The two worlds were 
kept separate.  Thus, it is clear that the initiation of the EU cohesion policy in 1989 
and its objective of directly involving the regions did represent a revolution in the way 
regional policy was to be conducted in Italy’s less-developed regions after 1989.  
The Third Phase (1986-2000) represents a substantial change in the Regional 
Development Policies in Italy: the European Regional policy has had a wide spectrum 
of implications affecting all the aspects described in the previous paragraphs.  The 
incoherence between the regional development policies, as they resulted throughout 
the several changes up during the previous phases, and the EU framework was 
evident, and included objectives, principles, instruments, and procedures.  This period 
has been characterized by several attempts to improve the coherence between national 
institutions and regional policies within the European Union’s framework. 
                                                      
52 “programmazione negoziata” 
53 Intesa Istituzionale di Programma” and  “Accordo di Programma” in the original language. 
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The introduction of Law 488/1992 can be considered the concluding phase of the 
“extraordinary intervention” in the Mezzogiorno.  The Law provided for the 
suppression of all of the structures related to the implementation of the “centralized 
intervention”. In other words, the Ministry for Extraordinary Interventions was 
abolished along with the Agency for the South (AGENSUD). Another implication of 
the Law was the concept of “special needs” and “depressed areas” to all parts of the 
national territory.”  The central government ceased to merely focus its development 
policies on the South (now there was a special EC policy to take care of the less 
developed regions as a whole) and now it expanded its activities to all depressed areas 
in the country.   The identification of the areas eligible for support was allocated to the 
Inter-ministry Committee for Economic Programming (CIPE)54.  The Law, in effect, 
“nationalized” the country’s previous policy toward the South in that regional 
development policies were no longer restricted to the southern areas of the country. 
Areas in the North were now also eligible. But what the law did not change was the 
fundamental approach to regional policies: they still remained in the eyes of the 
central government a responsibility of the national level. The national legislation never 
really changed the relationship between the centre and the regions with regard to the 
conceptualisation and execution of regional policies: they remained focussed on 
internal national administrative interactions rather than incorporating in a consistent 
manner the contribution by the regions. That task or opportunity was left to cohesion 
policy. In other words, it only became possible for the regions to become central 
actors in the formulation and implementation of regional policies when the policy 
originated at the European level. It was not possible to achieve this result when the 
policy was under the exclusive control of the national level. 
One of the last acts in the dismantling of the centralized approach to national regional 
policy was the introduction of Decree-Law n.96 April 3rd 1993 that foresaw the 
creation of the Observatory for Regional Policies.  It was the first instrument at the 
central level set up to monitor the dismantling of Agensud and the implementation of 
regional development policies in southern Italy. The lack of a national unit for the 
coordination of interventions in the south made it difficult for the national government 
to: 1) efficiently manage those programmes and 2) providing support and guidance to 
individual regions in their interactions with elements of the national bureaucracy and 
                                                      
54 Law 64/1986 art.4 “ aree del territorio nazionale individuate dal CIPE”. 
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the Commission in Brussels.  Two years later, the Observatory was abolished and the 
National Control Centre or “Cabina di Regia”55 was created on the basis of Law n.341 
of August 8th 1995. The Control Centre took over the responsibilities of the 
Observatory, and it was allocated the co-ordination of the different sub-units of the 
national ministries in charge of the planning and management of EU funds in addition 
to coordinating national financial resources earmarked for the support of regional 
development policies.  Shortly thereafter the “National Control Centre” was also 
dramatically modified: with the passage of Decree Law n.430 December 5th 1998 
which set-up the Department for Development and Cohesion Polices56. The 
Department for Cohesion was given responsibility for all of the all functions that had 
been previously allocated to the Cabina di Regia.  
 
5.4. Preliminary evaluations on the regionalization 
process 
The Italian Regional Development Policies have undergone a large number of 
institutional changes that have informed their objectives, instruments, and procedures.  
The most dramatic change has been related to the European dimension that the 
Regional Development Polices have assumed in the last years, and the role of the 
regions themselves.   
In the First Phase (starting 1950), the overall development strategy was defined in 
the Law instituting the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno: “empower the Southern Italy and 
the Islands” and reduce the economic disparities between the Southern Italy and the 
rest of the territory.  Until the 80s there had been only one instrument, the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno that was encompassing all the competences concerning the 
programming designing and implementation phased of all the extraordinary 
interventions, and it had been managed directly from central government.  
The Ordinary Regions had not a relevant role in the First Phase of the Regional 
Development Polices, but their relevance had a significant increase in the second half 
of the Seventies.  The Special Statute Regions (Sardinia and Sicily) did not appear to 
have had different responsibilities in the process of programming and implementation 
                                                      
55 “Cabina di Regia Nazionale” in the original definition. 
56 “Dipartimento Politiche di Sviluppo e Coesione” in the original definition. 
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due to their specific administrative competences. The reason why is that the Law 
creating the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno in 1950 was not giving a relevant role to the 
two Special Statute Regions, instituted three years earlier with the drafting of the 
Italian Constitution (1947).   As well after 1970, the ordinary Regions have had a 
limited role in interacting with the Cassa and Central Government with respect to the 
“extraordinary intervention in the Mezzogiorno”.  The Cassa had periodical 
consultations with the Committee of Regions of Mezzogiorno, but the latter had no 
active role in the definition of priorities and programming of interventions, until the 
entrance into force of Law 183/1976.  The “philosophy” underlying the activities of 
the Cassa and its relations with the other government bodies was based on the idea 
that the Cassa had “extraordinary objectives” and, accordingly, was necessary to 
provide it with extraordinary resources and an extraordinary administrative and 
operating framework.  The progressive empowerment of the regions, the devolution of 
Regional Development responsibilities has been the result of two convergent pressures 
towards institutional change: the European Union was focusing on a more active role 
of the local governments, as well national framework was moving steadily toward 
devolution.   
The evaluation of the last years of the “extraordinary intervention” in the 
Mezzogiorno could help in analysing the general picture of the relations between 
Central and Local Governments in managing regional development policies in Italy.  
One of the major critics to the regional development policies in Italy has been linked 
to the generalized financing of a myriad of small interventions in the last years of 
activity of the Cassa.   
The point to make here is that this is more related to the changed institutional 
framework rather than to specific mismanagement of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno.  
The increasing fragmentation of the expenditures in interventions for regional 
development, that has, in turn, affected the strategic relevance of the interventions, has 
its determinants in the institutional change taking place in those years.  The Law 
64/1986 was devolving to the Regions a relevant role in the programming phase of the 
regional development policies, as well as in the evaluation and selection of projects.  
The lack of administrative capacity of the regions in these activities has led to a 
division of the expenditures in small investments with no evident development 
strategy behind.  The investment in general interest infrastructures is one of the best 
examples of these problems: during the 80s all the interventions have had a local 
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relevance and no investments has been undergone for the development of national and 
interregional networks after the completion of the ones started under the Cassa.    
 
This Chapter has presented the results of the analysis of the regionalization process 
with respect to regional policies.  As the latter had been a totally centralized process 
until the later 70s, no specific evidence raised in terms of the Case Studies identified.  
Accordingly it is possible to infer that the regionalization process had been far 
more effective in political and administrative terms rather than in terms of regional 
policies. A possible explanation could be found in the absence, so far, of an alternative 
paradigm, and moreover, in a significant bias generated by path dependence. 
The next Chapter conversely is focused on Case Studies’ analysis’ results, as the 
Europeanization process.  
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6. THE EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS: POLICY AND 
FINANCIAL ASPECTS 
This Chapter presents the results of the analyses carried out on policy and financial 
variables evolution as a response to the Europeanization adaptational pressure with 
respect of the four case studies identified. 
 
6.1. The rediscovery of industrial districts in theory 
and practice   
This chapter looks briefly at the overall trend toward a decentralized model of 
regional policy in Europe (that constitute possible exogenous factors in promoting the 
change in paradigm), and it also looks at the internal (endogenous) factors that have 
shaped the Italian decentralization of regional development policies.  The thesis, by 
necessity, have to investigate at both exogenous and endogenous factors, but it 
emphasizes the shift in the latter as a means of providing an in-depth analysis of the 
paradigm shift and of its consequences on the structure of regional development 
policies in the country. 
After 1970 constitutional reforms in Belgium, France, and Spain changed the 
nature of the centralised nation-state. In Italy the introduction of a uniform system of 
regional government in 1970 finally brought to fruition the constitutional clauses that 
had remained dormant for over two decades.  In the UK an asymmetrical form of 
devolution—i.e., introducing it in Scotland and Wales but not in other parts of the 
country—was carried out in the latter part of the 1990s. A similar form of 
asymmetrical devolution took place in Portugal with regard to the ultra-peripheral 
regions of the Azores and Madeira following the ratification of the new Portuguese 
Constitution in 1976.  A decade later Greece introduced a decentralisation of its 
central administrative structure in order to accommodate a bottom-up regional 
development strategy. By the 1990s the change in the regional development paradigm 
became a general phenomenon in Europe. The predominance of top-down national 
development policies had been substituted by a bottom-up, regional focus in regional 
development policies. 
The shift in emphasis in development strategies is not only evident at the national 
level; it also characterises development policies being carried out at the European 
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level. This has not always been the case of policies financed at the European level by 
the Structural Funds: Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund 
(ESF) and Agricultural Fund (EAGGF-Guidance). Before 1988 EU regional 
development policies were as centralised as were national regional policies because, to 
a great extent, the role of the European level was conceived as one in which the 
Structural Funds provided a back-up to national regional development programmes 
rather than formulating a completely independent approach to the problems of 
regional development. That perspective changed radically on the heels of the 1988 
reformulation of the regulations of the ERDF, ESF, and EAGGF-Guidance section 
that permitted the launch of the EU’s cohesion policy in 1989. With cohesion policy 
that emphasis was no longer on national development policies but rather on regional 
development policies undertaken with the participation and support of sub-national 
institutional and socio-economic forces.  
The formulation of the role in regional development policies by the European level 
represented a third paradigm shift in that the primacy for some fundamental aspects of 
regional policy were transferred from the national to the European level, especially 
where significant number of Objective 1 regions57 existed (which was the case in Italy 
with in 1989 eight Objective 1 regions out of the total of twenty regions in the entire 
country). 
The EU’s emphasis on the regional role is particularly evident in negotiations with 
the new large member states from central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) where a particular emphasis was placed on the 
creation and functioning of regional bodies as active partners in the implementation of 
cohesion policy. In the thesis it is argued that the shift in the emphasis of EU cohesion 
policy did not take place as a result of the existence of regions but rather as the result 
of the shift in the development paradigm that was not restricted to the Italian case. In 
other words, it represented a broader European phenomenon associated with the 
decline of the notion that central government intervention represented the most 
effective and efficient way of promoting regional development outcomes. Thus, 
during the last fifty years a significant paradigm shift can be seen in the approach to 
                                                      
57 Objective 1 regions refers to those regions with a GDP per capita below 75% of the EU 
average. In 2007 the name was changed to “convergence” regions. The Objective 1 regions or 
the Convergence regions represented those regions receiving the bulk of EU development 
funds. 
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the formulation and implementation of regional policies. This shift is primarily evident 
in aspects of the policy regarding: 
• the policy rationale in the shift from a top-down to a bottom–up approach; 
• small enterprises and service sector initiatives became important components in 
the economic development strategy;  
• the role of sub-national institutions (regions) in the formulation and 
implementation of the policy; 
• the need to promote the participation of socio-economic groups in the policy 
process; 
• the promotion of integrated development programmes involving various 
economic sectors; 
• the adoption of a programmatic approach to the definition of regional 
development policies; 
• the leadership role allocated to programmes financed by EU cohesion policy. 
 
One of the crucial elements that have permitted the shift in development paradigm 
is the creation of political and administrative institutions at the sub-national level 
capable of assuming the responsibility of activating the new decentralized paradigm. 
Once the institutions are present it is possible to engage in bottom-up planning, the 
mobilization of local government and socio-economic forces, and the formulation of 
multi-year programmes.   
In a number of countries, the effectiveness of regional policy was questioned and 
criticised.  Regional policy moved progressively down the national policy agenda, 
downgrading the policy goals of reducing disparities and promoting regional 
convergence.  New industrialization paradigms focussing on the role of small and 
medium enterprises eventually found support from policy makers and economists 
(Ross and Hasher 1981, Piore and Sabel 1984; Garofoli 1991). 
As argued by several scholars (Sharpe 1993 and Leonardi 1995), the “retreat” 
(Bachtler 2001) of central government from active regional and industrial policies was 
accompanied by the rise of a new regional and local dimension to economic 
development.  This was partly attributable to regional institution-building which 
accompanied the increasing delegation of authority for certain economic development 
activities with a view to enhancing local identification with policies and increasing 
local responsibility for economic development. The trend was also due to a growth in 
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“bottom up” initiatives, as local authorities and other groups began to develop and 
implement their own measures to deal with growing economic and social problems.  
At the same time, regional policy thinking was shifting towards the promotion of 
endogenous development – by definition regional or local - with the rediscovery of the 
importance of entrepreneurship and small and medium enterprises (Capellin R., 
Garofoli G and others 1988; Fuà and Zacchia 1982; Cappellin 1990).  The reduced or 
small dimension of enterprises was no longer viewed as a hindrance or transitory stage 
in the development of the firm but rather as a positive characteristic of firms in 
making them capable of quickly shifting their production according to the demands of 
international markets. Smallness was therefore interpreted no longer as an initial phase 
in the transition of the firm but rather a final or stable phase in the life of the firm. 
From the mid-1980s onwards, new concepts of regional development were being 
discussed within the context of a new regional economic development scheme. The 
competitiveness of economies was increasingly attributed to the ability to innovate, 
move into new markets, and shortens the time between the production and distribution 
of manufactured products (i.e., the “just-in-time” approach aimed at the reduction of 
the warehousing of goods and time to bring them to market).  In this context, new 
theories of regional development came to the fore, especially those concerned with 
industrial milieu and the role of clusters and networks.  The challenge for regional 
development was to respond to an increasingly complex mix of regional and local 
problems and the need to develop a more sophisticated approach to improving both 
regional capabilities and attributes with measures that had important social as well as 
economic components. In order to achieve these objectives a new policy response was 
necessary in relation to regional policy. Regions no longer needed to remain as mere 
spectators of development dynamics mobilized from the top; rather, the new economic 
logic required them to become active partners in the planning and mobilization of 
resources in the pursuit of local and regional development.  
Parallel to the shift taking place in the policy paradigm and the drop in the 
importance of regional policy in national policy making, there was a growing interest 
at the European level on the socio-economic consequences of the creation of a 
reinforced European market. Concerns began to be expressed (Delors, 1986; EC 
Periodic Reports) that the creation of an integrated market at the European level would 
give rise to increased regional disparities: i.e., the rich would get richer and the poor 
would get poorer. This concern reached its apex with the formulation of the Single 
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European Act (ratified in 1986 by the twelve member states, including Spain and 
Portugal) and the initiation of a pro-active European regional policy. It was the 1988 
reform of the Structural Funds, which marked a new era in regional strategic planning 
promoted by the European level.  
Picking up on French experience with contrats du plan (State-region planning 
contracts) and the experimentation in regional planning efforts in the northern and 
central regions in Italy, a new approach to regional development planning began to 
emerge. An important step in the formulation of the new approach was the experience 
with the IMPs (Integrated Mediterranean Programmes) financed by the European 
Commission in three southern European member states (Greece, Italy and France)58. 
The IMP experiment began in 1986 (EC Regulation 2088/85) and it quickly gave rise 
to a new way of conceiving regional development policies in these three and 
potentially in other EU and not yet EU member states. The characteristics of the new 
approach were fourfold: the IMPs had a broad sphere of action, covering a range of 
policy sectors: physical and economic infrastructure, business development, human 
resources, tourism, environment etc; the national policy versions tended to encompass 
economic development in all regions, not just those designated for regional policy 
purposes (e.g. the regional strategies in England, regional growth agreements in 
Sweden); they tended to take a pro-active approach to development, with a multi-
annual programme of measures targeted at the business environment and soft 
infrastructure; they had a distinctive approach to policy implementation, which was 
collective/negotiated, led by regional authorities and involving a wide range of 
partners from local government, the voluntary sector, business and social 
communities.  
 
6.2.  Policy design under European approach  
The Europeanization of regional policy in Italy did not follow a clear political or 
administrative direction. It took place in fact as a de facto process when the EU 
cohesion policy effectively replaced in 1992 the national regional policy due to the 
latter’s abolition. Prior to 1992 the introduction of an Europeanized regional policy 
                                                      
58 The IMPs were focused on “changing the ‘industrial atmosphere’ of regional economies”.  The approach has 
been coordinated at the local level through the production of “factors influencing the local economic environment” 
(Leonardi 1993).. 
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(i.e. cohesion policy) represented not a major policy innovation for the country but 
rather a minor irritant that introduced a new philosophy and management approach to 
the task of spurring regional development. The first step in the Europeanization 
process was the introduction in 1986 of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes for 
most of Italy’s regions. At the beginning the IMPs were generally ignored by the 
southern regions that were the beneficiaries of the Intervento Straordinario. Three 
years later when the first cycle of the cohesion policy began most of the IMPs were, 
by necessity, integrated into the regional operational programmes for the 1989-1993 
period. During the period between 1989 and 1992 no major restructuring of national 
decision-making and policy implementation structures were undertaken. In fact, it was 
the regions that were called upon to create a regional policy administration to manage 
the operational programmes that was not necessary for the implementation for 
benefitting from investments carried out by Agensud or the Cassa. Therefore, the 
introduction of the European regional policy through the Structural Funds had its most 
immediate impact on the regions by challenging them to manage autonomously, for 
the first time, substantial resources for integrated operational programmes. This 
process, however, took place in a rather incoherent manner and without any sort of 
central guidance. In essence, the regions were left to their own fate and had to manage 
by themselves to organise over time a learning processes that would lead to more 
efficient and effective management (Nanetti 1986). It is no wonder then that most of 
the regional operational programmes were accepted by the Commission two to three 
years after the start of the programming cycle and by the end of 1993 most of the 
regions had spent less than one half of their allocated budgets. 
At the national level Europeanization of regional policy required a two-step 
process. First, the Intervento Straordinario had to be wound down involving the 
closing down of the administrative units and redistributing the existing personnel that 
had been allocated the task before 1992. That process was only brought to completion 
in 1994-1995 once the controversy on state aids was settled with the Commission. 
Thus, 1995 represented a radical break with an almost forty-year tradition of state 
policies for regional development in the Mezzogiorno and, even more dramatically, an 
end to an important cultural and political tradition of “meridionalismo”—that is, a 
tradition that had placed uppermost on the national political agenda the objective of 
developing the South economically and socially. 
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Secondly, new institutions had to be created, as I have discussed above, to manage 
the new policy at the national level and a new approach had to be introduced in the 
interaction between national and regional political structures and administration in the 
management of the policy. 
The innovations introduced by Structural Funds programming and implementation 
had a major impact on domestic intergovernmental relationships. As a formally 
regionalized state with a traditionally highly state-centric style of policy-making, the 
Italian state government lost power in Structural Funds programming in favour of 
regional governments. However, the focus of political attention on regulatory 
alignments and the urgency of programming practices – within the context of the 
breakdown of the political system after 1992 - defined this early stage of 
Europeanization and forced the central government to play catch-up in trying to come 
to terms with the administrative implications of the policy and the need to become an 
active player in the multi-level system of governance required by the policy. The 
result was a substantial lack of innovation. As a matter of fact, many observers view 
this stage in Europeanization as characterized by a significant policy void. Authors 
like Giannola (2000a, 2000b) and Viesti (2001), for instance, have pointed to the fact 
that the end of the Intervento Straordinario led to a total absence of any policy for the 
Mezzogiorno until at least 1996 (Viesti 2001). Such observations stand in harsh 
contrast with views that the end of the Intervento Straordinario -- supported by what 
has been considered by some to be the subject of the "fancy analyses of the 1980s" 
(Giannola 2000a) -- as an opportunity to turn towards more region-specific modes of 
development (Nanetti, 1996) and for a resurgence of the Mezzogiorno (cf. D'Antonio 
1985) after having escaped from the stifling clutches of the central bureaucracy. Taken 
altogether, these factors have determined the peculiar features of the policy-making 
environment that characterized the first stage of, on the one hand, the Europeanization 
and, on the other, the de-nationalization of Italian regional policy. This can be best 
described as a phase of “chaotic intergovernmental relationships” (Gualini 2004). 
Under these conditions, which resemble a situation of `radical uncertainty', state actors 
were characterized by incapacity to act strategically. For both state and regional 
administrations, this appears to have been above all a phase of grouping towards a 
new pattern of centre-periphery relationships and the introduction of new procedures 
in a context where the regulatory inputs were external in nature where there was a 
relative absence of domestic normative inputs from the central government As a 
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consequence, the dominant `nested' pattern of intergovernmental relationships was not 
yet significantly affected. Relationships remained formally defined by a basic 
hierarchical rationale of state-regional relationships. But in reality, the first steps were 
being taken by the regions to exploit the new role gained in the process of Structural 
Funds programming and in the new system of multi-level governance. However, given 
the lack of formal initiatives on the side of central administrations, the multi-level 
system of government introduced a latent form of competition between the regional 
and national level in interpreting the rules and regulations introduced by Brussels or at 
best a system of mutual vetoing of autonomous initiatives vis-à-vis the Commission 
undertaken by either level of national or regional government.  
As suggested in Gualini (2004), “the first stage in the Europeanization of Italian 
regional policy was marked by the dominance of exogenous rationales”. Institutional 
change was induced by the need of reacting to exogenous factor. The process of 
institutional change that developed “resembled the dominance of modes of 
intergovernmental interaction that Scharpf (2000) calls `hierarchical direction'” 
(Gualini 2004). This is well expressed by the dominant role in affecting change played 
by the alignment of national legislation to the new orientation of EU competition 
policy - whereby competencies are centralized at the supranational level in form of the 
quasi-judicial, non-negotiated mode of enforcement pursued by the Commission's 
Directorate for competition policy. The intergovernmental interaction is thus defined 
by “the dominance of bilateral national-supranational relationships within a perceived 
`nested' systems” (Gualini 2004), with a “leakage” outside of the system towards other 
levels of government. 
As a matter of fact, this first stage of institutionalization was defined essentially in 
reactive and adaptive terms. This is apparent in the constraints to innovation in the 
intergovernmental practices related to EU cohesion policy and national regional  
policy and  the rationale of reform which In Hall's terms, this initial stage in the 
Europeanization of Italian regional policy may be characterized as `first order change', 
that is, as a stage "whereby instrument settings are changed in the light of experience 
and new knowledge, while the overall goals and instruments of policy remain the 
same" (Hall 1993). First order change, accordingly, "is likely to display the features of 
instrumentalism, satisfying, and routinized decision making that I normally associate 
with the policy process" (Hall 1993). This aspect highlights the relevance of aspects of 
path-dependency in defining resistance to change at the meso level. The seeds for the 
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transformation of Italian regional policy into a multilevel policy space resided in the 
evolution of intergovernmental practices that - particularly through the regionalization 
of competencies and the re-embedding of policy measures in ordinary administrative 
procedures - had progressively eroded the legitimacy of the state-centric rationale of 
the Intervento Straordinario. With the reforms aligning Italian policies to the EU 
cohesion policy framework in the 1990s, as analysed in Gualini (2004) “the 
`periphery' of the `policy space' represented by the progressive development of 
subnational responsibilities and abilities progressively delegitimized the original `core' 
represented by the rationale of state-centric policy direction, taking over its role”. The 
"radical change emerged from a paradox: a clear break with the past was built on 
previous policy experiences" (Hooghe 1996). The process of institutionalization is a 
result of mismatch between the deconstruction of an old order and the development of 
a new order of relationships. Precisely this difficult process was to become the focus 
of a further stage of Europeanization of Italian regional policy. 
A second stage in Europeanization began after the 1993 reform of the Structural 
Funds, along with the start of the second programming period. The so-called “Delors 
II” package introduced a revamping of central state and a step back from some of the 
most significant elements of 'multi-level' decentralization of the programming process 
pursued by the Commission (Hooghe 1996).59 In Italy, this coincided with three 
important developments: the settling of controversies with the Commission on state 
aids schemes; the set up of a new regional support framework; the redefinition of state 
competencies on regional programming.  
Altogether, these “three developments represented in particular important 
measures in a process of regaining a 'gatekeeping' role  by the state administration” 
(Gualini 2004), through the restructuring of programming competencies, the building 
and consolidation of internal expertise, and the rise of new actors within the newly 
designated authority in European-regional programming, i.e. the Ministry of 
                                                      
59 The view that the member-states gained back some of their role in the 1993 reform of the Structural Funds 
regulation has to be taken with a big grain of salt given that in 1989-1993 the member states were not obliged to 
undertake an independent evaluation of their programme and the roles of reporting were never adequately enforced. As 
a consequence, the member-states were given more than ten years to finally document their programme expenditures. 
However, in the subsequent period, 1994-1999, ex-post evaluation was finally introduced and as a result of the 1996 
redrafting of the regulations a tighter control over reporting of expenditures was introduced. See Leonardi 2005,  
Chapter 1. 
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Budgeting, could not overcome completely the process of policy learning and 
institutionalization in lover levels of government, namely the Europeanization process. 
What was notable in this process was that the relationships between state and the 
regions - supported by an emergent performance-oriented discourse - tended to 
become more competitive, but within an overall programming environment geared 
towards a normalization of national performance scores and combining regional self-
interest with a new acknowledgment of the virtues of the intergovernmental 
partnership. Accordingly, there was a progressive shift from an interconnected pattern 
of relationships in order to develop cooperative programming practices. As Gualini 
(2004) suggests it could be described as “a 'cooperative -competitive' climate of 
programming”.  This emerging attitude can be considered the incipit of a new strategy, 
introduced from 1996 onwards under the centre-left coalition governments. With such 
a conflicted background the hypothesis of progressive reform in institutions emerges 
as an alternative to deadlock in constitutional reform. 
The key feature of this stage of Europeanization is the increasing ability of state 
actors to introduce elements of “normative institutionalization” (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991), i.e. to develop internally rule innovations within an existing space of 
governance. With respect of the present research, the endogenous factor of change in 
this phase could be identified in the ability of actors in responding to exogenous 
changes by acting on intergovernmental interactions in order to clarify and redefine 
policy rules and the role of actors. 
“A significant example of this is given by the modes of interaction underlying the 
application of the bilateral agreements between the Ministry of Budgeting and the 
Commission's Directorate for regional and cohesion policy, the so-called `Masera-
Wulf-Mathies agreements'” (Gualini 2004). In Hall's terms, the approach was 
therefore characteristic of `second order policy change', whereby "the instruments of 
policy as well as their settings are altered in response to past experience even though 
the overall goals remain the same" (Hall 1993). The introduction of redistributive 
arguments related to aims of national efficiency testifies of the development of new 
strategic attitudes towards regional performance on the side of state actors. 
Supranational actors such as the Commission were allocated the role as partners in 
directing sub-national actors to assume a more efficient and accountable courses of 
action and defining strategy for multi-level institutional capacity building, within EU 
policy rationales. While the mode of interaction adopted presented “features of a form 
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of intergovernmental negotiation” (Scharpf 2000) it nevertheless contained potential 
for generating different intergovernmental relations. 
This stage of policy change can be identified in a “predominantly dualistic pattern of 
relationships” (Gualini 2004), and it outcome was marginal as far as intuitional 
interactions are concerned. On the one hand, it marked the introduction of a new 
strategic approach to “local development” on the other hand; it introduced a 
significant recentralization of power and control.  The bundling of competencies in 
matters of “negotiated programming” strengthened in fact the regulatory, monitoring 
and implementation actor of the Ministry of the Treasury as a “gatekeeper” in a multi-
level governance system. The Ministry had the chance to use its administrative 
instruments to overrule or generate moral suasion on lower levels of governments, this 
happened in areas of local programming under regional competence as well. The 
result was an increased tension in intergovernmental relations. Accordingly, in 
subsequent stages of intergovernmental relations “building multi-level governance” 
became a preeminent goal. 
From 1996 onwards, a new strategy informed the policy initiatives of the centre-
left-cabinets that - between 1995 and 2001 – were in charge of national government. 
The new strategy, centred on the idea of a “negotiated” approach to programming, was 
extended throughout all levels of the partnership that contribute to both a `vertical' 
(that is, intergovernmental) as well as “horizontal” (that is, state-society based) 
interpretation of subsidiarity.  The new approach was emerging from the growing 
experience with cohesion and regional policy. In first place, new regulatory rationales 
progressively contributed to move away from a policy of mere reactions to exogenous 
factors. Practices of “negotiated programming” provided new means for enabling local 
initiatives and for promoting regionalization as a bottom-up dynamic, but also the 
operational conditions for linking development-oriented policies across multi-level 
jurisdictions within a framework of responsibilities respectful of principles of 
subsidiarity. In the second place, the emergence of multi-level polities and arenas was 
associated with important shifts in modes of governance: the development of a 
concerted and negotiated policy style, and the political rationalization of `local 
development' discourse within a broader reframing of state-local relationships.  
The institutional changes in view of a policy of “negotiated programming” within 
a multi-level framework, ranging from state-regional agreements to local initiatives, 
aimed at redefining the “gatekeeping” role of the state administration at “the centre of 
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a system of relationships capable of connecting EU policy with local realities by 
fostering more effective forms of partnership” (Gualini 2004). Implementing 
decentralized policy tools, e.g. “Patti territorial” (territorial pacts) and the “contratti 
d’area” (area contracts or agreements), subject to a more comprehensive redefinition  
of intergovernmental relationships resulted as a policy approach capable of offering an 
answer to Trigilia “paradox of the regions”, pointing to the need for of understanding  
the territory as economic resource as well as promoting a proactive, territory-centred 
renewal of state-society relationships (Trigilia 1991). 
This, on the one hand, has led state administrations to take initiatives those 
substantially by-passed disagreements over regional competencies (as in the case of 
the introduction of the first Patti territorial) and that, by and large, anticipated the 
resolution of important aspects of Italian `dilemma of regionalism'. On the other hand, 
however, it has allowed state actors to consolidate their strategy along a series of key 
moves:- the promotion of a cooperative climate and of a working consensus - 
particularly among the more dependent southern regions - on the need for innovative 
and effective aggregate programming approaches in order to exploit the upcoming 
2000-2006 round of Structural Funds funding (the so-called 'Delors III', possibly 
representing the last important period of Community support for the Mezzogiorno 
regions); - a progressive “embeddedment of programming into a polyarchic multi-
level design” (Gualini 2004));- the assumption of  a multi-level design of cooperative 
relationships as a model for state-local relationships, within the approach of 
`administrative federalism'.. 
It is in this sense that, as has been argued (Giannola 2001a), `New Programming' 
conferred a new legitimization of public intervention in the Mezzogiorno, favouring 
the merging between a policy discourse on local development and a policy discourse 
on state-led regional programming.  
This stage introduced a major change in the pattern of Europeanization of Italian 
regional policy. “First and second order change can be seen as cases of `normal 
policymaking', namely as a process that adjusts policy without challenging the overall 
terms of a given policy paradigm, much like `normal science'. Third order change, by 
contrast, is likely to reflect a very different process, marked by radical changes in the 
overarching terms of policy discourse associated with a 'paradigm shift'”. (Hall 1999) 
Third shift, accordingly, is, rather, a process of an endogenous nature, inherent to 
the dimension of policy-making as an activity in the social construction of meanings 
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(March and Olsen 1989).  The third stage of the Europeanization of Italian regional 
policy started along with the reform of the Structural Funds and the start of a new 
programming period, and the institutional structure that emerged was informed by the 
lead taken by state actors, as they turned it into an occasion for redefining their role. 
The ability of state actors to move, subject to European policy making framework and 
progressive Europeanization of institutions, led to the consolidation of their role in a 
multi-level governance model. The success factor for state actors can be identified in 
the dominant position acquired by means of procedural and organizational skills, and 
to extend such skills towards. Two aspects were critical in the implementation of 
intergovernmental interactions and in developing effects of institutionalization: the 
assumption of social partnership as an expression of a “shift towards a multilateral, 
interconnected system of intergovernmental relationships” (Gualini 2004); and the 
importance attributed to a consensual style of policy-making attuned to the new 
system of relationships. 
Preeminent importance can be given to the relevance assumed by reference to 
transnational policy as a source for legitimization of state action. This has been 
particularly relevant in the case of measures in which policy change and innovation 
has found a determinant support at European level. “Programmatic 
institutionalization” can be considered as a mature stage in institutional change. In the 
terms of state-local relationships interconnection established between “institutional 
capacity and institutional legitimacy” (Gualini 2004) consolidated the state's role 
within a concerted multi-level governance, as a guarantee of aggregate institutional 
performance. In the terms of state-society relationships the role it attributed to state 
mediation between supranational policies and territorial needs defined a perspective of 
multi-level governance locally oriented. 
Accordingly, the programmatic institutionalization of “Europeanized” regional 
policy in Italy developed the potential of constituting a new political space, a “site of 
collective governance'” (Stone Sweet et al. 2001). 
 
6.3. Case studies’ analysis and evaluation 
This paragraph addresses the analysis and evaluation of devolution in the financial 
dimension, as discussed in the methodological Chapter. Specifically, the analysis 
investigates the sources of funds, namely the proportion between Central and Local 
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Government resources allocated to regional policy as a variable to identify possible 
different outcome sin the devolution process in the four case studies. 
 
6.3.1.  Policy choices: sector priorities and policy implementation  
This chapter presents the results of the analysis carried out on the regional policy 
interventions and the related expenditures in the period examined. In order to do that, 
the analysis is focused on the national and regional contribution to the regional 
policies financing. In the next pages no analysis is provided on the use and allocation 
of EU funds as, although extremely relevant for regional development, do not 
supporting to answer our question focused on national dynamics. 
Though provided for in the 1948 Constitution, Italy's regions have become an 
effective tier of government only since the 1970s.  Their key feature is the power to 
legislate.  The extent of this power differs however between the two classes into which 
they are divided: 15 "ordinary statute" and 5 "special statute" authorities.  With respect 
of this research, as indicated in Chapter 2, I will focus on two ordinary regions 
(Calabria and Puglia) and two Special Statute regions (Sicily and Sardinia) in 
presenting the data on how the national regional policy was translated into action at 
the regional level in four southern regions60.  
The Ordinary regions were established in 1970.  Initially their role was restricted, 
with little real devolution of tasks.  During the 1970s and 1980s their functions were 
extended, especially in 1978 when they took on responsibility for the country's health 
service, the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale (SSN).  For ordinary regions, the most 
important legislative powers still concern the health sector.  Other areas for which they 
can legislate include social welfare; training and vocational education; town planning; 
public housing; economic development; tourism and cultural activities; agriculture, 
forestry and mining; regional public transport; public works and environment.  During 
the 1990s new functions have been assigned to them notably including the 
implementation of European Union regulations and policies. 
                                                      
60 The data presented in this chapter are the average annual figures for the following periods: 1971-1975; 1976-
80; 1981-1985; 1986-1990; 1991-1995, 1996-2000.  The calculation has been made with the aim of allowing an 
immediate comparison with the figures presented for the analysis of the interventions of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno 
in the previous chapter. Results presented are elaboration of primary data collected by the author. 
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Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 presented below show how the “current expenditures” 
progressively increased over time, but at a slower pace during the last fifteen years.  
The breakdown between Capital and Current expenditures remained broadly constant, 
showing a slow trend toward a reduction of capital expenditures beginning in 1991. 
The data lend credence to the criticism of the use of Structural Funds in Italy: they do 
not represent “additional” expenditures in the field of capital expenditures but rather 
the substitute for capital expenditures by the regions and the national government. 
Thus the relationship between current and capital expenditures has not substantially 
changed from 1989 onward. Instead, it has declined in favour of current expenditures. 
In Puglia and Calabria capital expenditures after 1991 declined 6% from the previous 
level of 32% to 24%, illustrative of the “crowding out effect” that European capital 
funding has had in relation to national investments. 
Table 6.1 Current and capital expenditures in Calabria and Puglia 1971-2000 (figures in 
Meuro and percentages, current prices) 
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-1985 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
 Current expenditures   786,84  1.639,31  2.316,90  3.762,94  6.180,11  6.938,50  
 Capital expenditures   391,36  920,51  1.047,34  1.741,33  1.971,21  2.340,17  
 Total  1.178,20  2.559,81  3.364,24  5.504,27  8.151,32  9.278,66  
 
       
 Structure of Uses  1971-75 1976-80 1981-1985 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
 Current expenditures  67% 64% 69% 68% 76% 75% 
 Capital expenditures  33% 36% 31% 32% 24% 25% 
 Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author’s calculation on Official Regional Budget data, various years 
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Figure 6.1 Ordinary regions: structure of expenditures (current prices) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on Official Regional Budget data, various years 
 
The findings confirm the critical relevance of the expenditures in the health sector.  
Its relative size (Table 6.2) rises from 46% in 1976 to over than 60% in 2000.  Other 
interesting outcomes of the analysis are in the sharp reduction of the expenditures for 
the economic sectors covered by the Structural Funds. Agriculture goes from 16% to 
8% and vocational education from 6 to 2% while industry, tourism and transport do 
not change over the period. 
Table 6.2 Structure of expenditures in Calabria and Puglia 1971-2000  
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-1985 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
 General administration  4% 3% 4% 5% 5% 5% 
 Education  3% 4% 3% 2% 1% 1% 
 Vocational training  6% 3% 4% 3% 2% 2% 
 Social assistance  2% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 
 Health  46% 51% 50% 53% 65% 63% 
 Agriculture, Forestry, etc.  16% 16% 13% 13% 8% 8% 
 Industry, commerce, craftsmanship  1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 
 Tourism  1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 
 Transport  6% 2% 6% 6% 4% 6% 
 Territory  5% 5% 5% 8% 6% 4% 
 Housing  11% 10% 10% 5% 7% 8% 
       
 Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author’s calculation on Official Regional Budget data, various years 
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The Special Statute regions have an even broader range of functions, enshrined in 
specific legislation with constitutional guarantees.  Their financing arrangements are 
also distinctive.  They draw on sources not available to ordinary regions - in particular, 
a share of central government's income tax and VAT.  The two Special statute regions 
present initial conditions that are very similar to those described in the previous 
paragraph. However, the path followed in the subsequent years is dramatically 
different (see Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2). 
Figure 6.2 Special statute regions: structure of expenditures (current prices) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on Official Regional Budget data, various years 
 
As shown in Table 6.3, the special statute regions have increased the current 
expenditures of about twenty times in the twenty-five years subject to analysis.  The 
capital expenditures have increased little more than 100%. Accordingly, the structure 
of the expenditure breakdown has been subject to an inversion between the capital and 
the current part. The move from capital to current expenditures and the role that 
national and EU funding have played in the provision of regional capital expenditures 
represent a key issue to be examined below. 
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Table 6.3 Financial expenditures in Sardinia and Sicily 1971-2000 (figures in Meuro and 
percentages, current prices) 
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-1985 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
 Current expenditures   454,85  1.022,04  2.856,10  5.716,17  10.037,03  11.301,52  
 Capital expenditures   786,52  1.105,28  1.887,05  4.147,80   3.789,98  2.757,26  
 Total  1.241,37  2.127,32  4.743,15  9.863,97  13.827,01  14.058,78  
       
 Structure of Uses  1971-75 1976-80 1981-1985 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
 Current expenditures  37% 48% 60% 58% 73% 80% 
 Capital expenditures  63% 52% 40% 42% 27% 20% 
 Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author’s calculation on Official Regional Budget data, various years 
 
The increase in current expenditures took place at the same time in the two 
“special regions”, and represented an increase of about 24 times the initial level of 
expenditures (end of period compared to the start of the data series). With respect to 
the sector of intervention (Table 6.4), the health sector is the most relevant, but its 
relative importance is not subject to the same sharp increase present in the ordinary 
regions. This is understandable, given that the special statute regions have had since 
the beginning a larger and more continuous responsibility in the sector. The data 
highlight a lower standard deviation in the breakdown of different regional 
interventions compared with the ordinary regions: the expenditures are more 
uniformly distributed among the other sectors, excluding health. It is noticeable the 
reduction in agricultural expenditure, due to a structural changes in the economy at the 
regional, as well as at national levels. 
Table 6.4 Structure of expenditures in Sicily and Sardinia 1971-2000  
Structure of expenditures        
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-1985 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
 General administration  8% 8% 8% 10% 13% 18% 
 Education  3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3% 
 Vocational training  5% 3% 5% 6% 7% 6% 
 Social assistance  3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 2% 
 Health  43% 43% 42% 37% 43% 47% 
 Agriculture, Forestry, etc.  17% 21% 17% 14% 11% 9% 
 Industry, commerce, 
craftsmanship  
5% 3% 4% 5% 5% 5% 
 Tourism  2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 1% 
 Transport  4% 4% 5% 5% 2% 3% 
 Territory  7% 3% 5% 7% 6% 3% 
 Housing  3% 7% 4% 5% 3% 3% 
 Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author’s calculation on Official Regional Budget data, various years 
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Besides their legislative role, it is relevant to state that both typologies of regional 
authorities are responsible (as noted earlier) for regulating, planning, and monitoring 
the work of provinces and communes, and for helping to finance their activities. 
Expenditures for the activities of the sub-regional institutions fall under the heading of 
“territory”.  The Constitution lays down that the regional authority should act mainly 
through "indirect administration", in other words through an agency relationship with 
provinces and communes, rather than to try to duplicate what they do.  Recent 
devolution measures have brought this approach into focus.   
 
6.3.2. The sources of regional funding 
The revenues of Italy's regional authorities, in parallel with their expenditure, have 
increased considerably over the decade in absolute terms but they have remained 
generally constant as a share of GDP.  At just under 14% of GDP, their share was 
exactly the same in 1998 as in 1989.  Figure 6.3 and 6.5 indicate how the structure of 
these sub-central revenues has evolved, in current-price terms, over years.  Two broad 
trends may however be distinguished: firstly transfers from the central State to 
regional and local authorities seem to have dropped back sharply since the early 
1990s, whilst secondly their income from taxation has soared.  In particular, their 
reported tax revenues have been reduced by more than three-quarters between 1997 
and 1998 when new fiscal powers came into effect.   
Until the late 1990s the fiscal capacity of Italy's regional authorities was limited.  
Indeed, ordinary regions had almost no taxation power before 1989, depending instead 
on a plethora of specific grants - dominated by the huge health service allocation - and 
two small general grants.  Special regions were financed from the start by shares of 
national taxation.  While shares could in some cases reach 100% of the relevant 
regional tax yield, this system of course did not offer fiscal autonomy.   
From 1989 a series of reforms began to extend the range of tax sources available 
to regional authorities, adding for example a surcharge on national petrol tax, and later 
a share of it; a tax on vehicle circulation and ownership, with discretion over its rate; 
environmental taxes including a tax on acoustic pollution; and the personal health 
service levy or "contribution", formerly accruing to the central treasury.  Apart from 
the latter health contribution, however, yields from the new regional taxes remained 
quite minor up to the late 1990s.  For "ordinary" regions in 1996, for example, the 
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health levy made up three-quarters of total income from taxes, while the State's health 
service grant represented 88% of all transfers these regions received from it. 
Ordinary regions present initial conditions characterized by a very limited 
financial autonomy (about 3% of the total resources).  The dependence from Central 
Government transfers remains relevant up to 1996.  In year 2000 the impacts of the 
fiscal devolution undergone in 1997 and 1999 are more evident as the revenues 
breakdown is close to 60%. 
Figure 6.3 Ordinary regions. Revenues breakdown 1976-2000 (current prices) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on Official Regional Budget data, various years 
 
Table 6.5 presents the evolution of the financial autonomy of the two ordinary regions 
considered in the analysis, through the representative years considered. 
Table 6.5 Structure of regional revenues in Calabria and Puglia 1971-2000(figures in 
Meuro and percentages, current prices) 
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-1985 1986-90 1991-95 1996-
2000 
 Own sources  39,75   51,16  196,72   237,28  1.070,33   2.339,65  
Central Gov’t Transfers  1.238,95  2.194,27  2.918,42   4.811,26   6.247,66   5.356,17  
 Total 1.278,70   2.245,42   3.115,13   5.048,54  7.317,99   7.695,83  
       
 Structure of the 
Sources  
1971-75 1976-80 1981-1985 1986-90 1991-95 1996-
2000 
 Own sources  3% 2% 6% 5% 15% 30% 
 Central Gov’t transfers  97% 98% 94% 95% 85% 70% 
 Total       100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author’s calculation on Official Regional Budget data, various years 
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Special statute regions have had their responsibilities defined since the drafting of 
Italian constitution in 1947. However, their level of financial autonomy in 1976 was 
still below 50%.  Only recently, with further constitutional amendments and 
administrative regulations the Own revenues of the two regions considered have been 
amounting more than 80% of the total regional revenues. 
Figure 6.4 Special statute regions. Revenues breakdown 1976-2000 (current prices) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation on Official Regional Budget data, various years 
 
Table 6.6 presents data confirming the dramatic change in the path of regional 
financial autonomy in the last four years examined.  The same has been the case in 
ordinary regions. 
Table 6.6 Structure of regional revenues in Sicily and Sardinia 1971-2000 (figures in 
Meuro and percentages, current prices) 
 1971-75 1976-80 1981-1985 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
 Own sources  477,03 1.236,13 2.866,05 6.059,26 9.520,23 9.333,93 
 Central Government Transfers  704,23 1.660,19 2.762,33 4.835,37 5.472,49 3.980,44 
 Total 1.181,26 2.896,32 5.628,38 10.894,63 14.992,72 13.314,36 
       
 Structure of the Sources  1971-75 1976-80 1981-1985 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 
 Own sources  40% 43% 51% 56% 63% 70% 
 Central Government Transfers  60% 57% 49% 44% 37% 30% 
 Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author’s calculation on Official Regional Budget data, various years 
 
Looking at both types of regional authorities, regions have control of these various 
income sources.  It has to be noticed that the stabilization of Italy's local government 
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financial regime in the late 1970s and early 1980s involved high levels of central 
grants, as I have seen, amounting to some 80% of the budgets of provinces and 
communes.  At first this massive input of grants was distributed simply on the basis of 
their historic spending.  Some equalization rules were introduced in the early 1980s 
but they were fairly simple and ad hoc, subject to annual change. 
Major reform of the grant system in 1993, associated with the launch of a new 
communal property tax (ICI), set up three funds for central support of current 
spending on the part of the two tiers of local government: the ordinary, consolidated 
and fiscal equalization funds.  The reform provided also for an ordinary and a special 
fund to support these authorities' capital investment, but little use has so far been made 
of them.   
